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ABSTRACT 
THE STATE AND UNIVERSITY: THE "ISLAMIC CULTURAL REVOLUTION" 
IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF IRAN, 1980-87 
Shahrzad Mojab, Ph. D. 
College of Education 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991 
Advisor, Dr. Steve Tozer 
The thesis is a study of the Islamic Cultural Revolution initiated by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in 1981 in order to Islamize the institutions of higher education. Data are 
based on official documents, participant observation, interviews and press reports. 
The universities played a vital and vanguard role in the anti-Monarchy revolution of 
1978-79. Led by leftist and nationalist students and faculty, the institutions advocated 
university autonomy and the establishment of a secular, democratic and independent state 
system. Politically, the ICR was the Islamic state's attempt to remove the opposition from 
the universities and to integrate the institutions into the Islamic state. Ideologically, it aimed 
at desecularizing the institutions and turning them into ideologically loyal institutions. The 
leftist students/faculty/staff were purged, strict political and ideological screening was placed 
on admissions and employment and student/faculty behaviour was closely monitored. 
Clergymen were appointed to administrative/teaching positions, males and females were 
segregated and Islamic ideology courses were introduced in all fields of study. The most 
ambitious plan was to restructure the universities along the tradition of Shi'ite Islamic schools 
known as Howze and to combine expertise with commitment to Islam. 
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The main finding of this study is that the Islamic Cultural Revolution has failed. In 
spite of superficial reforms, the universities have not changed in terms of function (training 
highly skilled labor for a diversifying capitalist economy and an expanding state 
bureaucracy), teaching/learning methods (experimentation and observation), curriculum 
(predominantly secular content aimed at training professionals), and the absence of academic 
and political freedom. 
The ICR was conducted by a state that had monopoly over education, was in control 
of the country's industry and economy, had silenced the opposition forces and the media, and 
was headed by a still popular figure, Khomeini. Moreover, Islam boasts a long tradition of 
higher learning. The failure of Islamization in an Islamic society having gone through an 
"Islamic revolution" is explained in terms of fundamental constraints on the state: economic 
ties between education, economy and the state, opposition to state policy, and factional 
conflict within the state. The theoretical implications of the Iranian case for the study of 
state-university relations are discussed. 
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PREFACE 
The modern state, in both developed Western capitalist societies and the Third World, 
plays an increasingly important role in shaping the destinies of the citizens. The dominant 
position of the state is readily visible in many Third World countries where the public sector 
owns and runs the entire educational system, major economic enterprises and the mass media 
while the government openly denies or suppresses political freedoms. A much less visible 
appearance disguises the equally omnipotent state in advanced capitalist societies where the 
private sector dominates the economy, the educational system and the media. Quite often, 
the "private sector", "free enterprise" or "free market" are used synonymously with 
"democracy" which is, itself, defined as the absence of government interference in the life of 
the individual or, rather, business community. 
Theorizing about the nature of the state is a serious challenge. Much of the 
traditional, liberal-pluralist, scholarship is characterized by a simplistic approach to the 
nature of the state. In advanced capitalist societies, focus on the state has been lacking in 
part because the absence of formal or legal ties between, for example, the universities (or the 
economy) and the state have rendered the examination of such relationships irrelevant. 
Likewise, in Third World countries, the presence of an omnipotent state is taken for granted. 
However, the main problem in studies of state and education is not an inadequate focus on 
the relationship itself. The liberal-pluralist scholarship on the topic is, rather, plagued by a 
view of the state that reduces its relationship with non-state forms of social organization to 
formal or legal ties. This perspective views the state as virtually independent of, neutral and 
above all centers of power such as the social class, the church and the educational 
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establishment. 
Alternative, critical, approaches have fared much better in so far as they do attempt to 
discern ties between education, social class, economic system and political power. In recent 
years, the nature of the state (in capitalist societies) has attracted much debate in ever-
diversifying Marxist studies. The classical Marxist position considers the state as both a 
product of class society (e.g. the state in capitalist society represents the capitalist class) and 
a promoter of capitalist relations of production. In this view, the state is not independent of 
or above production relations or social classes. Rather the state, together with other 
superstructural phenomena (such as ideology, education, mass media, science, art, etc.) 
actively serves the economic base. 
The Marxist theory of the state has undergone numerous refinements in recent years. 
Many issues such as the relationship between the social class and the state, hegemony, 
legitimation, economy and the state, the reproduction of the social system, autonomy of the 
state, etc. are being widely debated. Interestingly, while the main debate between Marxism 
and liberal-pluralist theories has centered on the autonomy of the state, it seems that the 
major controversy within current Marxist studies (in the West at least) is also over the same 
issue. This dissertation attempts to contribute to this debate (the autonomy of the state) by 
examining state/education relations in revolutionary Iran. 
The Iranian revolution of 1978-79, generally known as the "Islamic Revolution," 
posed a serious challenge to the world of scholarship. The academic world has been 
criticized, justifiably, for failing to predict the fall of the Monarchy whose despotism was 
either ignored or glorified by most Western specialists of Iran. Iranian specialists failed to 
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see, among a plethora of indicators, the powerful student movement, the succession of 
revolutionary struggles in twentieth century Iran, the multi-ethnic nature of Iranian society 
and the significance of Western domination over Iran. More striking was the failure of the 
academia to discern the inherent weakness of a much hated monarchy, an apparently 
powerful but, essentially, shaky state structure. 
When the monarchy was replaced by the Islamic state the academia, to quote a 
Persian proverb, "fell out of the frying pan into the Are." If before the Revolution, 
academic specialists explained developments in Iranian society as a function of the 
"modernizing" Pahlavi monarch, they appealed, after the revolution, to the elixir of religion 
and Islam in explaining not only Iranian society but also the entire Muslim world. Non-
Marxists quickly revised their theories to include religion rather than "secularism" or 
"modernity" as an engine of historical change. Anti-Marxists (e.g. Aronowitz 1981) rushed 
to inflict the last blow on class struggle theories and historical materialism. Western states 
and mass media raised the threat of "Islamic fundamentalism" to the level of "international 
terrorism." 
The academia's glorification of Pahlavi monarchy is, in fact, dwarfed by their 
inability to comprehend the failure of the "Islamic Revolution." The continuing flood of 
academic literature on Iran, ten years after the Revolution, is pre-occupied with assessing the 
Islamic revolution as a successful one. The former "monarchy-loving* Iranians are now 
depicted as unrepentant Muslim zealots moved into action only by a call to or from Allah. If 
the academics failed to understand the mortality of the monarchical state, they fail now to 
grasp the dismal failure of the Islamic state in Islamizing Iranian society. 
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In spite of countless indisputable facts, academics fail to see that Iranians are like all 
other nations, an essentially secular people; that the Islamic state, in spite of a once popular 
leader like Khomeini and a colossal machinery of repression built under his direction, has 
miserably failed in Islamizing Iranian society; that "Islamization" was a plan devised and 
promoted by only a fraction of the Islamic clergy; that dissent against the Islamic state has 
extended to Islam itself. In questioning the legitimacy of the Islamic state, many Iranians, 
middle and lower class, question the very legitimacy of a religion that they have upheld and 
respected for centuries. 
It is not the objective of this dissertation to examine all the obstacles-ideological, 
political, theoretical-that have contributed to the unsatisfactory performance of contemporary 
scholarship on Iran. While the dissertation is not a study of Iran's 1978-79 revolution, it 
deals with the most ambitious Islamization effort of the Islamic state-the reform of higher 
education-called the Islamic Cultural Revolution. This study examines the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution from its onset in April 1980 to 1987. This is the period of climax of the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution, a period during which the architects of Islamization, the maktabi 
Islamists, were ruling over the campuses. 
In order to examine the Islamic Cultural Revolution within the historical context of 
Iranian society, the monarchical period has also been covered. Thus, this study provides a 
rather detailed account of the Islamic Cultural Revolution and attempts an explanation of the 
failure of this "Revolution." While one of the latest academic studies of "Islamic Revolution" 
(Farhi 1990:106) contends that the Islamic state has succeeded in Islamizing Iranian culture, 
this dissertation tries to demonstrate the total failure of the most ambitious Islamization 
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effort, the Islamic Cultural Revolution. 
The failure of the Islamic Cultural Revolution looks more striking when we consider 
the fact that (a) the Islamic state and its leader, Khomeini, were still popular in April 1980 
when the Islamic Cultural Revolution was launched, (b) Islam had a long tradition of 
scholarship and higher learning, (c) the state mobilized enormous coercive and persuasive 
resources ranging from execution to Friday prayer sermons, and (d) opposition forces and 
independent print media had been effectively suppressed by April 1980 and the state had 
achieved a high degree of monopoly of power. 
The failure of the omnipotent, popular, Islamic state in Islamizing the university 
system in a Muslim society invites explanation. The dissertation explains the failure in terms 
of the web of constraints on the state. Both the state and the university are tied to the 
economic, social and political forces of society. The exaggerated autonomy of the state is, 
thus, called into question. 
The first draft of this study, written in November 1990, predicted the gradual 
dismantling of the educational order built by the Islamic Cultural Revolution. By Spring 
1991, the dismantling was already well in place. The architects of the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution, maktabf Muslims, are being driven out of the state and the campus by the 
Liberals. The Western secular institutions of higher education of the Monarchical period 
remain in place. 
Conceptually, this dissertation deviates from current academic studies of Iran. 
Relying on recent critical theory, the author question the validity of positivist claims of 
"value-free," apolitical, a-historical, "objective" social science. Positivist social science has, 
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for example, created a "value-free" conceptual system that not only fails to reflect the 
experience of Iranian society but, more importantly, imposes the worldview of only one 
trend in Western social sciences, a scholarship that is closely associated with the power 
structure in the United States. Concepts such as "oppression" (setam), "exploitation" 
(estesmar), despotism (estebdad), "reaction" (erteja'), "freedom" (Ozadt), "struggle" 
(mubareze), "resistance" (muqavamat) and "imperialism" (amperyallzm) discarded by 
positivists as "value-laden" concepts are an integral part of the conceptual world of Iranians. 
These concepts have concrete referents in Iranian society. The phenomena have motivated 
the Iranians for more than a century to conduct a life-and-death struggle for the cause of 
freedom, democracy and independence. Thousands of political prisoners have lost their lives 
because they refused to denounce "freedom," and "struggle," or simply refused to utter a 
word in support of "reaction," "monarchy," "Islam," or Islamic Republic. Hundreds of art 
works-paintings, poetry, novels, theatrical plays-have been devoted by Iranian artists to the 
eulogy of "struggle," "resistance," "freedom," or denunciation of "oppression," 
"exploitation," and "imperialism." A social science that seeks to neutralize this conceptual 
world is undoubtedly taking sides. 
Some conceptualization problems are not due to political inclinations of the world of 
scholarship. Cognitive, cultural and methodological considerations also shape the conceptual 
repertoire. One essential problem is the conceptualization of the political and ideological line 
of Ayatollah Khomeini and individuals or groups who identify with this phenomenon. While 
the representatives of this trend of thought are labelled as "hard-liners," "radicals," 
"revolutionaries," etc. the most widely used concept in the West is "fundamentalists." In the 
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political discourse of Iranian leftist-radical opposition, "fundamentalists" are known as 
"reactionaries," "conservatives" and "counter-revolutionaries." The "fundamentalists" prefer 
to call themselves "maktabt (followers of the [Islamic] "school" or doctrine), or followers of 
Esldm-e Faqdhatt, an Islam that advocates the rule of ihefaqlh, theologian-jurisprudent. 
"Fundamentalism" is not an appropriate concept because all Islamic Shiite sects and 
denominations, in Iran at least, trace their ideas and political agendas to the same 
fundamentals, i.e. Holy Koran and the traditions and words of the prophet and, especially, 
the twelve Imams. Thus, the two rival factions sharing power in the Islamic state, maktabCs 
("fundamentalists") and Liberals, both base their views on the same fundamentals which 
contain enough contradictory statements to be of pragmatic value to every side's satisfaction. 
Social scientists should look at the current, concrete content of the political and ideological 
agenda of any group, Islamic and otherwise. The present Islamic stale and its architects 
while influenced by Islam have, in fact, combined Western parliamentary forms of 
government with the worst elements of pre- and post-Islamic despotism of Iran and other 
Asian countries. Because of many limitations of the concept of "fundamentalism," this study 
uses the term maktabt. 
This study is addressed to specialists in higher education, Iranian and Islamic 
education and Iranian modem history and politics. Every attempt has been made not to 
encumber the study with irrelevant or unnecessary references to religious sources. Words 
and phrases in Persian or Arabic have been Romanized according to the Library of Congress 
Romanization system slightly modified here. However, most names of institutions and 
individuals appear either in their Anglicized forms (e.g. Muhammed) or according to the 
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rules of English spelling. This approach will facilitate the reading of the texts by those who 
are not interested in the niceties of philological distinctions. 
The material is presented in four chapters. Chapter One deals with methodological 
considerations. Chapter Two is a survey of the conflict between the state and the university 
in the area of administration. While the Iranian state, both Monarchical and Islamic, 
implements a policy of full integration of the university into the state, members of the faculty 
and students fought for university autonomy. Two autonomist policies emerged over the 
decades-a reformist line which advocated limited administrative and legal autonomy and a 
revolutionary line which tied autonomy to the democratization of the political system of the 
country. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was based on a policy of full integration of the 
university into the state. 
Chapter Three examines the Islamization of the faculty, teaching process and students. 
Since the universities are not administrative units primarily, the Islamic state, once in full 
control of university administration, moved on to produce a faculty and student body who 
would be loyal to the state ideologically and politically. 
Chapter Four provides a summary of Chapters Two and Three and analysis of 
findings. The major finding of this study is the failure of the Islamization policy of the 
Cultural Revolution. This failure is remarkable when the range of extensive coercive and 
persuasive measures used by the state is taken into account. The failure of the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution is explained in terms of the limitations placed on the state (no matter 
how omnipotent) by relations of production, the balance of forces among social classes and 
the resistance offered by opposition forces and, also, the internal contradictions of the state 
xv 
(the existence of two rival factions). All of these restrictions call into question the autonomy 
of the state in conducting an educational reform independently from the relations of 
production. 
The two major chapters, Two and Three, are organized chronologically. In order to 
provide a historical overview of the Islamic Cultural Revolution and to compare the Islamic 
Regime with its predecessor, the Monarchical regime, development beginning with the 
inauguration of the first university in Iran have been covered in some detail. 
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Ayatollah 
Esldm-e FeqOhatt 
Faqth 
Fatva 
Howie 
Imam 
Jehad 
Kumlte 
Maktabr 
Tollab 
Twelver Shi'ism 
Veldyat-e faqth 
VaW-ye faqth 
"Sign," "reason" or "miracle" of Allah; title used, in the last 100 years, 
by Iranian Shi'ite to refer to their top clergymen (see Matini 1983 for a 
history of the use of the two titles ayatollah and imam in Sunni and 
Shi'ite Islam). 
Khomeini's sect of Shi'ism which advocates the rule of the faqth, i.e. the 
theologian-Jurisprudent. 
Theologian-jurisprudent. 
Injunction in Islamic law. 
Islamic seminaries in Shi'ite Iran. 
The divinely inspired supreme leader of the Shi'ite Muslim community; 
the successor to the prophet Muhammad. 
Islam's holy war against infidels or enemies of Islam. 
Committees formed during the last months of the 1978-79 revolution to 
cuuiuuiau; ucmvmauautma, uiauiuuuuu ui iumu cutu u u i u uuait, nsvwa*ww. 
Followers of the (Shi'ite) Islamic school of thought or Shi'ite doctrine as 
advocated by Khomeini; followers of veldyat-e faqth. 
(Plural of (alabe) howze students; students in Islamic religious schools who 
aspire to become clergymen. 
Twelver Shi'a {Sht*a-ye asnO. 'asharT, is a sect of Shi'ite Islam prevalent 
in Iran. They are followers of Prophet Muhammad's fourth successor, 
Ali, who is called a "caliph" by Sunnis and imam by Shi'ites. All, is the 
first of die twelve imams who succeeded to Prophet. The twelfth imam, 
Mahdi, is believed to have been in hiding since 874. 
Guardianship or government by the theologian-jurisprudent; it is the 
system of Islamic state proposed by Khomeini and institutionalized in Iran 
after the 1978-79 revolution. 
The ruling theologian-jurisprudent (e.g., Khomeini, 1979-89) and Ali 
Khamene'i since 1989. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF STATE AND EDUCATION 
This chapter deals with methodological issues. It begins with a review of the 
literature on the current state of theory about the relationship between the State and education 
and on the case of Iran. This will be followed by brief sections on the research question, the 
significance of the study, the research design and data collection and analysis methods. 
1.0.0 Theories of State and Education 
Educational systems do not exist outside or independent of society despite the claims 
to the contrary. They are, in fact, pans or components of the large whole known as society. 
In spite of this truism, society/education relations often do not loom large in educational 
theory. While interdisciplinary approaches, e.g. sociology and anthropology of education, do 
indeed examine aspects of society/education relationships (e.g., education and social class, 
education and the economy, the family and school, education and culture), an important 
relationship, i.e., that between the structure of social power and education, has generally 
been ignored especially on the theoretical level. The following section provides a brief 
review of generalizations about relationships between state power and education. 
Literature Review: While power is exercised through many institutions such as the 
church, the family, business corporations and the media, the institution of the state stands out 
as the most prominent center of power. The military and civil bureaucracies with their 
immense legislative and executive power aim at maintaining the status quo. Maintaining 
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"law and order" is achieved not only through the police force and the army but also through 
the "manufacture of consent" by numerous cultural/intellectual institutions such as the 
schools, the church and the media. 
A survey of the literature on the relationship between educational systems and 
political or state power reveals two conflicting theoretical positions (Camoy 1979; Torres 
1985)-traditional or liberal-pluralist positions and critical educational theories. 
Traditional or liberal-pluralist educational theory is based on "common good" theories 
of the state. According to these theories, the state is an autonomous political institution 
"above" the system of political power and the class structure. Therefore, the state is said to 
act as a neutral referee overseeing the clashes of interest groups, clashes which presumably 
operate to create a system that reflects the general interest of all the citizens (Torres 1985: 
4796). These theories claim that the state is the collective creation of its individual 
members and that it provides a set of common social services (such as a system of defense, 
education, a legal system, and law enforcement agencies) for all or for a sizable majority. It 
is assumed that the state, in Western countries, has emerged as the expression of the 
individual rights of the citizenry; it respects individual liberty and, at the same time, achieves 
collective goals. Governments change in response to changes in the political desires of the 
citizens. 
The "common good" theories of the state insist that the state provides educational 
institutions that function in the interest of the majority of the citizens. The educational 
system is intended to serve everyone efficiently and equally in order to contribute to the 
increased productivity (and social mobility) of the citizens. Inefficiencies in the system exist 
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but they can be corrected if the public demands change. 
According to the second, largely Marxist view, the state does not serve the interest of 
all social classes; the state is an apparatus for the exercise of power in the interest of a 
particular section of society-the ruling class. Representing the dominant social class, the 
state exists in an antagonistic relationship to other social classes. This theory claims that 
educational systems are structured in such a way as to perpetuate state power and the 
economic system on which it is based. 
There are variations in the class conflict theory. Marx, Engels, Lenin, Gramsci, 
Althusser, Mao and other Marxists have contributed to the refinement of the Marxist theory 
of the state. Since the 1970s, Marxist and other critical scholars in Western countries have 
applied these conceptual/theoretical formulations in their analysis of the educational system 
(e.g., Carnoy 1979; Bowles and Gintis 1976; Apple 1982 and Giroux 1983). 
1.1.0 Theories of Educational Change 
This dissertation will examine a case of educational reform in the higher education of 
a Third World country. Education, like most other phenomena, changes throughout history. 
What are these processes of change? What are the factors affecting change? What is the 
relationship between power and change? 
The two major theoretical positions outlined above provide two conflicting views of 
educational change. Traditional educational theory, based on the "common good" view of 
the state, claims that education is reformed-i.e. made more efficient, in order to allow all 
citizens more adequate economic and political participation in a society that is knit together 
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by a democratic state. Contradictions and problems-injustice, corruption and malfunctions-
exist but they are marginal and not inherent to the democratic system. The goal of the 
system is to provide prosperity and progress. The education system changes in order to 
become more efficient; it educates and retrains the citizens so that they can adapt to 
progressive changes provided in and by the system. According to this view, the educational 
system stands above the concerns of class politics. 
The Marxist theory, however, places the educational system together with the state, 
ideology, the legal system, religion, and culture-within the superstructure of society. In 
Marxist-Leninist theory, formal education serves the interest of a particular, dominant, class 
of society. Education is, thus, an apparatus of the ruling class and the state representing this 
class. Educational change depends, therefore, on the unceasing contradictions within the 
social-economic system. Change in the infrastructure would result in adjustment in the 
superstructure. For example, industrialization and urbanization will force the capitalist state 
to provide technical/vocational education and to spend funds on research and higher-level 
education. 
Contradiction is the source of change, according to Marxist theory. Thus, the 
educational system may be changed in order to make adjustments to the base. In other 
words, the superstructure plays an active and, sometimes, determining role. Education can 
therefore serve the purpose of adjusting or changing the infrastructure. Contradictions exist 
also within the educational system itself (e.g., between students and administration; students 
and instructors; secular and religious education; faculty and administration) and between the 
educational system and other components of society including the state (e.g., contradictions 
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between students and the state especially at times of political crisis; the educational system 
and the ever-changing economic base). 
Non-Marxist social science examines many aspects of these multi-dimensional 
processes of change but only in bits and pieces that cannot be pieced together conceptually 
and theoretically. Marxism, as a holistic theory interested in interrelating various 
components of society, predicts that in the highly complex system of society certain 
processes are principal, fundamental and, even, determining. Political power held by the 
ruling class through the instrument of the state is one such factor. Educational change will, 
thus, be determined or restricted by the requirements of the state. Education is also a site of 
struggle for the assumption of power by dominated classes or groups. 
There are, however, variations within the Marxist view of the state and education. 
Since the 1970's, the focus has been, in the Neo-Marxist approaches, on the relative 
autonomy of the superstructure and especially the state (or political system) and ideology 
(Torres 1985; Camoy 1979). Neo-Marxists argue that the (classical) Marxist theory of the 
state is "instrumentalist" in that it considers the state as an instrument of the ruling class or a 
reflection of the dominant relations of production (see, for example, Apple 1989:10-12; Dale 
1989). The literature on the subject (based mostly on the observations of Western capitalist 
societies) "has moved in the direction of arguing that it is the state, rather than production, 
that should and will be the principal focus of class struggle" (Camoy 1984:9). 
Examining the educational process, neo-Marxists assign a prominent role to the state, 
rather than to relations of production (or the economic base) as a factor shaping educational 
change. In their study of five Third World countries where a transition to socialism 
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occurred, Camoy and Samoff (1990:380) conclude that the "state, not education per se, is 
the key issue here. We cannot separate how education develops in the transition [to 
socialismj-or what education is-from the nature of the transition state." This view assigns a 
prominent and independent role to the state in the process of planned social transformation. 
A major theoretical issue is, therefore, the autonomy of the state in shaping the 
educational process. Since education is tied to the economy, social structure, culture and 
religion of a society, a relevant question is the scope of the constraints imposed on the state 
by these relationships. Can the state reform the educational system without introducing 
changes in the economic or social structure of society? Is educational policy reducible to 
educational issues or is it, at the same time, political, economic and social policy? 
The educational reform within Iran provides detailed data on the role of the state in a 
time of revolutionary change. The findings of this study shed some light on debates over the 
role of the state in the process of educational change and the autonomy of the state. Theory 
will be used to explain data while the findings will be analyzed to make contributions to 
theory. 
1.2.0 The Iranian Case 
A survey of the literature on the Islamic Cultural Revolution reveals that no 
comprehensive study of the subject has yet been undertaken in Iran or elsewhere. A survey 
of the literature in Western languages shows that three article-length studies of the subject 
have been written by Iranians. One study compares the Islamic Cultural Revolution with the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution and argues that the Chinese policy of "politics in command" 
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appeared in Iran in the form of "religion in command." (Sobhe 1982:271). The comparisons 
are hasty and not within a theoretical framework capable of accounting for the two different 
state systems and their historical contexts. The second article (Entessar 1984:47-64) confines 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution to the conflict between religion and secularism and does not 
deal with the political aspect of the reform. Another writer, Irfani (1983:204-210) devotes a 
chapter of his book to the subject and explains the Islamic Cultural Revolution in terms of 
the power struggle within the government. None of these studies is adequate in terms of 
data, scope of analysis, theoretical framework, and conclusions. 
1.3.0 Research Question 
The focus of this study is upon the political and ideological aspects of university 
reform in Iran. Thus, the main research question is: What are the political and ideological 
foundations of state policies concerning university reform known as the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution. The Islamic Cultural Revolution is defined here as the reform of higher 
education on the basis of Islamic principles formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini or the 
maktabt line attributed to him. While some representatives of the maktabt line have sought 
to expand the definition in order to include the Islamization of culture and economy, the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution remained to be used as the Islamization of higher education.1 
1
 The Persian word farhang 'culture' means both 'education' and 'culture'. Since the 1960s, 
the Iranian govememnt sought to use farhang in the latter sense. Thus, the name of Vezarat-e 
Farhang, 'Ministry of Education' was changed to Vezarat-e Amuzesh va Parvaresh and the word 
farhang was usesd in the name of a newly created ministry, Vezarat-e Farhang va Honar, 
"Ministry of Culture and Arts.' However, the v/otdfarhangf as used in EngelQb-e Farhangt-ye 
Esldmt, 'Islamic Cultural Revolution', has been translated in the English-language Iranian print 
media and official documents as "cultural" though Khomeini's decree on the establishment of 
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1.4.0 Significance 
During the nineteenth and, especially, the twentieth centuries, education has been 
increasingly and overwhelmingly a function of the state (Torres 1985:4796). However, 
theoretical and empirical studies of the relationship between the state and education are of 
quite recent origin beginning in the 1970's (Ibid., p. 4793). Many theoretical issues have not 
been resolved yet. 
This dissertation provides a detailed study of the state-university relations in a Third 
World country following a major revolutionary upheaval resulting in changes within the state 
system. By examining the reform of the higher educational system of Iran (the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution), this study (a) contributes to recent theoretical debates on state and 
education from a Marxist perspective and (b) provides the first comprehensive study of the 
Iranian case. 
By focusing on the contributions of Marxist theory, the dissertation fills in the 
theoretical lacunae. The Iranian case provides fresh evidence from a society with a 
predominantly capitalist economy, a theocratic state, and a parliamentary republican form of 
government. 
Though the role of the universities in the revolutionary history of Iran is generally 
acknowledged, the ever-expanding literature on the 1978-79 Revolution systematically 
ignores the role played by this important element of Iranian society. The dissertation 
provides the only detailed account of the educational dimension of the revolution. 
the Council of Cultural Revolution (see Appendix A) limits the mandate of the Council to the 
Islamization of the universiteis. 
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1.5.0 Research Methodology 
The Iranian case can be studied from different disciplinary perspectives (e.g., politics, 
history, sociology) using different methodological approaches (e.g., case study, comparative 
study, empirical study). The approach in this dissertation falls largely within the 
interdisciplinary framework of politics of education and the methodology adopted will be 
"policy analysis." 
Policy Analysis: Why is "policy analysis" the appropriate approach? In recent 
years, the state-education relationship has been considered an essential element of research on 
educational policy and planning (Torres 1985:4797). As a fairly recent methodology, policy 
analysis is still not adequately developed and there is little consensus about its scope, 
components, technique or its function in disciplinary research (cf., e.g., Coleman 1975; 
Nisbet 1985; Jones 1985). It is, therefore, necessary to specify the main elements of my 
approach. 
The policy analysis used in this study is not prescriptive or "decision-oriented." In 
other words, its aim is not to provide information as a basis for government decision-making. 
It is, rather, to contribute to theorization on the relationship between the state and (higher) 
education. The following policy processes will be examined: 
Nature of the Policy: What was the policy? 
Source: . What are the ideological and political origins of the 
policy? 
Other variables such as economic and educational 
factors will also be examined. 
Goals: What aim was the policy intended to achieve? 
Implementation: How and to what extent was the policy 
carried out? 
In order to provide an adequate descriptive survey of the reform, numerous aspects of 
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the reform policy will be examined under three major categories: 
1. Administration 
2. The Teaching Process 
3. Students 
1.5.1 Data Collection 
The data for this study consists of primarily of written materials by various 
government authorities who planned and carried out the reform of the universities. Most of 
the sources are primary nonpersonal documents that provide a fairly comprehensive picture 
of the policy and practice of the government and changes that have occurred so far. 
Data on the nationwide reform of the institutions of higher education during the 
period under review were collected from the following sources: 
Primary Sources 
Government Documents: 
The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 
The Higher Council of Cultural Revolution 
The Cultural Revolution Council 
University Crusade 
Individual Universities 
The Islamic Republic Party 
Khomeini's messages and statements 
Posters, stamps, and leaflets. 
Semi-official Sources: 
Interviews, comments, news, and editorials published in the pro-government 
press Kayhan; Kayhan Havai (weekly edition of the daily Kayhan); Eftela'at; 
JumhOrt-ye Eslamf; Enqeldb-e Esldmt; DOneshgQh-e Enqeldb. (See 
Bibliography for information on these publications). 
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Non-official Sources: 
Interviews with purged and non-purged students and faculty members who are 
in exile. 
Press reports published in Iran but not identified with the government e.g., 
Adlne, Mufld, Ayandegdn. 
Proceedings of conferences on the Islamic Cultural Revolution all held in Iran. 
Opposition press e.g., Kdr, Haqtqat, ROh-e K&rgar, Paykdr. 
I began collecting data in 1981 as a direct observer of the reform while staying in 
Iran and have continued to acquire fresh material by corresponding with various government 
and university authorities. Extensive interviews with purged and non-purged students and 
faculty members constitute a major part of my investigation, especially since late 1983 when 
I left Iran. Face-to-face interviews have been conducted. The interviews have been 
nonscheduled, with open-ended questions. Due to conditions of extreme repression 
perpetrated by the Islamic regime in Iran and abroad, psuedonyms have been used to refer to 
interviewees. 
Primary sources in the area of theory include the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
Stalin and Mao. Academic literature on the subject, e.g. Camoy 1979; 1984; Camoy and 
Samoff 1990; Giroux 1983 and Dale 1989, will be used to examine the current state of 
theory-building in this area. 
Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources will be used for studying the background of the question. The 
literature on the Islamic Cultural Revolution, in English and other Western languages, is very 
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limited. There is a flood of publications on the 1978-79 Revolution of Iran. Nevertheless, 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution and the subsequent reform movement in the institutions of 
higher education have not received enough attention. The following bibliographic references 
were consulted for relevant literature: 
Resources in Education 
ERIC 
Current Index to Journals in Education 
Education Index 
British Education Index 
Canadian Education Index 
Australian Education Index 
Middle East Abstracts 
Dissertation Abstracts has also been consulted for the survey of different 
interpretations of the reform of higher education in pre-revolutionary Iran. Since the 1979 
Revolution, more than a dozen dissertations have been written on different aspects of the 
higher education system of Iran. These have been written in American universities only. 
Most of these dissertations, unfortunately, are descriptive or administrative reports lacking 
any theoretical significance. 
1,5,2 Data Analysis 
"Document analysis" or "document study" is the primary method of analysis used in 
this research. The documents vary greatly in terms of their structure and the purpose for 
which they were originally written. They are, however, mostly primary and nonpersonal 
documents, such as: minutes of the meetings of different offices at the Ministry of Culture 
and Higher Education or confidential interoffice memos of the Cultural Revolution Council. 
The print media (government and nongovernment) as well as personal interviews also 
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constitute a major part of the primary documents. 
In document analysis, two major methods of study have been identified: (a) the 
relatively unstructured and interpretive case-study approach and (b) the structured content 
analysis approach that yields quantitative data from verbal documents. The case-study 
approach provides the preferred analytical tool for the study. It allows me, for example, to 
select the best examples from the vast collection of relevant newspaper documents in order to 
illustrate my points. This approach also lends itself to qualitative rather the quantitative 
analysis. 
Data from the government sources will be first used to descriptively study the three 
major areas of higher education reform, i.e. administration, the teaching process and 
students. 
Findings will then be used to discuss state-education relationships within the 
framework of Marxist-Leninist theory of society focusing on superstructure-base relations. 
Secondary sources will be used to furnish data on other cases. 
This is not a "descriptive" study. It is assumed that facts do not always speak for 
themselves. In fact, any selection, organization and reporting of facts is shaped by one's 
explicit or implicit ideological, political, theoretical and methodological considerations. 
Thus, the extensive data on Iran, partly reported here, has been systematized and explained 
within the theoretical framework adopted in this study. While theory guided this study, the 
data presented here is intended to contribute to the theoretical debate on state/university 
relation. 
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1.6.0 Scope 
This study examines the relationships between the state and (higher) education. These 
relationships are complex and multi-dimensional. The conceptual framework adopted 
provides the focus. Both state and education will be treated as part of the superstructure of 
society and their interrelationship within the superstructure and in relation to the 
infrastructure will be examined. 
Focus has been on major policy issues. Though the study covers many components 
of the university system, it has inevitably omitted certain elements or aspects of the 
educational process. For example, state policy on Iranian students studying abroad has not 
been examined in any detailed. Even an important factor affecting state policy on higher 
education, i.e. the Iran-Iraq war of 1981-88 has not been examined adequately. It must be 
noted, however, that these omissions, largely due to limitations of time and space, do not 
distort the findings of this study. In fact, the Islamic state's policy of gearing the universities 
to the war effort is consistent with the over-all policy of treating the educational system as a 
state organ used to maintain the Islamic regime. 
1.7.0 Limitations 
In terms of sources, one main limitation is the writer's inability to interview the main 
actors-top government officials-involved in the university reform. This limitation is partly 
compensated by full access to published official documents and numerous published 
interviews. 
As far as the case is concerned, the dissertation does not intend to be a study of the 
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higher educational system of Iran. It is, rather, a survey of the policies of the Iranian state 
that have shaped the university system in Iran. 
This study is not prescriptive. Thus, the aim is not to evaluate state policy much less 
to recommend alternative policies. The purpose is to examine ideological and political 
origins of official policy and social structural and economic constraints on such policies. 
15 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN SHAPING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY 
This chapter examines the reform of the administrative structure of higher education 
under the Islamic Cultural Revolution. The focus will be upon the conflict between the state 
and the university (students, faculty and staff) over the governance of institutions of higher 
education. Thus, the main question addressed by this chapter is: "Who governs the 
university?" 
In a country like Iran, where the educational system is centralized and the state has 
full monopoly over formal education, the question of governance may seem to be settled or, 
at least, simple. For one thing, the university is set up, owned and administered by the 
state; it is4 therefore^ mart of the state structure which is in full control of the institution. 
Also, as despotic political systems, the Iranian regimes, Monarchical and Islamic, have not 
been interested in maintaining "arms-length relationships" with any state institution such as 
the mass media, the language academy or other scientific organizations. However, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, the exercise of political power in the university is much more 
complex than it appears to be on the surface. Governing the university seems to be more 
difficult than governing other state organs. 
Although and, to a large extent, because the university is owned and administered by 
the despotic state, a conflict over governance has ensued ever since the emergence of the first 
university in Iran. This conflict focused on the "autonomy" (esteqldl) of the university. 
This chapter examines both sides of the contradiction-the state and the university-and two 
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sets of policy-the state policy of unrivalled rule over the campus and the university policy of 
autonomous status. 
In order to better comprehend the reform of administrative structure under the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution, this chapter provides an historical account of the conflict over university 
autonomy. It will be shown that, under conditions of political stability, the Monarchical and 
Islamic states pursued a policy of full control of educational institutions whereas in crisis 
situations (e.g., 1941-53, 1960-63, 1978-81) those states faced serious challenges from the 
faculty, students and staff and the state was forced into temporary compromises. 
The autonomy-seeking university underwent a radical change as a result of the 1978-
79 Revolution. Thus, two distinct sets of autonomist policy have emerged. The earlier 
legalistic and reformist notions of autonomy which demanded financial and administrative 
independence were replaced, during the 1978-79 Revolution, by a revolutionary approach 
which raised questions of the class nature of university governance and demanded full control 
of the university by students, faculty and staff. 
2.0.0 The Struggle for Autonomy Under 
The Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979) 
The Pahlavi dynasty emerged as a result of the 1921 coup in which Reza Khan, later 
Reza Shah, played a leading role. Western historians and political scientists explain the 
Pahlavi state as a "modernizing" one which replaced the loosely integrated Qajar dynasty 
(1785-1925) (see, for example, Wilber 1975). The new state set up a highly centralized 
administrative and economic structure. Although the state system was defined as a 
Constitutional Monarchy by the 1906 constitution, the Pahlavi state was not bound by any 
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constitutional requirements. Throughout most of the rule of the dynasty, the Parliament was 
a mere instrument of the monarch who managed to control parliamentary elections. 
The Pahlavi dynasty pursued a policy of Westernizing Iranian society. Pro-Western 
politics, secularization and the promotion of pre-Islamic Iranian culture were components of 
state strategy. Education, and especially higher education, served as an instrument for 
reforming the state structure and Iranian society. 
2.1.0 The Autonomy Under Reza Shah: Tehran University 1930's 
The first university of Iran, Tehran University, was established by the government in 
1934 via the incorporation of several existing colleges into a new institution. The French 
system, particularly the University of Paris, served as a model. 
In accordance with the practice of continental European state-controlled universities, 
the founding charter of Tehran University provided for (a) administrative autonomy, and (b) 
legal security of tenure for the professoriate. This important tradition of autonomy in the 
European university system was highly valued by the Iranian professoriate, most of whom 
were educated in Europe. However, this autonomy soon came into conflict with the despotic 
and extremely centralizing political system of the Pahlavi dynasty. In fact, the question of 
autonomy became the focus of struggle between the professoriates and the state from Tehran 
University's founding (1934) until the onset of the Islamic Cultural Revolution (1980). 
According to Article 7 of the 1934 founding charter of Tehran University, the 
"University enjoys legal character and will be represented by the Chancellor and will be 
independent administratively and financially, and under the direct responsibility of the 
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Ministry of Education." In accordance with the above provisions for self-government, the 
deans of the colleges at Tehran University were to be elected from among the professors, and 
the chancellor, who was also the University principal and acted as dean of his college, was to 
be a professor (Article 14). The Chancellor would be chosen by election among the deans 
for a renewable terms of three years (Article 3, Note 1) (Daneshgah-e Tehran 1947:86, 87, 
89). 
Nevertheless, the administrative autonomy of Tehran University was violated by the 
state on the eve of the university's opening. When the Dean of the College of Medicine was 
appointed by the Government this appointment provoked a successful strike organized by 
radical intellectuals (Abrahamian 1982:155). 
In violating the administrative autonomy of the University, the Ministry of Education 
adopted the policy (1935-43) of appointing a chancellor elected by the University Senate only 
with the approval of the Minister of Education and final confirmation from the Shah. Also, 
the Deans were appointed by the Minister and the rest of the Senate members had to meet 
certain requirements (Arasteh 1961:332). 
University autonomy, although extremely limited, was thus incompatible with the 
increasing autocratization of Reza Shah's rule. The monarch did indeed suppress all 
opposition forces, including the press, religious institutions, ethnic peoples, women's 
organizations and other potential sources of dissent (on these suppressions see Abrahamian 
1982:149-165). 
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2.1.1 Autonomy in the "Liberalization" Period (1941-53) 
In September 1941, Allied forces occupied Iran and Reza Shah was replaced by his 
son, Mohammad Reza. The tight grip of Reza Shah over the economic, political, educational 
and religious life of Iran was relieved to some extent. Poverty, rising prices, unemployment, 
and oppressive feudal relations in the village prevailed throughout the nation. Opposition to 
the monarchy was ubiquitous; peasant uprisings, workers' strikes, student unrest, ethnic and 
religious movements, and anti-imperialist struggles were prominent. These conflicts 
culminated in the emergence of two autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan 
(1946), the nationalization of the British-dominated oil industry (1951-2), and the expulsion 
of the Shah (he escaped to Italy) as a result of public protests (August 1953), and the return 
of the Shah to the throne as a result of a CIA-staged coup (August 19, 1953). 
During these critical years, all sectors of Iranian population got organized. The 
Tudeh Party2 and the National Front (nationalist) were the most prominent political 
organizations. The proliferating press of Iran were divided into the Freedom Front Press and 
those supporting the Shah and the West. The faculty and students were active forces in this 
national struggle (more on this in Chapter Three). The twelve years, 1941 to 1953, form a 
period in Iranian history often characterized as the "incomplete democracy" or 
"liberalization." 
2
 Hizb-e TQde-ye Iran (The Party of Iranian Masses), known in the West as the 
Communist Party of Iran, was formed in 1941 by members of the well-known "Fifty-Three" 
Marxist group. The party was suppressed during the CIA-staged coup d'etat of 1953 but re-
organized in Eastern Europe and its leadership moved to Iran after the 1978-79 revolution. 
The party was criticized by communist and radical political organizations of the 1970s and 
1980s as a reformist and pro-Soviet organization that had betrayed the revolution. It was 
suppressed by the Islamic Republic in 1981-82. 
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It was under these circumstances-weak state power and a powerful and extensive 
opposition-that the demand for university autonomy was raised again. This demand was 
part of the anti-monarchical movement which was aimed at curbing the autocratic rule of the 
Shah. The demand came from nationalist and leftist faculty and students who opposed the 
Shah's dictatorship and his dependence on the West. Autonomy was understood as financial 
independence from the Ministry of Finance and administrative independence from the 
Ministry of Education as had earlier been prescribed by the founding charter of Tehran 
University. 
Dr. Siyasi, Chancellor of Tehran University3, dismissed all the appointed deans, and 
called on the professors of each college to elect their deans through secret ballot. After these 
elections, the first University Council or Senate (showrd-ye ddneshgdh) was formed, 
consisting of the thirteen elected deans and two elected professors from each college who 
were elected by their respective College Councils for a two year term (Esmail Beigee 
1957:400). Dr. Siyasi, who had already been elected as the dean of his college, was re-
elected as chancellor. Administrative independence from the Ministry of Education was 
realized after he created a university administrative office (edare-ye koll-e dablrkhane-ye 
danashgah). 
The financial autonomy of the university also materialized in this period. On January 
3
 Siyasi was among the first group of students sent by the government to study in Europe. 
A liberal academic, he was appointed as minister of education in several cabinets during the 
crisis years of the 1940s and early 1950s. He struggled for the autonomy of Tehran University. 
His model of autonomy was the European, particularly, French university. His recently 
published memoirs (Siyasi 1987) provide an insider's view of his confrontations with the Shah's 
regime over state interference in the universities. 
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23, 1945, a member of the parliament (National Assembly), Dr. Mossadeq (later, Prime 
Minister), introduced legislation concerning the financial independence of Tehran University 
from the Ministry of Finance. Or. Mossadeq protested the government's interference in the 
institution's affairs which had led to "liquidating the question of the University" (Pakdaman 
1979:5). According to the new legislation, the chancellor drew up the University budget 
which was submitted to the Parliament by the Minister of Education. After the 
Parliamentary approval of the University budget, the Ministry of Finance was required to 
place the funds at the University's disposal which was spent in accordance with the 
regulations enacted by the Council of the University (Esmail Beigee 1957:400). 
In this period the relationship between the state and the university was one of constant 
power struggle in which the university had the upper hand. According to Afzal, "the 
University of Tehran ruled supreme" during this period (Afzal 1971:370). 
2.1.2 The Loss of Autonomy (1953-77) 
The "liberalization" period ended on August 19, 1953. The monarch had been forced 
to leave the country in the face of popular opposition. In a matter of days, however, he 
returned to power "as a result of a CIA backed and, in large part, CIA directed coup" 
(Cottam 1979:332). His return was followed by extremely repressive measures-executions, 
arrests and the outlawing of all political and non-political organizations and opposition press. 
Soon after the coup, Richard M. Nixon, then the Vice-President of the United States, 
visited Iran and was granted an honorary doctorate at Tehran University. On December 7, 
1953 (16 Azar 1932), the Royal Army entered the campus and fired at students who were 
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protesting Nixon's visit. Three students were killed.4 The University Council lodged a 
protest with the government. However, the unpopular monarch was determined to 
consolidate his rule through the elimination of all actual and material sources of dissent. 
University autonomy was, thus, repealed. The trend in the next three decades was one of 
increasing state control of the university. The policy of strict state control of universities 
will be examined in terms of (a) centralization of political power, (b) Americanization of 
administration and (c) expansion of the university. 
2.1.3 The Consolidation of Political 
Power Over the University (1953-1977) 
2.1.3.1 Weakening the Authority of Tehran University 
Soon after the 1953 coup, the government took several measures towards increasing 
control of Tehran University (Afzal 1971). The first measure was the Shah's interference in 
the election of the university chancellor. According to a law passed in the parliament 
(Section 2, 1954), the University Senate would elect three candidates (all at professorial 
rank) one of whom would be recommended to the Shah by the Minister of Education. The 
candidate, if approved by the Shah, would be appointed for a three-year term. 
The second measure was the subordination of the University to the development and 
modernization planning of the government. In the late 1950's, a Plan and Budget 
Organization (PBO) was set up for the purpose of coordinating and centralizing development 
programs. The PBO, modeled on American government organizations, became a powerful 
4
 Students in Iran and abroad (members of World Confederation of Iranian Students) 
designated Azar 16th (December 7) as "Student Day" which has been regularly 
commemorated since in political protests, songs, titles of journals, poetry, etc. 
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state organ and its director became a cabinet member enjoying enormous executive power. 
Gradually, educational planning became a prerogative of the PBO. Not only finance but, 
even more significantly, educational policy was decided by a very powerful, non-educational, 
state organ (Afzal 1971:372). 
The third measure, related to the second, was the further restriction of the policy-
making powers of the University and the reduction of the university to an institution which 
executed policies made elsewhere (Afzal 1971:371). In 1962, a Central Council of 
Universities (CCU) (Showra-ye Markazl-ye Daneshgah) chaired by the Minister of 
Education was established. The idea behind the CCU was the coordination and integration of 
higher educational policy into the five-year development plans* devised by Plan 
Organization. One member of the CCU was the director of Plan Organization who was 
responsible for ensuring that the universities stay within the recommendations of the five-year 
plans. Thus, the University Senate was no longer the highest policy-making organ; in fact, 
its decisions could be vetoed by the CCU. Moreover, the CCU not only controlled the 
decisions of the University Senate, but initiated action on its own and made decisions which 
were binding on the University. Programs which had been rejected by the University Senate 
found their way into the agenda of the CCU, were approved and then sent back to the 
University to be implemented. 
The fourth measure taken to control the university was the centralization of all 
government employment. The government established a Civil Service Commission on High 
5
 These plans encompassed the following time periods: 1949-56, 1956-62, 1962-68, 
1968-73 and 1973-78. 
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Council of Administrative Affairs (in the early 1960's) which supervised employment in all 
publicly funded organizations (Ibid.). As a result of this policy, the University lost its 
authority to employ faculty and staff. It has been argued that the formation of this 
centralized system was the outcome of a policy of extending the control of the secret police, 
SAVAK (National Security and Information Organization), over government employees 
including those hired in the universities (Abrahamian 1982:420). 
The policies outlined above aimed at removing all vestiges of the autonomous status 
of the "Mother University"-Tehran University. Meanwhile, the government undertook other 
measures in order to reverse the oppositional role of Tehran University and to undermine its 
political weight. While it seems that the formation of the CCU and a new Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education (1968) might have contributed to the coordination of higher 
educational policy, it must be noted that the universities were in fact entangled in a complex 
web of state organs ranging from the Minister of Labor, to the Central Bank of Iran, to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Table 1 depicts aspects of this intricate bureaucratic web as it 
existed in the early 1970's. 
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Table 1. Major Government Ministries and Organizations 
Dealing with Systems of Higher Education 
Ministry or 
Organization 
Ministry of 
Science and Higher 
Educ. 
Organization for 
Education 
Evaluation 
Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
and Finance 
Plan and Budget 
Organization 
State Organization 
for Admin-strative 
and Employment 
Affairs 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Ministry of Art 
and Culture 
Ministry of 
Information 
Central Bank of 
Iran 
Department of 
Customs 
Department of 
Pension Fund 
Salary and Wage 
Council 
Nature and Scope of Functions 
Initiation and termination of educational organizations; channelling of annual 
budget to Plan and Budget Organization; approval of programs and 
curricula; granting of fellowships and scholarships to students; approval of 
research grants. 
Selection of entering students through a unified and centralized examination 
procedure. 
1) Allocation of funds (grants) to universities on a quarterly basis; 
2) Approval for disbursement of funds (grants) 
Appraisal and approval of university budgets; evaluation and approval of 
fixed-investment projects. 
Determination of employment regulations for non-academic personnel. 
Approval of international educational contracts and granting of visa to 
foreign scholars. 
Approval of international educational contracts and granting of visa to 
foreign scholars. 
Allocation of certain scarce resources. 
Educational, cultural, and national promotion of the fine arts in cooperation 
with the universities. 
Information regarding employment. 
Transfer of funds for purchasing foreign capital goods, and, at times, 
extension of credit. 
Monitoring and control of capital equipment items which universities can 
import free of customs duties. 
Collection of pension funds and payment of such funds upon retirement. 
Monitoring and approval of salaries above levels approved by the 
government (in case of chancellors and other top officials). 
Nou 
Gov't 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Gov't 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Source: Samii et al. (1978:41) 
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2.1.3.2 The Americanization of University Administrations: 
The Board of Trustees 
A policy of increasing Americanization of Iranian society was adopted by the Shah 
especially after the CIA coup of 1953 reinstalled him on the throne (see Bill 1988 and Ricks 
forthcoming on Iranian-American relations; see Eicher et al. 1976 on U.S.-Iranian relations 
in higher education). Before 1953, the monarch's policy of Westernizing Iranian society 
took Western Europe as a model. However, beginning in the last phases of World War II 
and especially after 1953, the U.S. gradually replaced Britain, France and Germany as a 
major external force in Iranian politics, economy and culture. 
Although the Americanization of the universities was part of the general policy of the 
Americanization of Iranian society, it also aimed at neutralizing the powerful academic rebel, 
Tehran University. As clear evidence of this, one may cite Shiraz University which was 
founded in 1956, and was renamed Pahlavi University in 1962 as the first "American style3 
University to counterbalance Tehran University and to be seen as a model for future reform 
and expansion of higher education (see below). 
Soon after the 1953 coup, the University of Southern California and the Foreign 
Operations Division signed a contract (1954-1960) with Tehran University to study the 
organizational structure of the University. The result was a series of recommendations for 
substantial reorganization of higher education (Sassani 1963:29). American advisers found 
the Iranian system of higher education to be stagnant. They found that the problem was 
rooted in the French-based system of education-the professor rather than the student was 
considered the center of the educational process, student evaluation was based on annual 
examinations, a fixed number of courses was imposed on the students, instruction was based 
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on rote learning, lecture and recitation, and faculty members were promoted on the basis of 
the chair system. 
Reforms based on these findings were gradually introduced. An important change in 
the administrative structure was the introduction of the board of trustees. 
The first university to be governed by a Board of Trustees rather than the Ministry of 
Education was Shiraz University. The Board members included the (ex-officio) members of 
the highest governmental positions such as the Minister of the Imperial Court, the Director of 
the National Iranian Oil Company (a government enterprise), and the Director of the Plan 
and Budget Organization. The Board was also headed by the Shah. Although Pahlavi 
University was a non-government institution6, its budget came directly from government 
sources-the Plan and Budget Organization and the National Oil Company ("Daneshgah-e 
Pahlavi-Shiraz," Yaghmd 1968, No. 4:225-230; No. 5:288-291; No. 6:349-350; and No. 
7:409-411). The University budget had increased 100% and faculty and staff salaries were 
higher than those of similar institutions. The university was in charge of faculty and staff 
hiring and financial and administrative affairs. 
Meanwhile, Tehran University was tightly controlled by the government (see above) 
and was unable to hire even new staff members. Jahanshah Saleh, chancellor of the 
university, argued that the solution to the problems of Tehran University and provincial 
institutions lay in the formation of boards of trustees.7 In 1967, the Law of Boards of 
6
 Nongovernment universities were founded during the period extending from the early 
1960's to 1974. They were closely controlled by the state (see below). 
7
 The Law of Board of Trustees was approved by the following provincial universities in 
1967: Tabriz, Jundi Shapour, Mashhad and Isfahan. Members of the Royal family filled the 
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Trustees was approved. The first board, consisting of top government officials (such as the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of the Imperial Court, the Minister of Finance), was in full 
control of administrative and financial affairs. 
While the Board of Trustees gave Tehran University the semblance of autonomy, in 
practice the university was under further state control since the board itself was composed of 
the most powerful state representatives. In fact, a year after the formation of the Board, in 
violation of university regulations, the chancellor was for the first time appointed from non-
university faculty and the next year a non-academic person, i.e. the Minister of Economy, 
was appointed chancellor. Commenting on these developments, Afzal (an Iranian academic 
and university administrator) wrote that the "...university, now under an independent board, 
could not have wished for a more distinguished and high-powered group ... the government 
runs the university and cabinet ranks are the spring-board for university positions ..." (Afzal 
1971:372). 
Soon after the formation of boards of trustees, their authority was restricted by the 
Ministry of Science and Higher Education (see below) established in 1968. In fact, the Law 
of Boards of Trustees was revised in order to give planning, directing, and supervising 
power to the Ministry. The Law was approved by the Shah in 1972 and was implemented by 
all the institutions (Daneshgah-e Tehran 1975-76:13-14). 
The extent of state control of the university is indicated by the fact that eleven of the 
twenty boards of trustees were put under the chairmanship of the members of the Royal 
Family as indicated by Table 2. It must be emphasized that the Royal presence, either in the 
chairs of these boards (Afzal 1969:8). 
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form of chairperson or in the form of honorary chancellor, can be seen in universities which 
were founded after 1970 and in those founded by the Shah as a counterweight to Tehran 
University-e.g., Pahlavi and Aryamehr universities. The chair at Tehran University was 
always filled by the Prime Minister. 
Table 2. The Royal Court and Government Presence on the 
Boards of Trustees of Iranian Universities (1934-1974) 
ft. 
Founded 
1956 
1957 
1962 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Yanr 
Founded 
1934 
1949 
1949 
1950 
1954 
1962 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1974 
1974 
Non-fOTcnuneat 
Uuwersiuea 
Pahlavi University of Shiraz 
National University of Iran 
Aryamehr University of Technology 
BuAli Sina University 
Reza Shah Kabir 
Farabi University 
Fatah Pahlavi University 
Govcrnatcnt 
UircnirJes 
Tehran University 
Azarabadegan University 
FenJowii University 
Isfahan University 
Joodi-Shapour 
National Defence University 
Free University 
Bahichestsn University 
Revohmoniry Corps Univmly 
Teachsrs Training University 
GiUn University 
Kermau University 
Razi University 
Honorary 
Chancellor 
The Shah 
Prince Abdul Reza 
The Shah 
Crown Prince Reza 
The Shah 
The Queen 
The Queen 
Honorary 
ChanrfUnr 
Prioceu Shaluaz 
Chair of the 
Board of Trustees 
A. Alam. Minister of the Imperial Court 
Minister of the Imperial Court 
Princess Fatemeh Pahlavi 
Dr. ManoucherEqbal 
A. Alam, Minister of the Imperial Court 
The Queen 
Minister of Science &. Higher Education 
Chair of the 
Board of Trustees 
Dr. MsnoucherEqlMl 
The Queen's Mother 
Princess Fatemeh Pahlavi 
Princess Asbraf Pahlavi 
Minister of Science & Higher Education 
Minister of Science & Higher Education 
Prince Cholam Reza 
Minister of Science & Higher Education 
Princess Farahnaz 
Princess Asbraf Pahlavi 
Princess Ashraf Pahlavi 
Source: Based on Samii et al. (1978:7) 
30 
The Americanization of higher education was in full swing by the early I970's. All 
the old and new institutions had adopted the American system of semesters, unit/credits, 
boards of trustees, student advisors, etc., and the European "chair" system had been 
abolished in the old institutions. However, the boards did not function according to the 
American model. Comparing Iranian boards with the American models, Samii et al. 
(1978:12) reported the failure of the boards by the late 1970's: 
Imported from the United States-where it had been an important 
tool to advance the objectives of universities, colleges, and non-
profit organizations-the boards have faced serious difficulties in 
Iran in recent years, to the extent that they were almost 
abolished ... In Iran, most board members are top-level 
government employees seeking prestige without having either 
the power or the willingness to perform functions similar to 
those performed by board members in the United States. 
The failure of the boards can be explained in terms of the nature of the Iranian state 
and relations between the state and university. The absolutist monarchy, faced with 
increasing opposition from the university, did not allow any degree of self-government at 
these institutions. It seems that in the U.S., economic and political conditions for 
governance by the boards exist; that is why the boards emerged in the U.S. where the 
university has established close ties with the capitalist economy and the oppositional role of 
the students and faculty is most prominent during periods of crisis (e.g., in the 1960s). In 
Iran, the conflict between the state and the university is most persistent and prominent in the 
political arena. The state dominates the economy by monopolizing heavy industry, oil, 
fisheries, rail and air transportation, tobacco, etc. 
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2.1.3.3 Expansion of Higher Education: The Control Dimension 
The rapid expansion of higher education after the 1960's resulted in the further 
aggravation of the conflict between the university and the state. The Americanization of the 
administrative structure of the universities discussed above and the formation of a new 
Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 1968 were, to some extent, attempts on the part 
of the state to ensure the political loyalty of the institutions. 
The expansion process had multiple sources and the expansion policy was complex 
and underwent a number of changes. The focus of this chapter will be upon administrative 
aspects of the expansion. 
By 1946, i.e., twelve years after the founding of Tehran University, there was no 
trace of government interest in expanding higher education. In December 1945, the Turkish 
people of Azarbaijan revolted against the central government and established their 
autonomous republic. The first provincial university was established in this republic in 1946. 
Turkish replaced Persian as the language of instruction (Ferqe-ye Demukrdt-e Azarbdijdn 
1946:60). The popular government of Azarbaijan was, however, toppled after the Royal 
Army offensive in December 1946. Although many of the achievements of the republic 
(e.g., women's suffrage rights, land distribution, use of Turkish as language of instruction) 
were repudiated by the Shah's regime, the monarch was unable-for propaganda purposes-to 
close down the university. 
The Shah's regime embarked on ceaseless propaganda against the Republic and the 
date of the fall of the Republic (Azar 21st/December 12) was made a national holiday 
officially celebrated. Research on the Republic and its neighbouring democratic Kurdish 
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republic was not allowed under the Shah. Government-controlled Iranian sources (see 
Daneshgah-e Azarabadegan 1974-75:j-ch) and even Ph.D. dissertations written by Iranians 
abroad and tapping on these sources, claim that the first provincial university was established 
by the central government in 1947. However, the fact that the establishment of provincial 
universities was imposed on the cental government by the Azarbaijan Republic was 
underlined by Iranian officials during controversy among Iranian academics and university 
administrators in 1947 (see, e.g. Shafii 1975:1118-1119). 
In a recent history of the institution prepared and published by the University, it is 
admitted that the founding of Tabriz University by the Shah's government was due to 
pressures from the people of Azarbaijan and students of the dissolved university for whom 
the need for such institution had become tangible (Daneshgah-e Tabriz 1987:4). 
Soon after the fall of the Republic, Colleges of Medicine were established in Tabriz, 
Isfahan, Shiraz and Mashhad. They were gradually expanded into universities but did not 
receive adequate attention (Shafii 1975) until the 1960's. 
The expansion of the universities in the late 1940's was, therefore, due to political 
rather than economic (e.g., training skilled human resources) considerations. A policy of 
expansion was, however, apparent in the 1960's. The policy responded, in part, to an ever-
increasing demand for higher education (the number of applicants for admission increased 
from 15,000 in 1963 to 292,000 by 1977; see Mojab 1985:28). 
Another objective of the expansion policy was to undermine the political and 
educational authority of Tehran University. As early as 1960, the Court Minister Hosein 
'Ala told a visiting American educational advisor, Gaylord Hamwell (1962:22), that the 
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university had been "handicapped by a location in the capital city where students constitute a 
ready-made instrument for political devastation and propaganda." According to one 
observer, Marvin Zonis (1971:42), 
Despite the regime's control over the social backgrounds of the 
entering students, it is harder for the regime to control the 
instruction that these elite children receive. Thus, the response 
of the Shah has been to expand the university system, where 
necessary, by building completely new institutions outside the 
capital city with a younger and previously uninvolved faculty. 
(presumably, the recent Ph.D.'s from America and Doctorates 
from France have matured in the more pacific, post-Mossadegh 
period).* 
The policy of both undermining Tehran University's authority and responding to the 
increasing demand for higher education was implemented through the transformation of 
Shiraz University into an American-style institution (affiliated with the University of 
Pennsylvania) and through the founding of nongovernment institutions. According to Bill 
(1972:99-100), while the methods of student control in Tehran University included force and 
open intimidation, in Pahlavi University the method was bribery in the form of scholarships 
(see also below). Other bribes in the form of dormitories, food, sport facilities, and easier 
access to the University of Pennsylvania were also offered. 
The first nongovernment institution, the National University of Iran, was in fact 
* The Shah had expressed his plan to establish an American University to the U.S. 
Government during his 1958 visit to the United States (Hendershot 1975:244). In his 
autobiographical work (Pahlavi 1960:262), the monarch wrote: "To stimulate our entire 
educational system, I should like to establish here a university modeled strictly on American 
lines and with a primarily American staff." 
34 
established (1960) by the Shah9 and tightly controlled by the government. The Board of 
Trustees was formed by a Royal Decree under the chairmanship of Hosein Ala, Minister of 
Royal Court, and the chancellor was appointed. Soon, more non-government post-secondary 
institutions were opened. The most important was Aryamehr Industrial University founded 
in 1966. Like the National University, this institution, which played a major role in the 
1978-79 revolution (see 2.2.1), was controlled by the Royal Court. 
One major consideration behind the formation of non-government institutions was 
their supposed potential for more obedient student populations. By charging large sums of 
tuition fees, the government hoped that nongovernment institutions would tie the students 
down to classrooms and the library. This objective was not, however, realized. 
Economic considerations played a major role in the expansion of the universities in 
the 1970's. The sharp rise in the oil revenue ($34 million in 1953 to $5 billion in 1973 to 
$20 billion in 1977, according to Abrahamian 1980:21-22) and the application of the Nixon 
Doctrine to Iran (turning Iran into the military and economic base of the U.S. in the Persian 
Gulf area; see, among others, Cottam 1979:334) are two examples of this. This new role of 
Iran, called by the Shah "Great Civilization", included the building of the Royal Army into 
the fifth largest army of the world (including huge military bases and highways, high-tech 
weaponry, etc.) and the encouragement of foreign investment. 
The new role of Iran in the Persian Gulf region required the employment of a sizable 
high-skilled pool of human resources. According to a 1977 government study, Iran would 
9
 For the complete text of the constitution of the National University of Iran see Ministry 
of Culture and Higher Education. Islamic Republic of Iran 1982:278-80. 
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need, by 1978, 1,122% more engineers (general), 966% more industrial engineers, 660% 
more chemical technicians, 647% more exploration and metallurgy engineers, 173% more 
university professors, etc. (Samii et al. 1978:17). Thus, the universities were expanded 
rapidly. The number of institutions of higher education jumped from 73 in the 1960's to 137 
in 1970 and to 250 in 1975 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Expansion of Institutions of Higher 
Education in Iran (1950-1975) 
250 
137 
73 
17 
Number of 
Institutions 
1950 1960 1970 1975 
Years 
Source: this calculation is based on data furnished by Iran. 
Ministry of Science and Higher Education 1974 
2.1.3.4. Direct Rule of the Shah: Polky-Making 
and Militarization of the Campus 
The unprecedented expansion of the universities discussed above created a large, 
concentrated, student population in the capital city of Tehran, the provincial capitals and a 
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number of outlying towns. Ensuring the political loyalty of this potentially disloyal 
opposition force was a major administrative challenge to the regime. 
A number of administrative measures aimed at the effective control of the campuses 
were taken. One was the formation of a Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 1968 
(this, together with the Ministry of Culture and Arts emerged from the Ministry of Education 
which remained in charge of primary and secondary education). The formation of a Ministry 
in charge of higher education did not, however, guarantee effective control. In fact, by the 
mid 1970's, some seventeen inter-ministerial councils and thirty-seven committees were 
established to instill some unity of action (see Table 1 above and Eicher et al. 1976:33). 
Alarmed by mounting student struggles in Iran, the U.S. and Europe (Vaghefi and 
Vaghefi 1976:139-140), the monarch sought to bring the universities under his direct 
supervision and improve strict military and secret policy control over the campuses. In 
1968, the Shah announced an "Education Revolution" which, in essence, consisted of his 
direct supervision of the higher educational system. Part of this "Revolution" were the 
much-celebrated annual educational conferences held at Ramsar (a summer resort on the 
Caspian Sea) under the Shah's own or the Queen's control and attended by top 
administrators, chancellors and officials affiliated with university affairs. 
Between 1968 and 1975, the Shah chaired eight conferences where educational policy 
was made. According to Iranian sources close to the Shah, the initiation of the first Ramsar 
conference in 1968 was: 
due primarily to the events which had taken place earlier in the 
universities of the West and especially in the United States, 
namely, the student rebellion against the status quo, and at times 
the autocratic rules which symbolized the middle ages in those 
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universities, the latter more relevant to the universities in France 
(Ibid.). 
In addition to the conferences which formulated policy, an Imperial Council of 
Education, chaired by the Shah and the Queen, was set up which was designed to play an 
increasingly important role in charting the course of higher education (Samii et al 1978:9). 
By 1968, educational policy-making at the highest level was, thus, the prerogative of 
the Royal Court. The enforcement of policy was relegated to a complex web of 
administrative bodies. The enforcement of "law and order" was assigned to the secret 
police (SAVAK), the police, and the University Guards. 
Secret policy control had begun earlier in 1962. Writing in 1972, James Bill 
(1972:99-100), an observer of Iranian politics, noted that: "The three-pronged policy of 
intimidation, bribery, and selected concession has succeeded in some degree to quiet the 
students down. It has not Succeeded in diminishing their Opposition liGf can it build 
commitment".10 
10
 The extent of control at Tehran University can be gauged from the following. 
According to a student who attended Tehran University in 1960-63 and 1968-72, "after the 
January 21, 1962 (1st Bahman 1340) attack on demonstrating students when government 
troops devastated the campus of Tehran University, high metal fences were set up all around 
the campus and entry into the campus was checked at the entrance doors. By the early 
1970's, security was very tight. Access to the stacks of the Central Library was limited to 
graduate students but only when accompanied by a mustakhdem (servant) of the library. No 
one was allowed to post any written message on either the walls or the covered and locked 
bulletin boards. Once, in 1971, one of my professors called me at home just before leaving 
home to attend his class. He asked me to put a note on the door of the classroom to inform 
the students that he could not attend due to illness. While posting the note, the department 
servant passed by and saw me and quickly pulled down the note warning me, 'Don't you 
know you are not allowed to post anything on the walls without permission from the 
Secretariat (Dabrrkhaney-e Daneshgah)?' I had to go to Dablrkhan-e and acquire 
permission and post the message in the covered bulletin board through the mustakhdem who 
held the key to the board" (Interview with Azad, March 19, 1987). 
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In fact, events showed that the student movement, like the underground political 
organizations, had undergone a radical transformation in policy. The student movement 
platform had changed from the reformist slogan of the early 1960's, "The Shah must reign 
not rule," to "Down with the Shah" (see 3.7.0). 
2.2.0 The Revolution, The Fall of the Monarchy and the 
Autonomy of the University (1978 - February 11, 1979) 
Iran, the "Island of stability in the Middle East," was shaken up by an economic 
crisis which gradually evolved during the mid-1970's and matured in the late 1970's. The 
first signs of revolt against the state came from shanty-town dwellers of Shahr-e Rey, a 
satellite town of Tehran. These people attacked the municipality in 1976 and destroyed state 
property and secret service (SAVAK) cars. Open political dissent, limited to the campuses 
up to that point, gradually spread to artists, writers, poets, religious schools and, even, a 
group of veteran politicians of the defunct National Front. 
Campus activities against the state were not reduced in scope or degree by the spread 
of political opposition beyond the universities. In fact, with the gradual upsurge in political 
struggle throughout the nation, university revolt was broadened to involve faculty and staff 
who, together with students, were able to bring about the full sovereignty of institutions of 
higher educational by January-February 1979 when the state was on the verge of collapse. 
It is not feasible to examine the widespread revolt against the administrative structure 
of higher education on all campuses. To provide insight into the process of dismantling the 
old administrative structure and its replacement by a system of self-rule, developments in 
Aryamehr Industrial University will be examined. 
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2.2.1 Aryamehr Industrial University: A Case Study of a Struggle for Autonomy 
Aryamehr Industrial University, renamed Sharif after the Revolution, was set up as a 
model for new apolitical institutions of higher education in 1966 (see 2.1.3.3). The monarch 
hoped that the institutions would undermine the academic and political weight of Tehran 
University's Technical College (Daneshkadeh-ye Fannl) which was the best technical school 
but, at the same time, was a hotbed of political activism. 
The new institution was bolstered by hiring the best experts, providing better salaries 
and lighter teaching loads to faculty, and by encouraging research. In less than seven years, 
the university had nine colleges, three instructional centers and four research centers. By the 
mid-1970's, it became a top-ranking academic institution attracting the best graduates of 
secondary schools. 
While Aryamehr University, like other institutions, was not autonomous (the 
president, vice-presidents and supervisors of administrative office were all appointees), it did 
enjoy more self-governing status on the college level than other institutions. For instance, 
the deans of colleges and the research and instructional centers were elected directly by the 
members of the councils of the colleges and centers. 
The college councils played an active role in the administration of the university. The 
faculty and staff seriously pursued issues such as employment, promotion, and the planning 
of instructional programs, in fact they set up special committees in order to secure the 
interests and rights of the academic and administration staff. In order to protect their 
professional interests, the faculty and staff, for the first time in the history of Iranian higher 
institutions, formed a professional executive organ called "Welfare Committee" (kumtte-ye 
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refdh) (Pegah 1987a:33). 
The first confrontation of the faculty with the state occurred in March 1976 when the 
members of the faculty protested state interference in university affairs, the violation of 
freedoms in the university, and the presence of (security) guards on the campus (B.Kh., No. 
16, Shahrivar/August 23, 1977, p. 1). The government, disappointed by the faculty and 
university council's lack of cooperation in suppressing politically active students, decided to 
put an end to the problem by either dissolving the university or transferring it to Isfahan, the 
capital of Isfahan province in central Iran, where a branch of the institution had been 
established in the late 1960s (Pegah 1987a:37). 
The plan to transfer the entire university to Isfahan was announced by the Minister of 
Higher Education in the winter of 1977. The decision violated the university's constitution 
which stipulated the establishment of the institution in Tehran for an "unlimited period" 
under the Higher Trustship of the Shah (Article One)" and that the institution branches of the 
university could be set up in provincial cities if proposed by the vice-trustee and approved by 
the Board of Trustees (Article Two)." 
The decision to move Aryamehr University from Tehran was justified by the 
government describing it as complying with the policy of "decentralization in Tehran" and as 
contributing to the solving of the traffic problem. Prime Minister Amuzgar, in an interview 
with BBC radio (quoted in Bestty-e Ayande, Vol. 1, No. 3, Tir 1357/June-July 1978, p. 36), 
referred to problems of traffic, air pollution, housing, overpopulation and inadequate public 
11
 The complete text of the Constitution of Aryamehr University has appeared in Iran. 
Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 1982:270-277. 
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services. "That is why," he said, "we intend to move a number of higher educational 
institutions to other cities" (Ibid.). The government also announced plans to use university 
facilities for establishing a "Center for Military Sciences and Arts." According to the faculty 
of the university, this was a plan to convert the institution from one involved in training 
much-needed experts and engineers to one to be used for training military experts to suppress 
the people (B.Kh., No. 2, 27 Urdibehesht/April 17, 1977). The Premier argued that the 
industrial University had been expected to be turned into a polytechnic. "By polytechnic we 
meant not the French but, rather, its American concept-i.e., a school capable of training 
something between an engineer and technician. A kind of foreman and individuals capable 
of managing a medium-size factory" (BesU-y-e Ayande, Vol. 1, No. 3, Tir 1357/June-July 
1978, p. 36). 
The government faced stem opposition to the closing of the Tehran campus and its 
transfer to Isfahan. Reacting to this opposition, the government announced that new students 
would not be admitted to the Tehran campus for the forthcoming academic year of 1978-79. 
Thus, the authorities omitted the name of Aryamehr University from the list of institutions 
admitting students in the central entrance exams. The government also transferred twelve 
active members of the faculty to non-educational government offices outside the campus 
(B.Kh., No. 16, 1 Shahrivar/August 23, 1978, p. 2). 
The academic and administrative staff did not give up. The first action was a letter 
addressed to the Premier and signed by 138 faculty members (3 Bahman/January 23, 1977). 
No response came and the state-controlled media refused to make it public. During the first 
week of Urdibehesht (third week of April) an unsigned leaflet entitled "Do not let them 
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dissolve Aryamehr Industrial University" circulated widely and clandestinely on the campus. 
The leaflet denounced the government decision as being detrimental to the national, academic 
and progressive interests of the country (Pegah 1987a: 39). It also called on all of the 
universities throughout the country to oppose the regime's action. Soon after the circulation 
of the leaflet, the Welfare Committee (a faculty-staff professional organ, see above) 
organized a faculty meeting which issued a resolution declaring a strike of the academic staff 
(27 Urdibehesht/May 17, 1977) to be in effect until the government officially allows the 
admission of new students to the Tehran campus. 
Another action defying the authority of the state was the publishing of the BOltdn-e 
Khabart (News Bulletin) of the Industrial University by using the facilities of the 
"Publication Committee" (In Iran, all books and periodical publications must be authorized 
by the government). The Bulletin included, in addition to news about the strike, information 
about struggles and strikes in other higher institutions and throughout the country. It was 
Iran's only uncensored and unlicensed periodical and it was reprinted in and outside the 
country. 
The question of autonomy was addressed in the second issue of the B.Kh., 27 
Urdibehesht/May 17, 1977, p. 1, 4). The government wanted to dissolve the university 
because the faculty had: (1) demanded autonomy and freedom for the university, (2) insisted 
on compliance with the regulations and by-laws of the university, (3) had opposed all kinds 
of beating, battery and non-human actions and the presence of security guards on campus, 
and (4) had organized to achieve their legal objectives and rights. 
On the orders of the Chancellor, the payment of faculty salaries was stopped on 17 
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Urdibehesht/May 17, 1977, all government financial support was called off, and the 
University was declared a private institution to be financed by faculty, students and staff. 
The Chancellor, Dr. Mehran, also ordered the evacuation of the office equipment of 
the Scientific Publications Institute (Mu'assese-ye Entesharat-e 'Elml) and dismissed its 
managing director (Ayandegdn, 21 Urdibehesht/April 11, 1977). In another action, the 
cafeteria for the staff was closed down (B.Kh., No. 2. 27 Urdibehesht/May 17, 1977). The 
government responded to the strike by preventing the entrance of the students to the campus 
as of June 9, 1978 (Rastdkhtz, May 29, 1977). Moreover, the Board of Trustees was made 
responsible for maintaining order and the government agreed to provide assistance for 
keeping order (Ayandegdn, May 29, 1977). One of the deans of colleges was demoted and 
one faculty member was dismissed.12 
By this time (spring 1978) waves of strikes and demonstrations had engulfed all 
higher education institutions. Government policy included the suppression of resistance by 
all possible means, especially through violence. The guards attacked Tabriz University on 
May 8, 1978 and the Tehran University dormitories on May 30, 1978. These violent actions 
failed, however, to intimidate the students or faculty and staff whose demands were limited 
to purely academic and professional issues. In fact, the government's iron hand led to 
further politicization of the professoriate and staff. By late spring, most of the faculty and 
staff had joined the struggle and the chancellors and security guards were the backbone of 
state authority on the campus. Thus, expulsion and dissolution of the campus guards and 
12
 The dismissed professor was Dr. Farzad Biglari. Later, after one year in jail, he was 
executed by the Islamic regime on 1 Esfand 1361/20 February 1982. 
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security officials became a major demand of the university. The Faculty of Azarabadagan 
(Tabriz) University issued a resolution calling for the expulsion of the guards (Nehzat. 30 
Urdibehesht/April 20, 1977, p. 3). Opposition to the top echelons of university 
administration was also mounting. The Chancellor of Tehran University, for example, had 
decided, without consulting with the faculty, to assign an F grade to all students who had 
boycotted classes. The faculty protested the decision which they called a "manifest crime" 
(Junbesh, No. 4, 20 Khurdad/May 10, 1977, p. 106 and Nehzat, No. 2, 12 Khurdad/ June 2, 
1977, p. 91). 
In response to financial pressure by the government, the faculty of Aryamehr 
University set up a "Loan Fund" which was administered by a group composed of 
representatives of all the colleges. Enormous sums of money were contributed by the 
public13 and the faculty of other universities. 
The most important measure taken by the faculty in directly eradicating the authority 
of the state was to declare the admission of students for the forthcoming academic year 1978-
79. Admission was always conducted through annual control exams and no university was 
allowed to admit students independently. This unprecedented action had two major 
implications: it rejected state rule over the campus through the Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education, the Board of Trustees, and the appointed Chancellor and it turned the 
issue of dissolving Aryamehr University into a national issue. The faculty set up a "Student 
Admission Committee" which submitted to two major dailies, Kayhdan and Etteld'dt, 
13
 Monetary contributions were made by, among others, the Society of Trades, Guilds 
and Craftsmen of Tehran Bazar (Khabarndm-e-ye, Ettehdd-e NtrQhd-ye Jebhe-ye MellC-ye 
Irdn, No. 15, 20 Tir 1357/June 11, 1978). 
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advertisements announcing the admission of students. The advertisements appeared in the 
first edition of Ettela'at (3 Tir 1357/June 25, 1978) only because government censorship 
prevented its subsequent publication. However, students and others voluntarily reproduced 
the ad and circulated it throughout the country. The action was applauded enthusiastically 
and more than 20,000 applicants submitted their applications.14 
The government responded by publishing false announcements in the strictly 
controlled media. For example, an announcement appeared in the dailies which disclaimed 
the ad published in the first edition of Etteld'dt declaring that"... the public is hereby 
informed that this ad is not official and it violates university regulations on student admission 
and that it was submitted to the newspaper by irresponsible individuals and without the 
approval of the Board of Trustees and university authorities; it is therefore invalid" 
(RastdkhH, 5 Murdad 1356/ July 27, 1978). 
The government ad was reprinted in the same paper on 10 Murdad/August, 1978. In 
order to weaken the growing power of the faculty, staff and students, and the "national" 
solidarity built around this struggle, the government took an extraordinary measure. "Special 
facilities" were offered to students who wanted to leave Aryamehr University and to study 
abroad. These facilities removed two obstacles which faced all students - the students who 
had not done their compulsory military service would be exempt from paying deposits" and 
14
 The "Admission Committee" extended the application deadline from 26 Murdad/July 
17 to 9 Shahrivar 1357/August 31, 1978 (B.Kh., No. 15, 25 Murdad 1357/July 16, 1978, p. 
7). 
15
 Secondary school graduates were exempt from compulsory military service while 
studying for a degree in institutions of higher education. They were drafted into the army if 
they discontinued their studies. No one could obtain passports without going through 
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the Ministry of Science and Higher Education would facilitate the issuance of passports by 
helping people to leave as "transfer students" to American universities for the summer to 
learn the English language (B.Kh., No. 14, 18 Murdad 1356/August 9, 1977, p. 3-4). These 
measures failed, however, to weaken the revolt. 
Instead of achieving the desired objective of putting down opposition to the state, 
repressive measures on and off the campus further fanned the flames of revolutionary 
struggle throughout the summer. This led to defeat after defeat for the regime. Responding 
to the situation, the Shah removed the Prime Minister and a "National Conciliation 
Government" headed by Premier J. Sharif-Emami was set up (August 17/November 5, 
1978). "Conciliation" did not, however, materialize and, instead, revolutionary activism 
together with state coercion broadened and deepened. At Aryamehr, the striking faculty and 
staff had the upper hand and did not accept any state authority as legitimate or competent to 
manage the university. In fact the B.Kh., of Aryamehr University announced, in July 1978, 
the Ministry of Science and Higher Education to be suspended (mu*allaqe) (Ibid.) and, soon, 
djsjojjred. (Ibid., No. 16, 16 Shahrivar/ September 1, 1978, p. 1). 
By August, strikers' demands included 1) the revocation of the decision to transfer 
Aryamehr University from Tehran to Isfahan, 2) the reinstatement of the twelve faculty 
members who had been appointed to non-academic positions, 3) the payment of faculty 
salaries, 4) the election of the chancellor through a council formed by elected faculty 
members, and 5) the admission of students for the academic year 1978-79. 
The most important demand-the election of the chancellor by faculty members-aimed 
military service. 
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at a more autonomous status for the institution. The government, increasingly weakened by 
the mounting struggle throughout the country, finally accepted all the demands (Ayandegdn, 
8 Shahrivar/August 7, 1978) and the university council for the first time elected the 
chancellor (B.Kh., No. 18, 15 Shahrivar/ September 6, 1978, p. 1). In achieving all their 
goals, the striking faculty were able to enjoy an autonomous status unprecedented in Iran. 
All academic, administrative and financial affairs were now under the jurisdiction of the 
university council which was elected by the colleges and "centers". The elected president 
announced that he would execute the council's decisions and directives (Pegah 1987a:46). 
The autonomy achieved by Aryamehr University was a product of the struggle against 
the state on and off the campus. Also, autonomy could not materialize in the absence of the 
"revolutionary crisis or situation"-one in which, according to Lenin (Lenin 1915:464), "it is 
impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change ..." and "... there 
is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses" who are drawn "into independent 
historical action." It was under this evolving revolutionary crisis that the universities, 
fighting unswervingly, removed all traces of state rule over the campus and achieved full 
independence by early February, 1979. A major product of the struggle on campus was the 
formation of the National Organization of Iranian Academics (hereafter NOIA, Sazman-e 
MelE-ye Daneshgahi-yan-e Iran). 
The NOIA's policy on university autonomy will be discussed below while its 
formation and the activism of its membership will be examined in 3.2.1. 
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2.2.2 The National Organization of Iranian Academics 
and the Struggle for Autonomy 
The increasing involvement of the faculty in political activism, especially the 
successful struggle of those in Aryamehr University, led to the formation of the National 
Organization of Iranian Academics (NOIA). More than one hundred faculty members from 
all over the country participated in the deliberative meeting of July 25, 1978 held at Tehran 
Polytechnical Institute. The goals of the organization were summed up as (Pegah 1987b:3): 
1. The defence of the autonomy of the universities. 
2. The defence of the economic and social rights of academics. 
3. The continued university activism as part of the struggle of the 
Iranian people for social justice. 
A committee consisting of thirty members (one to four representatives from each 
institution) was elected in order to draft the constitution of the organization. Also nine 
individuals were elected to act as the organization's provisional executive committee. 
The "National Reconciliation Government" tried to maintain state control of the 
universities by taking the initiative with respect to autonomy. Houshang Nahavandi, former 
chancellor of Shiraz and Tehran Universities, was appointed Minister of Science and Higher 
Education and he introduced the "Bill on University Autonomy" to the Parliament. The bill 
was rejected by all faculty members throughout the country who called it the "Bill on 
Dissolution" of the universities (Kayhan, 12 Mehr/October 4, 1978). They argued that "the 
'bill' granted vast powers to the Minister of Science and the Central Council of Universities 
and their ancillary board of trustees (Articles 1, 6 and 15)." The faculty of National 
University rejected the bill on similar grounds-i.e., it granted total power to the Ministry of 
Science, relegating university autonomy to boards of trustees who would, in practice, be 
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appointees, granting all university powers to the board of trustees, causing confusion in 
financial affairs and hiring procedures, the selection of the chancellor by the board of 
trustees, and the dissociation of research from the universities (Ibid.). Thus, the concept of 
"autonomy," compared with the pre-revolutionary period (See 2.0.0, 2.1.0, and 2.1.1), was 
more radicalized. 
The formation of NOIA was officially declared on October 4. Over one thousand 
academics had approved the organization's charter. The charter stated (Kavoshgar, No. 2, 
Winter 1987, pp. 19-21): 
we, academics of Iran, consider the continued existence of the 
present university system inconsistent with scientific dignity and 
national independence and contradictory to the real demands of 
the university community. In order to enable the university 
community to take steps toward its real mission, we demand: 1) 
autonomy of the university system, 2) democracy in the 
university system, 3) freedom in the university, and 4) social 
welfare of the university community. 
The first article of the charter deals with university autonomy and reads, "... 
university autonomy will materialize [if it is] detached from personal interests and individual 
desires and free from all interventions by the state and executive organs ... University 
autonomy is one of the principal pillars of the flourishing of society; encroachment on 
autonomy is encroachment on the past, present and future of society" (Ibid.). According to 
the second article, "any kind of despotic power is inconsistent with democracy in the 
university system. All those in charge of the university must be elected through the voting 
of and from among the university community" (Ibid., p. 56). Article three deals with 
cultural and economic freedoms and declares that "freedom of thinking, freedom of speech, 
freedom to discriminate ideas, and thought and freedom of association are important elements 
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of university freedom." Article four calls for academic "job security" (Ibid.). 
Unanimous opposition to the "Autonomy Bill" and the government's policy of 
perpetrating state control of the universities led to a major retreat by the Shah's regime. The 
Minister of Science and Higher Education, Houshang Nahavandi, resigned. On his first day 
in office, the new minister, Fazlollah Qazi, announced the revocation of the bill and the 
government's decision to meet all the demands of the university community (Kayhdn, 1 
Aban/October 23, 1978) as follows: 
* The bill on universities now under consideration in the Parliament will be 
immediately revoked and another bill with a new approach and with 
consideration to the views of the faculty and with their cooperation will be 
prepared and presented to the Parliament. The Minister said this action will be 
taken very quickly and he is sure the faculty will cooperate with him. The 
basic principles of the bill will become guidelines for the Ministry. 
* The complete and real independence of the universities such as financial, 
educational and administrative independence will be enacted. 
* All university positions such as the chairman of the department, chancellor 
of the university and heads of colleges will be on elective basis. The 
circumstances of the election, which will be by direct and secret voting, will 
be determined according to the views of the faculty. 
* The position of the chancellor of the university will be a totally non-political 
position. The purpose is to let university authorities and personalities regain 
their deserved immunity and respect. 
* The University Council will be the highest authority and source of decision-
making in the university. 
* The present boards of trustees with their actual composition and form will be 
declared dissolved and their tasks will be undertaken by the universities 
replacing units whose form and content will be decided by the councils. 
However, since legislation is needed for this purpose the present boards of 
trustees will continue their activities till the passing of legislation. 
* The faculty members who have been retired without reason and are prepared 
and qualify to work in the university will be called to resume their work with 
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respect at the first available opportunity. 
* Freedom and immunity of writing, speaking, discussion will be secured 
within the confines of the universities and institutions of higher education. 
* The university guards will be removed and since the internal order of the 
universities is the concern of the universities themselves, it will be undertaken 
by the chancellor of the university and higher education centers and this will 
be regarded as an internal issue. 
* All the students who have been in trouble because of political activities in 
the past years will be released. 
* The administration of each institution of higher education will be based on 
the principle of independence and decentralization and the relegation of powers 
to the universities and in the hands of faculty members with the cooperation of 
the students and administrative staff. 
* Removal of discrimination in pay ... 
* Attention to be paid to the financial and welfare situation of the 
administrative staff. 
The Minister said, "All my efforts will be directed at preventing the intervention of 
non-university authorities in the affairs of the university. I would like to inform you that I 
regard the Ministry of Science, from now on, as an administrative organ that serves the 
universities which will strive, together with the faculty, to actualize the above-mentioned 
plans and, then, I will talk to the universities and experts about the fate of this Ministry in 
connection with the University." 
The government's spectacular retreat-i.e., granting all the demands of the university 
community—was apparently based on a policy of quelling a major center of dissent-the 
universities. This policy could succeed only if the academics continued to have a concept of 
autonomy limited to administrative self-rule detached from more vital issues such as 
democracy and freedom on and off the campus (this was the concept of autonomy in the late 
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1940's, early 1950's and early 1960's when, under conditions of political crisis, the 
professoriate was able to raise the demand for autonomy; see 2.1.0 and 2.1.1). However, 
this radicalization of the concept of autonomy together with the increasing unfolding of the 
revolutionary crisis led to the failure of the government initiative. Offering "complete and 
real independence" to the university did not appease the rebellious institutions because the 
state had already lost its control. The university, which was the only unceasing center of 
political struggle under conditions of political stability, could not turn into an island of 
stability at a time when the masses of people were fighting for the overthrow of the 
monarchical state. In fact, availing themselves of the freedoms achieved, the academics, led 
by NOIA, continued their struggle and decided to reach out to the movement off the campus. 
Towards this end, two important campaigns, the National Solidarity Week and the Re-
opening of the University, were organized (see 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2). 
2.2.3 Final Steps Toward Autonomy 
The purpose of the National Solidarity Week, organized by NOIA, was to turn the 
universities into a spring-board for the ever-growing national struggle against the state. In a 
country where freedom of association did not exist, the universities were closed to the non-
academic public and therefore the only location where people, irrespective of their 
profession, could get together was the mosque and, at times, the covered bazaar. Taking 
advantage of the freedoms achieved, the NOIA opened a new battlefield against the state. 
People of all walks of life welcomed Solidarity Week. Academia, once isolated, 
turned into an active arena for political, educational, artistic, intellectual and organizational 
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activity. Speeches by writers, artists, poets, political activists and political prisoners just 
released attracted tens of thousands of people to the campuses, especially at Tehran 
University located at the center of the capital city. A major religious/political figure, 
Ayatollah Taleqani, sent a message of support to the organizers of Solidarity Week. The 
universities throughout the country turned into gathering places, headquarters for the 
dissemination of news and the distribution of leaflets, and starting points for marches and 
demonstrations (Sh.A., No. 17, November 1978).16 The university was in fact called a 
"Bastion of Freedom" (sangar-e OzOdt). 
The government tried to stop the activities of the NOIA by announcing in the state-
controlled media that only students with identification cards would be permitted to enter the 
campus. However, thousands of people poured onto the Tehran University campus on 
Saturday, November 4th. A demonstration began and when demonstrators marched towards 
the southern entrance door to begin their march, troops began shooting. Several dozen 
demonstrators were killed. The next day, demonstrators pulled down the Shah's statue at 
Tehran University (from an eyewitness report, published in Sh.A., No. 17, November 1978). 
The "National Reconciliation" cabinet of Premier Sharif-Emami resigned and the Shah 
installed General Az-hari at the head of a "military government" (November 5, 1978 -
December 29, 1978). The new government ordered all the universities closed down for an 
indefinite period (France Press quoted in Yddndm-e, p. 17). 
The military government failed to stem the revolutionary tide, and the crisis in the 
16
 A new publication, Hambastegt (Solidarity), which was jointly produced by NOIA and 
the Iranian Writers Association appeared at this time. 
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government worsened. Soon, a new cabinet headed by Shahpour Bakhtiar, a rightist member 
of the liberal nationalist opposition, was installed by the Shah (December 29, 1978 -
February 11, 1979). 
NOIA considered the closing of the universities as a significant step by the state 
towards suppressing the revolutionary movement. The NOIA believed that the campuses 
should be reopened even by force if necessary. Thus, the week of 20-26 Day 1357/January 
10-16, 1979 was declared "Re-opening Week." They engaged in extensive publicity to 
prepare the public for re-opening and decided to try reopening the Industrial University by 
faculty without the presence of the students. Depending on government reaction, they 
intended to incite the public to reopen Tehran University (Pegah 1987b:9). The NOIA 
announced on 19 Day 1357/January 9, 1979: 
Reopening is the basic demand of the Iranian people. The 
Government has closed the institutions; their opening will be a 
great obstacle to the despotic and conspiratorial powers. Now 
that people all over Iran have declared the illegitimacy of the 
ruling power, the only legitimate source to decide the complete 
reopening of the universities and institutions of higher education 
is the university community (students, staff and faculty). The 
destinies of the university systems must be relegated to the 
university community.17 
In response to this call, the universities were gradually reopened by students and the 
public. Aryamehr and Shiraz universities reopened on 20 Day 1357/January 10, 1979. 
Political parties and personalities all supported the course taken by the universities. 
Ayatollah Taleqani called on the people to help the universities (YOdndm-e n.d.:64). The 
Iranian Writers Association invited all members to join the movement for reopening (Ibid.). 
17
 The compete text of this announcement appears in Yddndm-e n. d., p. 64. 
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The NOIA declared its decision to reopen Tehran University with the participation of the 
university community and all other people on 23 Day 1357/January 13, 1979. About half a 
million people took part in the ceremony. Parts of the NOIA resolution read at the 
ceremonies (Ettela'at, January 15, 1979, p. 3) are as follows: 
To protest the military encirclement of the universities, to protest the 
closing of the universities on students, staff and faculty, to protest the policy 
of silence of the appointed and imposed management of the universities, a 
group of Tehran University faculty, members of the NOIA, began a sit-in to 
open the university, this bulwark of freedom, twenty-five days ago at the 
Administration Building of Tehran University. 
The atrocious regime used utmost effort to break the sit-in by military 
encirclement of the place, by terrorizing, by the beating and wounding of our 
striking colleagues at the Ministry of Higher education and by martyring our 
colleague Kamran Nejatollahi. 
... the reopening of the universities is the demand of all the people of 
Iran. In the words of Ayatollah Taleqani, "the university is the center for 
purification (tazkiye) and education of the young generation and is a bulwark 
of freedom and freedom-loving.'* 
This great gathering ... is an occasion to declare that the Iranian 
academics bow to the creative and revolutionary genius of the Iranian people 
and regard it their duty to sincerely take part in the realization of the future-
building demands of all our society. The main demand of the revolutionary 
movement of the people is to overthrow the despotic system that depends on 
imperialism. Today, the people of our country want to bring about 
fundamental changes in all the present political, social and economic 
institutions and to build an independent progressive and free society on the 
ruins of this despotic system. 
This gathering is an occasion to declare that the realization of real 
independence, democracy and freedom of the university is impossible unless 
independence, democracy and freedom rules in all levels of society; 
independence and democracy will be realized in a university which develops 
the culture and knowledge of society away from aggression and rule of the 
colonial powers, a culture which embraces, and is responsive to, the ideals of 
a free and independent nation. 
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This gathering is an occasion to declare that the academics must always 
be with the people and serving them and try to create conditions in which the 
present class-based and colonial university changes into one that is responsive 
to present-day needs and freedom of speech and thought will be respected 
therein. 
This gathering is an occasion to declare that in building the future 
university all the students, staff and faculty must together participate in all 
university activities and all the students, staff and professors who have been 
dismissed for political reasons must come back to the university. 
We strongly condemn the violent behaviour of the ruling power and the 
offending behaviour of the appointed and imposed administrators of the 
university toward the students, staff and faculty. 
We condemn again the recent massacres and demand that those 
responsible be tried in the presence of the Iranian people. We demand that all 
the prisoners of the period of despotism be released. We warmly greet the 
heroic people who have helped us reopen the university and we take upon 
ourselves to defend the achievements of the people. 
We declare that the ruling power does not have any legitimacy and 
legality and the governments appointed by this system or to be appointed by it 
will only serve the interests of the enemies of the Iranian nation. 
Down with the corrupt despotic rule! 
Long live the unity of the academics 
with the people of Iran! 
Long live the struggle of the heroic people of Iran! 
Other universities reopened on January 15 and 16 (see the news in Kayhan and 
Ettela'at). After reopening, the faculty and students took several measures in order to 
exercise their sovereignty. A number of changes were instituted: (a) the names of some 
universities were changed (see Table 6 ) , b) the appointed chancellors were dismissed and 
university councils were formed (Kayhdn, January 16, 1979, reported the resignation of the 
chancellor and vice-chancellors of Tehran University, Abu-Reyhan University and National 
University), and c) the struggle of the university was further strengthened to that of the 
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masses. Thus, the NOIA announced that"... the reopening of the universities is not aimed 
at resumption of educational activities but, rather, is for the purpose of further organizing the 
militant forces and protecting the educational and scientific milieu as a 'bastion of freedom'" 
(Kayhdn, January 18, 1979). 
The monarch's departure from the country on January 16 was celebrated throughout 
the country and his statues were brought down on two campuses (Ettela'at, January 17, 
1979, p. 3). Now that the overthrow of the Shah's regime was as certain as the ascendency 
to power of an Islamic leadership, some of the faculty who were members of the NOIA 
announced the formation of their own Islamic Society of Academics (Anjuman-e Eslaml-e 
Daneshgahi-yan) on 28 Day 1357/January 18, 1979 (Kayhdn, January 18, 1979). The group 
was, however, heterogeneous politically and ideologically. Political differentiation, however, 
occured after the coming to power of Khomeini and especially during the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution. 
The universities achieved complete independence during the period from the latter 
part of January until the overthrow of the monarchical regime on February 22, 1979. 
Students belonging to revolutionary parties and groups opened their headquarters on the 
campuses and offered training in the use of firearms. Speeches, revolutionary literature, wall 
newspapers, revolutionary songs, and posters, changed the face of the campuses. The 
campus of Tehran University clearly emerged as the main center of revolutionary activism. 
This was one reason why the clergy left the less lively religious schools and mosques and 
began their sit-in (demanding the return of Khomeini from exile) in Tehran University's 
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mosque on January 28, 1979 (Kayhdn, January 28, 1979).1S Another reason for the 
selection was the clergy's intention of challenging the domination of the campuses by leftist 
students. 
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran from Paris and was 
welcomed by millions of people. He had planned to speak at Tehran University but the 
unprecedented gathering of people prevented him from reaching his destination (Ettela'at, 
February 3, 1979, p. 3). The Shah's regime was overthrown on February 22 following an 
armed uprising. 
2.2.4 University Autonomy: Its Realization 
and Radicalization 
For the first time in Iranian history, the universities enjoyed full autonomy, freedom 
and democratic rule which existed from mid-January to February 22, 1979 when the new 
Islamic regime came to power. Top ranking administrators either left the campus or were 
expelled by students, faculty and staff. The security guards disappeared and students, faculty 
and staff were in charge of the campus. The administrative system installed by the Shah's 
regime was dismantled. 
As was stated earlier (see 2.2.2 & 2.2.3), the revolutionary crisis of 1978-79 drew 
the majority of faculty and staff of the universities into active political struggle side by side 
with students and other people on campus. The faculty emerged as an organized and 
" The NOIA chapter of Tehran University declared its support for the clergy's demand 
and stated that the selection of the campus by the clergymen was "another indication of the 
solidarity of all strata of Iranian people in order to achieve the objectives of the great 
revolution of the Iranian nation" (Ettela'at, January 28, 1979). 
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politically radical group on campus. The NOIA played a significant role in the revolutionary 
struggle during the fall of 1978 and the winter of 1979. 
A major development was the radicalization of the concept of university autonomy. 
Whereas in the 1940's and 1950's autonomy was viewed as a financial and administrative 
arm's length relationship with the government, the faculty began to realize the limitations of 
this perspective. In their struggle against the Shah's state, they reached the conclusion that 
autonomy would materialize only when democracy, and freedoms of speech, ideas and 
association prevailed not only on the campus but, more importantly, throughout society. 
This explains, in part, why the NOIA was not content with the government's offer of 
meeting all the demands relating to autonomy and why, instead, the NOIA chose to continue 
its fight to overthrow the state. 
Autonomy did not loom large during the last four weeks of the Shah's regime. The 
focus was on the overthrow of the monarchical state power. 
2.3.0 The Islamic Republic: Dual Power and the Struggle 
for Political Control of the University 
(February 11, 1979-March 21,1980) 
In analyzing the events of this period two essential features of the new Islamic regime 
must be taken into consideration. First, Islamic state power was not homogeneous 
ideologically or politically; at least three distinct factions shared political power extremely 
conservative (e.g., the Islamic Republic Party), "moderate" or Liberal (e.g., Bazargan 
Cabinet and Bani-Sadr) and radical (e.g., Taleqani and, on particular issues, Khomeini). 
There was conflict, as a result, among these partners in state power. Almost every major 
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issue was affected by this power struggle. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was a 
representative case. 
The second feature of the Islamic regime was its inheritance of the bureaucracy of the 
Shah. SAVAK, the Monarch's Rastakhiz Party, and the police were the only organs of state 
power that were dismantled by the people during the Revolution. This police force was soon 
reinstated without visible change. New organs of coercion-the Revolutionary Committees 
and the Revolutionary Guards-were added to the old Army and Gendarmerie. However, all 
the Ministries (except the Ministry of Court) remained more or less intact. In fact, 
government authorities emphasized, on several occasions, that all the laws, rules and 
regulations of the old regime were binding unless in conflict with Islamic laws (Shar'). 
2.3.1 The Source of Power Adniuustration from Above 
The Shah's regime was overthrown on February 22, 1979 when the army surrendered 
after two days of armed conflict (in a number of military bases in Tehran) with groups of 
leftist revolutionaries. The "liberal", "moderate" cabinet of Premier Bazargan, which had 
been appointed by Khomeini before the February 22 uprising, called for restoration of law 
and order soon after the surrender of the army and the take-over of the state radio and 
television system. The government called on the armed revolutionaries to surrender their 
arms. 
In a move as significant as the disarming of the revolutionaries, Premier Bazargan 
appointed a "temporary superintendent" to Tehran University. The appointment letter, 
published in the media (e.g., Kayhdn, February 24, 1979) reads as follows: 
61 
Dr. Mohammad Maleki 
You are hereby given the duty to take charge of supervising and 
administering Tehran University together with Mrs. Dr. T. Barat-Ali, Dr. H. 
Sabaghyan, Dr. K. Abhari and a limited number of other colleagues who you 
find necessary and you will appoint temporarily [this will be the arrangement], 
until the Minister of Science will be appointed and the regulations for the 
independence of universities will be drawn up. 
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan 
All four appointees were members of NOIA who had religious tendencies. The 
NOIA reprimanded them for accepting the positions and for their non-compliance with the 
policies of the organization (Interview with Dr. N. Pakdaman, October 7, 1983). Also, 
many members of the faculty and students opposed the Premier's action (Kayhdn, 9 Esfand 
1357/February 28, 1979) and called it a non-democratic move (Kayhdn, March 1, 1979). 
However, religious groups such as the Islamic Society of Academics supported the 
appointments (Kayhdn, February 25, 1979) and the Muslim students of Tehran University 
claimed that they did not regard NOIA as a legitimate source of decision-making (Kayhdn, 
February 26, 1979).19 
Several significant points can be discerned in Bazargan's letter of appointment: 1) the 
new chancellor's position was defined as "temporary superintendent" (sarparast-e muvaqqat), 
2) three persons were nominated by the Premier to "supervise and administer" the university 
"together" with the superintendent; this was intended as an opportunity to give a semblance 
of a "council" or collective leadership, 3) the appointees were members of the NOIA; this 
19
 These students were not organized at the time although a week later they declared their 
"Muslim Students' Society of Tehran University" (Anjuman-e Daneshjuyan-e Musalman-e 
Daneshgah-e Tehran) (Ayandegdn, March 4, 1979). 
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emphasizes both the power and the prestige of the organization and the Premier's attempt to 
weaken it by encouraging discord within it, 4) the Premier promised to draw up legislation 
for the independence of the universities; this indicated how popular the idea was, and since 
the old regime was opposed to the autonomy of the institutions, it would have been difficult 
for Bazargan to reject it openly, and finally 5) the appointment of the chancellor of Tehran 
University before the appointment of the new Minister of Higher Education showed how 
important the role played by this university was in the politics of the country. 
The policy of appointments was strongly criticized by NOIA, the students and 
administrative staff. NOIA considered the policy to be anti-democratic and simply a replica 
of the Shah's system of university governance (Ettela'at, March 4, 1979). Instead, the 
organization proposed the principle of administering the university through coordinating 
councils-i.e., councils of students, administrative staff and faculty members elected by direct 
and secret ballot. 
NOIA's program for autonomy was specified in "A Preliminary Draft for the Law on 
University Autonomy" published in the dailies (Ayandegdn, February 20, 1979). Some of 
the articles in this draft are as follows: 
Article 2: Higher academic (scientific) institutions enjoy financial, administrative, 
educational and research autonomy (independence) and have legal character. 
Article 3: Higher academic institutions are independent, non-profit and public units 
which are administered on the basis of freedom, democracy and the principle 
of election on all levels of management and through the participation of the 
members of the faculty, staff and students. 
Article 4: The higher academic institution is administered through a council called "the 
central coordination council." 
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Article 5: The Central Coordination Council (CCC) is composed of all the 
representatives of the (showrd-ye hamdhangt-ye markazt) faculty, staff and 
students of each (academic) unit. 
Article 6: The CCC is composed of three sub-councils of students affairs, financial and 
administrative affairs, and academic and research affairs. 
Article 7: The CCC will elect through secret voting one individual as supervisor 
(accountable) for contact with government and other organizations and three 
individuals as accountable for the sub-councils. 
University relations with the state are predicated on the following: 
Article 23:In order to coordinate instructional and research plans, a council called "the 
Coordinating Council of the Country's Higher Academic Institutes" (CCCHAI) 
should be instituted (showrd-ye hamdhangt-ye mu'assesdt-e dmuzesh-e 'Alt-ye 
keshvar). 
Article 24: The CCCHAI is the highest decision-making authority on the country's higher 
educational system. 
Article 25: The CCCHAI will be composed of the elected representatives of university and 
higher educational institutions and representatives of executive and legislative 
powers.20 
The most urgent measures to be taken by the CCC were described as follows (Ayandegdn, 
February 20, 1979): 
1. New legislation and the determination of university needs. No new 
hiring should take place until this is done. 
2. Helping reinstate students, staff, and members of the faculty who had 
been dismissed from the university for political reasons. 
20
 Khalq-e Musalmdn, dated November 11, 1979, examining this proposed autonomy 
plan, noted that government representatives included the ministers of higher education, 
education, economy and finance, and the head of the Plan and Budget Organization. Also 
included were those members of the parliament who are in charge of committees concerning 
educational planning and budget. 
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3. Determining criteria and procedures for investigating wrong-doings in 
the past and cleaning the university atmosphere. 
The following diagram depicts the structure of the proposed autonomous university system: 
Figure 2. The NOIA's Proposed Plan for an Autonomous University 
The Government 
The Coordinating Council of 
Higher Academic Institution 
The Central Coordinating Council 
of the Higher Academic Institutions 
Student 
Affairs 
Financial and 
Administrative Affairs 
Academic and 
Research Affairs 
Two weeks after the appointment of Tehran University's "temporary superintendent," 
the new government merged the Ministry of Culture and Arts and the Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education into the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. On February 26, 
1979, the new Minister continued appointing temporary superintendents and deans to all of 
the institutions of higher education. Table 3 shows a sample of these appointments for the 
months of February-March 1979. 
2,3,2 "Dual Power" On the Campus 
While the minister lost no time in appointing superintendents and deans of higher 
institutions, the students, faculty, and administrative staff continued their efforts to form 
councils and elect their own deans and superintendents. The Islamic Government did not 
recognize the NOIA or the students as decision-making bodies; they were not, in fact, 
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recognized even as sources of consultation. At the same time, the Ministry (and the 
government in general) was unable to disregard the NOIA and subdue the students. This 
situation was reflected in the attempts to govern the institutions by both sides. Tables 3 and 
4 show the struggle over administrative/political control of the campus during the first month 
after the February 11 uprising. 
Indicative of the dual power are cases of active opposition to the government's efforts 
to rule from above. Two such cases were the appointments of Mr. H. Farid A'lam as 
temporary superintendent of the Polytechnical University and Dr. Taghizad-e as the 
chancellor of National University. A'lam was respected among the students and faculty. 
However, the faculty and students openly opposed his appointment and declared that they 
would continue to run the university through the faculty council and to form the university's 
coordinating council (Kayhdn, February 28, 1979). 
In the case of Dr. Taghizad-e, the faculty of National University protested his 
appointment in a letter to the Minister of Culture and Higher Education noting that Taghizad-
e was a member of the faculty of Manchester University (England) and that his appointment 
was made during the month he was on vacation in Iran. Taghizad-e, the letter noted, had 
left for England and had appointed his deputy as supervisor of the university (Ayandegdn, 
May 27, 1979). Table 5 shows the councils formed until June 1979. 
To sum up, the policy adopted by the Provisional Government of Bazargan was to 
maintain the old system of higher education, i.e., state control of the university. Premier 
Bazargan accepted the election of the chancellors by the deans and no more. "The university 
is a hub of politics, keep it in peace, otherwise it will later serve us out," he had said 
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(Interview with Dr. Naser Pakdaman November 7, 1983, Paris). 
Table 3. Appointment of Chancellors and Deans by the Minister of Higher 
Education and Temporary Superintendents (February 11 - March 11, 1979) 
Date 
Feb. 26, '79 
Feb. 26, '79 
Feb. 27, '79 
Feb. 27, '79 
Mar. 3, '79 
Mar. 4, '79 
Institution 
Abu Reyhan Biruni University 
Shiraz University 
Labor University 
Ferdowsi University 
Shemiran College 
Tehran University 
National University 
Mottahedin University 
Tabriz University 
Science and Industry University 
Farabi University 
Urumiya University 
Damavand College 
Isfahan University 
BuAli Sina University 
Mofidi College 
Isfahan Industrial University 
Sistan and Baluchistan University 
Gilan University 
Position 
Temporary Superintendent 
Temporary Superintendent 
Temporary Superintendent and 
Dean 
Temporary Superintendent and 
Dean 
Temporary Superintendent and 
Dean 
Temporary Superintendent and 
Dean 
Source: Based on data collected from press reports 
and chronology compiled by Mojab (l985:Appendix A) 
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Table 4. Election of the Organs of University Governance by Faculty, Students and 
Administrative Staff (February 11 - March 11, 1979) 
Date 
Feb. 18, '79 
Feb. 21, '79 
Feb. 21, '79 
Feb. 24, '79 
Feb. 26, '79 
Feb. 28, '79 
Feb. 28, '79 
Mar. 3, '79 
Mar. 3, '79 
Mar. 3, 79 
Mar. 3, '79 
Mar. 5, '79 
Mar. 6, '79 
Mar. 8, '79 
Mar. 11, '79 
Name of Institution 
Dehkhuda University (Qazvin) 
Tehran University, College of 
Public Health 
Science and Industry University 
Babulsar College 
Mehdi Reza'i University 
College of Physical Education 
(Tehran University) 
Industrial University 
College of Management (Gilan) 
Technical College (Tehran 
University) 
Teachers Training University 
3 Colleges of Tehran University 
Farabi University 
Tehran University 
Tehran University 
Tehran University 
Election 
Faculty Council 
Coordinating Council 
Deans and Chairmen of the 
Deparments 
Management Council 
Student Council 
Councils 
Chancellor 
Council 
Council 
Student Councils 
Student Councils 
Coordinating Council/Temporary 
Superintendent (confirmed by 
Temporary Superintendent) 
Deans of 3 colleges (confirmed) 
Student Councils 
Deans of 3 colleges (confirmed) 
Source: Based on data collected from press reports and 
chronology compiled by Mojab (1985:Appendix A) 
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Table 5. Coordinating Councils at Tehran University, June 1979 
Name of the Institution 
College of Letter* and 
Huoianiiiei 
College of Economics 
College of Public Health 
and Institute of Health 
Research 
Basic Medical Sciences 
College of Law and 
Political Science 
College of Pharmacy 
College of Veteriniary 
Science 
College of Dentistry 
College of Sciences 
College of Social Science 
and Cooperation* 
College of Aonunistrativ* 
Science* and Management 
College of Education 
Technical College 
College of Agriculture 
College of Natural 
Resources 
College of Fine Art* 
Institute of Nuclear Science 
sndT*cbnk* 
International Institute of 
Biophysics and 
Has the 
Coordinating 
Council been 
formed? 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Ye* 
Ye* 
No 
Ye* 
Ye* 
Yta 
Ye* 
Ye* 
Ye* 
Date of 
Formation 
March 1979 
March 1979 
Feb. 1979 
March 1979 
March 1979 
March 1979 
March 1979 
April 1979 
Feb. 1979 
May 22. 
1979 
April 1979 
-
March 1979 
March 1979 
March 1979 
April 1979 
April 1979 
Feb. 1979 
Number of Members of the 
Coordinating Council 
Faculty 
10 
Students 
« 
Admin. 
Staff 
3 
2 
3 
3 
5 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
1 
-
l i the 
Coordinating 
Council the 
highest 
derision 
making 
authority? 
Yes 
Yes, except in 
instructional 
affairs 
Yes 
Yes + College 
Council 
Yes 
Yea 
Ye* + College 
Council 
Ye* 
Ye* 
Ye* + 
Superintendent 
Ye* 
. 
Ye* 
Ye* 
Yes 
Ye* 
Ye* 
Yet 
Has the 
Council elected 
or confirmed the 
SuperiBtendeat 
( •Dean or 
Chancellor)? 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
-
Yes 
Yes 
« . 
Ye* 
-
Ye* 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Ye* 
Source: Ddneshgdhtydn, No. 1, June 20, 1979, p. 6. 
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2.3.3 The Purge of Administrators: Chancellors, Deans, 
and Support Staff 
The "cleansing" (paksazi) or purge of students, faculty, staff and management who 
were associated with the monarchical regime and secret police (SAVAK) was one of the first 
measures taken in all institutions of higher education. At Tehran University, a week after 
the victory of revolution, a group of faculty, students, and staff expelled all of senior 
administration, the deputies, and some of the director generals and locked and sealed up their 
offices (Kayhan, February 18, 1979). Gradually, in most institutions, committees for 
"cleansing" or "purging" composed of representatives of faculty, students, and staff were 
formed (Ayandegdn, March 11, 1979). 
The government and the universities were divided over purge policy. The purge 
committees set up by the universities believed that all accusations should be declared openly 
and the accused be allowed to defend themselves. The purpose was to expose the- Shah's 
regime and to inform public opinion about the old system of university management. The 
government, on the other hand, was more interested in simply purging the most obvious 
associates of the Shah's regime without any trials and tranquillizing the campuses. 
A glimpse of possible accusations which would lead to a purge can be gained from 
the following criteria for expulsion adopted by the "Revolutionary Council for Purification of 
Tehran University": 
- being a member of SAVAK [Secret Police], in the pay of SAVAK, or 
supported being by SAVAK, 
- being a minister or member of the parliament of the old regime, 
- exhibiting behaviour which was inhuman, anti-people, and against the dignity 
of universities, 
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- being a representative, speaker, responsible, or manager in made-to-order 
organizations such as the [Shah-made] Iran Nuvin Party, the Mardum Party, 
the Rastakhiz Party, etc. 
- being an individual who, in international or national meetings, had defended 
the old regime and tried to put a democratic face on it, 
- having received material or job privileges because of an association with the 
[Imperial] court... 
2.3.4 Depoliticization: Law and Order on the Campus 
The universities continued to be hotbeds of political activity after the fall of the 
Monarchy. In terms of popular political activism, no religious institution in the country bore 
any resemblance to the campuses of Tehran University, Industrial University, National 
University, or Polytechnical University. Almost all anti-Monarchist political trends, religious 
and secular, were present on the campuses. Latest news on the political developments of the 
country, not covered by state-controlled broadcast media, was available in leaflets, wall 
newspapers, newsletters, and by word of mouth. Freedom of speech and assembly allowed 
the campuses to be active centers of political discussion, debates, lectures, sit-ins, protests, 
etc. The sale of revolutionary literature, posters, and tapes of songs was part of daily life on 
the campuses. The campuses were more immune from the attack of the religious zealots of 
the Islamic Republic Party who had already begun to burn bookstores, attack rallies, and 
arrest leftist activists. People from all walks of life went to the campuses to find out about 
the intricate political situation of the post-revolutionary period. The two underground 
revolutionary guerilla organizations-Mujahedm and FedaT-came out in the open first on 
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the campuses where they established their headquarters the day after the uprising.21 
In line with the general policy of the new government to establish "order and peace", 
the temporary superintendents of the universities first asked the revolutionary organizations to 
leave the campuses. Both of the revolutionary organizations-Mujahedm and Pedal-left the 
campus of Tehran University on February 18, 1979. The temporary superintendent repeated 
his earlier calls for an end to "any assembly and demonstration in Tehran University in order 
to keep order and peace in the educational environs." Restoring peace and order was, 
according to the superintendent, the "dream of many students." He declared (Ayandegdn, 
April, 1979): 
It is strictly forbidden to hold any gathering without the 
permission of the responsible authorities of the university which 
may be granted only under emergency conditions. Also the 
university will be officially closed on official holidays and on 
Fridays and no group will be permitted to hold any gathering. 
A week later, Dr. Maleki (the temporary superintendent of Tehran University), announced 
that "students would not be permitted to enter the campus on Thursdays and Fridays" 
(Peyghdm-e EmrOz, April 14, 1979; see below on Friday prayers at Tehran University 
campus). 
21
 Sazmdn-e Mujahedth-e Khalq (Organization of People's Mujahedm) was a leftist 
Islamic group who broke away from the liberal trends in the post-1963 years (see 
Abrahamian 1989). Sazmdn-e Chertk-hd-ye Feda't-ye Khalq (Organization of People's 
FedaT Guerillas) was a Marxist-Leninist group formed in late 1960's. Both groups called 
for the overthrow of the Shah's regime and engaged in guerilla operations. 
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2.3.4.1 "Clubwielders" on the Campuses: 
The Islamic Republic Party 
Premier Bazargan's faction within the Islamic state did not resort to repressive 
measures in their effort to take control of the campus. In fact, none of the new organs of 
coercion-the Revolutionary committees or the Revolutionary Guards-were under the control 
of the Premier. Neither was the reinstated police force in a position to play a suppressive 
role on the campus. 
Various forms of repression-attacks on assemblies, arrests and assassinations, burning 
bookstores, etc.-were carried out, however, by gangs organized by the Islamic Republic 
Party, by the Revolutionary Committees or Revolutionary Guards who had close ties with the 
leadership of the party. The IRP groups usually attended a rally, lecture or meeting to 
disrupt it; the armed "committee" men or Revolutionary Guards would then interfere and 
arrest the leaders or organizers of the event. This method was widely applied off campus. 
The groups were named "clubwielders" (chumdq-ddrdn) in post-revolutionary Iran. These 
activities of the IRP were opposed by many of the "moderate" leaders in power (e.g., Bani-
Sadr, Bazargan, etc.). A politically active clergy member, Sheikh Ali Tehran!, told the 
French journal Liberation that (June 26, 1981): 
I have told the Imam [Khomeini] that the IRP is like another 
SAVAK. Its budget is larger than that of SAVAK. The crimes 
it commits are more numerous than those perpetrated by 
SAVAK. The IRP has its private prisons where torture is 
practised and has resulted in the death of several persons. Party 
leaders monopolize all power and are placed at the head of all 
organizations of the country. They use repression to impose 
their control on schools and universities and the Bazaars just as 
the deposed Shah did (quoted in Zabih 1982:83-4). 
Acts of repression on the campus were carried out mostly by the IRP's Islamic 
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Student Associations (anjuman-e eslaml-ye daneshjuyan), to be distinguished from the pro-
Mujahed the Muslim Student Organization (sazman-e daneshjuyan-e musalman). 
2.3.4.2 Friday Congregational Prayers on the Campus 
The Friday noon prayers, which had been discontinued for religious and political 
reasons, were resumed on Khomeini's order after the fall of the Shah. According to Islam, 
all Muslims residing in one geographical unit (village, town, city) are required to congregate 
in a Jdme' mosque and call the prayer together after listening to a lecture of guidance 
(khu{be) given by the Friday Imam. The Friday Imam is among the top-ranking clergy. 
The purpose of the weekly event is to give the people of one locality the chance to get 
together and be guided on major religious or political issues. 
The Friday prayer has turned into one of the most important religious and political 
events in the country (for more on this, see Arjomand 1988:167-68). The lectures are 
broadcast live and televised the same evening; the government-controlled press print the best 
of the lectures. However, the question is, why did the authorities choose Tehran University 
campus for this important event which, according to centuries-old religious tradition, must be 
performed in the largest mosque of each locality called Jame' masque? 
The selection of this campus for this important "devotional-political" ('ebddt-stydst) 
event cannot be explained on religious grounds. The political motives behind it seem to be 
more significant. Occupying the campus of the most important university on all weekends by 
force meant depriving the faculty, students, and others from the use of the campus for 
oppositional political purposes. Also, the Revolutionary Guards and the Revolutionary 
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Committees were, thus, able to occupy the campus for two days for the purpose of providing 
"security" for the prayer-holders (namdz-guzdrdn). 
2.3.5 The NOIA and the Outcome of the Struggle 
for University Autonomy 
The measures taken by the Islamic govemment-e.g., the policy of appointment rather 
than election of administrators, organized attacks on the offices and headquarters of political 
groups on the campus, the use of Tehran University campus for Friday prayers-had 
convinced many students and faculty that the new regime was against the ideals of autonomy 
and democracy at the university. The university community continued, however, to fight for 
autonomy. A seminar on "Society and the Autonomy of the University System" was 
conducted over three days at the Industrial University in the spring of 1979 (Ayandegdn. June 
11, 1979\ 
The Minister of Culture and Higher Education and the Minister of Education both 
attended the seminar. The seminar participants expressed their concern about prevailing 
conditions and the monopolistic policies of the government (see detailed report in Tehrdn 
Musawar, No. 22, June 22, 1979). Some excerpts from the resolution issued by the seminar 
were as follows (Kavoshgar, No. 2, pp. 25-28): 
The university system must move forward, as a bastion of 
freedom, in order to defend freedoms and struggle against all 
threats and intimidation and abolish all types of submission and 
dependence in society. 
The university system cannot uphold its mandate for building a 
popular university unless freedom in universities and educational 
institutions prevails. 
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We participants declare that higher education is public education 
and the university must, unlike what it has been so far, serve 
the deprived and oppressed classes. 
We believe that Iranian universities, especially universities 
belonging to the oppressed [ethnic] peoples of Iran, should 
freely take steps towards reviving their languages and cultures. 
One of the principal conditions for realization of this demand is 
autonomy of the university system. This autonomy does not 
mean administrative and financial independence from the state 
administrative organs. It, rather, means admitting the fact that 
the existence of despotic and technocratic institutions outside the 
university is against the interests of society. 
By securing academic and cultural independence of the country, 
the university system should actively participate in the 
realization of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist objectives of 
the Iranian revolution. University autonomy is impossible 
without maintaining democratic relations in universities and 
educational institutions. 
Thus the resolution tied the government's disregard for autonomy to the suppression 
of freedoms throughout the society.22 By this time, opinion and political conflicts had 
matured inside the NOIA. 
When the NOIA was formed in the heat of struggle against the old regime, the 
membership consisted of individual faculty members who came from diverse political, 
economic, cultural, and religious backgrounds but were united against despotism. The main 
body of the membership consisted of secular nationalists and leftists. Individuals with 
religious inclinations did, however, participate in the movement although they did not raise 
any "Islamic" demands before the fall of the monarchy. The ascendency of religious 
22
 This resolution refers to the suppression of women, the censorship of the press and 
other media, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, the attack of Muslim religious 
groups on cultural, artistic and social programs, etc. (Ibid.). 
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leadership precipitated by Khomeini's rise to prominence after December 1978 and the 
assumption of power by this faction led to open political differentiation within the NOIA. 
Some members of the NOIA, who had religious tendencies, were appointed to (top) 
administrative positions on and off campus. A second, small group who lent unconditional 
support to the Islamic regime, functioned as a base for extending state control over the 
university. The majority of the membership were, however, suspicious of the Islamic 
regime. They considered the university to be a potential force able to resist the new 
regime's encroachments on the freedoms and rights of the people and, thus, they engaged in 
the formation of councils in order to radically change the administrative system (Pegah 
1987b: 10-11). 
Although the Islamic regime had monopolized power in society, it could not establish 
its sovereignty over the universities principally because it lacked adequate support among the 
students and faculty. With the coming of summer (1979), the closing of the universities and 
schools, and the dispersal of students, the regime moved to put more limitations on political 
freedoms. The ransacking of the offices of the dailies (e.g., Ayandegdn and later, Kayhdn), 
censorship of the press, the attacks on the headquarters of political organizations (see 3.7.0), 
the Army's suppression of workers' strikes and peasant councils, the purge of leftist and 
nationalist teachers and of government employees, the restrictions on women's rights - these 
were some of the practices of the new regime in late spring and throughout the summer. In 
order to cope with these circumstances some of the activists of NOIA decided to form new 
organizations in order to oppose the anti-democratic policies of the regime on the campus 
(see Chapter Three on faculty). 
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With the beginning of the new academic year in the fall of 1979, the campuses once 
again turned into a scene of conflict between groups supporting and opposing the Islamic 
regime. Although, by this time, the state had been able to consolidate its power in certain 
areas, the university had not yet been conquered, and it continued to be a center of 
resistance. A Top clergy, Ayatollah Beheshti, said: 
You should better know that, in the great majority of the 
universities and colleges, the groups of the left and those against 
the Islamic Republic have been able to achieve their desired aim 
by raising the slogan of "councils" and by voting in elections 
(quoted in H. Siyamak 1989:5). 
The Islamic regime tried to divert public attention from dissenting centers such as the 
universities. The occupation of the U.S. embassy on November 4, 197923 by Muslem 
Students Following Imam's Line and the cease-fire with Kurdish autonomists on November 
16, 1979 achieved, among other things, the objectives of power struggle both within the 
regime and against the opposition. The embassy seizure aimed at diverting public attention 
from the deteriorating situation and rallying public support while the ceasefire in Kurdistan 
helped the government to disguise military defeat and prepare for continuing the repression 
of the opposition forces under more favourable conditions. In fact, by the end of winter 
(1980), preparations for the conquest of the university were being finalized. 
23
 It must be noted that November 4 had been designated, by leftist groups, as "Student 
Day" [Secondary School] in memory of students killed by the Shah's regime in front of 
Tehran University's main entrance on November 4, 1978 (The Pahlavi monarchy introduced 
a distinction in Persian language between daneshju, i.e. 'student' in post-secondary schools 
and daneshamuz, i.e. 'student' in primary and secondary schools). See Chapter 2 footnote 4 
on university student's day. 
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2.4.0 The "Islamic Cultural Revolution: 
The Consolidation of State Power 
The "Islamic Cultural Revolution" (hereafter ICR) (enqeldb-e farhangt-ye esldmt) 
refers to the attack on the campuses throughout Iran by armed gangs organized by the 
Islamic government from April 19 to April 22, 1980. Leaving hundreds dead and wounded, 
the offensive aimed at removing leftist political students and their offices from the campus 
(see Chapter Three on students). The label, "Cultural Revolution" was first used by 
President Bani-Sadr after the conquest of Tehran University's main campus. 
The ICR stands out as an important political move which was initiated in 
circumstances of intense external and internal power struggles. As such, the event cannot be 
adequately explained without considering the complex political circumstances surrounding it. 
2.4.1 The Problems cf Establishing State Authority 
The extraordinary popular support of Khomeini, as leader of the anti-Shah 
Revolution, has often concealed the problems of the new regime in establishing its authority 
over political entities which were active participants in the revolution but were reluctant to 
follow the new regime. These autonomy-seeking entities were: 1) The network of 
institutions of higher education and secondary schools (numbering about one million students 
and teachers); 2) the nationalities (especially the Kurds, Turkmans, Arabs and Baluch people 
forming about 30 percent of the population); 3) the important daily press (Ettela'at, Kayhdn, 
Ayandegdn) which had just emerged from months of anti-Shah struggle, and 4) leftist and 
nationalist political organizations. 
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2.4.3 Factionalism Within State Power 
Although Khomeini emerged as the "sole leader," the leadership forces he appointed 
to rule the country-the Revolutionary Council and the Provisionary Government-were 
heterogeneous in politics and ideology. In April 1980, when the ICR began, the main 
factions sharing political power were roughly as follows: 
1. Khomeini: the most important figure because of popular support; he was more 
conservative than in late 1978, i.e. closer to Islamic Republic Party. 
2. The Revolutionary Council: consisting of two factions: the IRP and the 
liberals (Premier Bazargan; Bani-Sadr), the Council was presided over 
and chaired by Bani-Sadr. 
3. President Bani-Sadr and the Liberals: The President was below the 
"supreme leadership" of Khomeini; he was responsible for the 
implementation of the constitution, the coordination of the tripartite 
powers, and presidency over the executive power, except when such 
power was exercised by the supreme leader. 
4. The Islamic Republic Party: although not an official or state party, the IRP 
shared political power through leaders such as Beheshti, Khamene'i, 
Rafsanjani, and others who held key posts. The party also had the 
Revolutionary Guards and committees on its side. 
These factions were involved in a bitter battle among themselves. The IRP tried to 
oust President Bani-Sadr (January 1980 - June 1981) and to take full control of state power 
(see Zabih 1982, for an account of the power struggle). 
2.4.3 The Planners of the "Islamic Cultural Revolution" 
Khomeini's New Year message (March 21, 1980) served as a Fatvd (religious decree) 
to the Islamic Republic Party to start on offensive against the universities. The message was 
a detailed review, in thirteen points, of the problems faced by the Islamic regime in 
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consolidating its power. Point eleven of the message dealt with the universities: Khomeini 
authorized the purge of the leftists from the universities without identifying an executive 
body: 
A fundamental revolution must take place in all the universities 
across the country, so that professors with links to the East or 
the West may be purged, and the university may provide a 
healthy atmosphere for the cultivation of the Islamic sciences. 
However, the first clear reference to the takeover of the campuses came from the 
head of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), Ayatollah Beheshti, who warned that it would no 
longer be possible for the Party to tolerate the leftists and that the IRP would invite people to 
rise against them (I.E., April 10, 1980). 
The Minister of the Interior (who was in charge of the police and the Gendarmerie) 
sent a circular to the Minister of Culture and Higher Education (April 12, 1980) and urged 
"the chancellors and those responsible to avoid giving permission to political groups on any 
grounds for political lectures and propaganda." In order to justify the offensive against the 
campuses, the Minister of the Interior made a clear distinction between "political groups" and 
"students" and between "political lectures"/"propaganda" and "cultural activities." The 
propaganda line of the government was to mobilize public opinion by claiming that the 
trouble was caused by political groups (not students) who used the campus for propaganda 
purposes preventing students from acquiring knowledge. 
On April 15, Rafsanjani (the then speaker of the parliament) gave a talk at Tabriz 
University. The university authorities had not been notified about the presence of this 
prominent government figure on the campus. Questions from the audience disrupted the 
meeting. Following this disturbance, a group chanting, "The Islamic University must be 
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created!" occupied the central building of the university. After the occupation the chancellor 
and two vice-chancellors resigned from their positions. The chancellor told the press in an 
interview that the protestors were in the minority: "One cannot subject the lives of 12,000 
people to the whims of 250 people" (quoted in Ptruzt, No. 1, Mehr/September-October 
1980, p. 69). 
The Council of Tabriz University issued a statement: 
It is necessary to mention that the lecture was given without the 
knowledge of the university's responsible authorities and had 
been announced through unsigned leaflets. After occupying the 
university's central building by the mentioned groups they sent a 
number of people to the university in support of the occupation, 
among whom, unfortunately, were a number of armed people. 
After arriving at the lecture hall, a number of them attacked the 
instruction units, damaged buildings of the College of Letters, 
Technical College and College of Science, destroyed student 
libraries, and began violently beating and arresting students 
(Ibid.). 
The next day (April 16, 1980), in an IRP-sponsored seminar on "The Mission of Students 
and the University" held at the College of Theology (Tehran) one speaker commented that 
the "black and dark shadow of bloodshed" was visible over the universities. Another speaker 
warned that the universities would be closed or suspended if necessary (I.E., April 16, 
1980). 
Besides the important factor of Khomeini's backing, the IRP had effective 
organizational and military tools to carry out the Islamic Cultural Revolution (see Figure 3 
below). 
The Islamic Student Associations were numerically insignificant but they provided the 
party leadership with information on campus political developments. The Revolutionary 
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Guards and Committees functioned as the armed organs of the IRP. The National 
Figure 3. The Organizational and Military Structure of the Islamic Republic Party for 
Implementation of the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
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Mobilization Headquarters announced on April 21, 1980 that: 
The trained members of the "20 million-strong Army"...are 
prepared...to help the responsible and committed students and 
academics promptly and to remove the operational headquarters 
of the [political] groups...from the educational centers. 
The authenticity of the announcement was denied the next day and the National Mobilization 
Headquarters declared that it would not interfere in "tiny and minute affairs and group 
confrontations...except in necessary cases when it would take action only on the orders of the 
commander-in-chief" (Kayhdn, April 22, 1980). 
The chief of the Headquarters was apparently removed the next day. The JumhOrt-ye 
Esldmt, on April 23, 1980 announced: 
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The person responsible for the Headquarters of National 
Mobilization did not have the competence to run an important 
institution at all because he had appointed SAVAK members and 
had turned his back on the proposed regulations and had 
deviated from the basic aims of the headquarters of the National 
Mobilization and suffered from very weak management... 
The denial and, later, the removal of the chief of the Headquarters were apparently a 
propaganda effort to mask the rule of the armed forces and to emphasize the involvement of 
the "masses" in preparation for the attack on the campuses. 
The IRP's most effective mass mobilization instruments were Friday prayers which 
were widely utilized to agitate public opinion against the left. In Rasht, Ahvaz, Tabriz, and 
Tehran mobs of worshippers were dispatched to the campuses. The final declaration of war 
against the left came in the April 18, 1980 Friday Prayer of Tehran in which Khamene'i 
officially announced the "holy war" (jehad) against the university. He accused the students 
of participating in the armed struggle of the autonomists of Kurdistan and Turkman Sahra, 
and of revolting against Islam (J.E., April 18, 1980). After the prayer, gangs attacked three 
campuses. 
The state-controlled press of Iran reported clashes between government-organized 
armed gangs (known as chumdq-ddrdn, 'club-wielders' and students throughout the country. 
Four hundred students were injured and two killed in Shiraz; in Tehran University, three 
were killed and over 160 wounded; some 350 persons were wounded and one killed in 
Mashhad all on April 23. On April 22, at least ten were killed on the campuses of Ahvaz 
and Gilan universities. On April 24, the governing body of Tehran University resigned in 
protest to the violence which left at least six persons dead and four hundred wounded (press 
84 
reports quoted in Mojab 1985, Appendix A, pp. 87-93). 
The IRP faction within the Revolutionary Council served as a pressure force on the 
President. The party leadership tried to impose party policy on the "moderate" faction led 
by Bani-Sadr. A significant document on the Cultural Revolution is the editorial of the IRP's 
daily JumhOrt-ye Esldmt on April 19, 1980. The editorial made it clear that the IRP 
decided to drive out both leftists from the campuses and the supporters of Bani-Sadr from 
power. The Bazargan faction from the Revolutionary Council stated: 
The people are now casting their eyes on the deviant students 
[Moslem students] on one hand and on the executive authorities 
on the other hand; we know that the students will not refrain 
from their demands and the nation is backing them. If the 
Revolutionary Council wants to show carelessness (tasdhut) on 
this issue, it will face the wrath (qahr) of the masses. 
The April 20, 1980 issue of the IRP newspaper, J.E., carries an article entitled, 
"Who Opposes the Cultural Revolution and Why?" The article discusses the ways leftist 
students use the campus for anti-Government purposes: 
The use of the facilities and property of the universities by 
leftist forces. 
The establishment of operational headquarters by the left. 
The leftist students majority in the student council. 
The left's misuse of university immunity. 
Slogans for keeping the universities open for the purpose of political activities. 
Further elaborating these points, the article states that "leftist groups and opponents of 
the Islamic Republic" initiated the slogan of administration through councils and they 
achieved their aims through elections, while students believing in Imam's Line were 
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preoccupied with working in the revolutionary institutions, especially the Construction 
Crusade (Jehad-e Sazandegi). Linking the students who occupied campuses to the Moslem 
Students Following Imam's Line, who occupied the U.S. Embassy was another important 
aspect of IRP campaign during the Islamic Cultural Revolution. 
Finally, the following excerpt, taken from an official monthly of the Cultural 
Revolution Council (see below) published by University Crusade (Jehad-e Daneshgah!) a 
year later, reveals the behind-the-scenes planning of the IRP (Rahimi 1982:82): 
The plan had been discussed with Mr. Khamenei, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and Martyred Bahonar. Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani 
approved it and bravely emphasized its implementation. 
Confirming the plan, Mr. Khamene'i pointed out certain 
precautions. Bani-Sadr had found out about it in the last days of 
the event and had announced his disapproval. Anyway, 
everything was ready to explode. For two weeks anxiety and 
agony had cast a shadow on the university. The spark came at 
Tabriz University. The counter-revolution's insult to Mr. 
Hashemi Rafsanjani and the strong reaction of the Muslim 
students started the revolution...Bani-Sadr, [used] his usual 
method of "if you can't create a wave, ride on it..." The 
Revolutionary Council to some extent surrendered to the views 
of people like Bani-Sadr by announcing the reopening of the 
universities [from the April 21 takeover] till June 5th [the end of 
the semester]. However, the Muslim students fortunately held 
the torch of the cultural revolution burning by non-presence in 
classes and exams till the Imam appointed a council for the 
investigation of the subject and the planning of the new system 
of universities. 
Based on these revelations, one may conclude: 
1. The decision to launch the ICR was not taken by the Party's student body 
but by the top leaders of the Party. 
2. Bani-Sadr had not been informed about the decision. 
3. The IRP had decided to close the universities before the end of the semester and the 
IRP's faction within the Revolutionary Council was criticized for yielding to Bani-Sadr's 
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insistence on keeping them opened till the end of the semester. 
As far as Bani-Sadr's role in the ICR is concerned, he had frequently emphasized that 
he was against the leftists' domination of the campuses. He did not disagree with the IRP 
and Khomeini on this point. His disagreements always centered on the methods of driving 
out the leftist opposition. At the time, he opposed the use of coercive measures and, instead, 
preferred negotiations and, in case of failure, mobilizing the "masses" against the left. It is 
obvious, however, that Bani-Sadr was not himself in a position to use coercion, since the 
Kumlte and the Guards were not under his authority.24 
The day after the Revolutionary Council issued its three-day ultimatum to leftist 
students, Bani-Sadr indirectly complained about the Islamic Republic Party's wilful deeds on 
the campuses in an editorial (E.E., April 19, 1980): 
When there is disagreement on the purpose of unity and 
method, one must use a method that is nroposed by the people's 
elected and legal authorities; this is so because if there is a 
multiplicity of methods, each group carries out its preferred 
method without the knowledge of the others and without the 
knowledge of the responsible one, and, as a result, everyone 
will lose control of the affairs and it will be impossible to 
achieve the aim. 
One such case which has become a problem today is the 
fundamental reform of the educational system. How and at 
what time should this task be carried out? What authority 
should scientifically recognize the above- mentioned necessities? 
Which authority should find out whether the social background 
24
 Kumttes were committees formed during the last months of the revolution in major 
Shiite urban centers to take charge of the distribution of kerosene and other much-needed 
material. The Kumttes were, after the overthrow of the Shah, armed while the Shah's police 
system was disintegrating. The Kumttes came under clerical control and were independent 
of the police when the latter were reorganized by the Islamic government. The Kumttes 
functioned as one of the organs of repression of the opposition. 
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for carrying out this reform is being provided for? Which 
authority has [determined] the scope of reform and has provided 
for the means of carrying it out? 
Bani-Sadr, again, indirectly criticized the IRP in another editorial (E.E., April 20, 
1980): 
Why insist on closing the university and by the way of 
occupying, at that? If this affair is necessary at all two months 
before the normal university vacation, why should it not be 
carried out through the announcement of the responsible 
Minister or the Revolutionary Council? If the opposition groups 
had insisted on this, one could understand that their aim was, as 
on similar occasions, to weaken the government, but one cannot 
understand and explain it when forces belonging to ourselves do 
it. 
Finally, on April 21, 1980, Bani-Sadr attacked the IRP and exposed the IRP plans 
against him (£.£., April 21, 1980): 
The leaders of a flank of a political group have told their aides that 
they should not let Bani-Sadr win... 
If the question of reforming the educational system is a 
basic one for the students...the university must close down and 
spread its waves everywhere, i.e., every place must be closed in 
order to change the wrong and counter-revolutionary system. 
Bani-Sadr further emphasized the seriousness of the conspiracy by making an analogy 
to the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Ibid.): 
Those who want to copy, from behind, China's 'Cultural 
Revolution' in Iran and think that they will remove or weaken 
him [Bani-Sadr] are openly betraying their country. 
The E.E. April 26, cites a CBS interview with Bani-Sadr which amounts to his 
summing up of the events translated from the Persian text): 
Question: Do you think that the recent turbulence in the university is a threat to your 
government? 
88 
The President: It [the threat] has now turned into consolidation (tasbtt). It was a 
threat before but, after the people's reaction was perceived, the threat became 
consolidation... Last night a friend explained the situation in this manner: A 
locomotive was launched and was beginning to speed up when you [Bani-Sadr] 
jumped into it and halted it. 
Bani-Sadr wrote about the ICR a year later when he was forced out of power by his 
rivals and gave a more detailed account of the event. He emphasized the accord between 
Khomeini and the IRP on the closing down of the universities before the end of the spring 
semester (see Appendix A for Bani-Sadr's description of events). 
The evidence presented here, together with the information gained from interviews 
with several students participating in the defence of the campuses, indicate that none of the 
students possessed any firearms. They had decided to stay on the campus till the last 
moment and leave one hour before the end of the ultimatum. They wanted to show through 
this "tactic" their resistance to an anti-popular act on one hand and to avoid confrontation 
with the people on the other hand. The IRP was interested, however, in a bloody 
confrontation because the Party intended to get rid both of the leftists and Bani-Sadr. The 
IRP was certainly very unhappy about the rapprochement between Bani-Sadr and the two 
major leftist organizations, Mujahedm and Feda'i. It would have been a serious defeat for 
the party to see the peaceful evacuation of the campus, since it would have strengthened 
Bani-Sadr's position. Only bloodshed imposed by the Revolutionary Guards and Kumttes 
could damage the President's success (when Bani-Sadr questioned the IRP faction in the 
Revolutionary Council on the killings, they answered that the leftists would not have left the 
campus otherwise). 
Khomeini avoided, as usual, getting directly and personally involved in the bloodshed. 
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To contribute to the success of the ICR, however, he had to get directly involved in the 
affair on the last day of the ultimatum. He forcefully warned the leftists to leave the campus 
and expressed his support for "all that has been said by the Revolutionary Council and the 
President of the Republic concerning the necessity for a purge of the universities and a 
change in the atmosphere prevailing in them..." 
Bani-Sadr tried to prevent the confrontation through radio broadcast appeals and by 
sending his representatives to Tehran University after the shootings. Bani-Sadr also visited 
the campus and used the occasion to attack the IRP and their conspiracy to overthrow him. 
"The first principle of the [cultural] Revolution," he said, "is that the Government elected by 
you must be the executive force of the people and no other executive force outside the 
Government is justified in making the people's decision." 
2.4.4 The Goals of the "Islamic Cultural Revolution" 
The ICR was planned and carried out by a ruling political power that was seriously 
divided and faced with instability. It is obvious that unity of purpose and action could not be 
expected under the circumstances. Each of the "numerous centers of power," to use Bani-
Sadr's words, had its own interests. 
Khomeini's aims were twofold: 1) to overthrow the rule of the left on the campuses 
and to establish the authority of the Islamic state over this unruly political entity. Khomeini 
had led similar struggles to establish state rule over the mass media, the autonomist 
movement of the nationalities, political organizations, etc. The evidence, however, indicates 
that Khomeini did not share the IRP's aim of ousting Bani-Sadr; 2) to Islamize the secular 
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universities. He wanted the unrivalled rule of one ideology, his brand of Islam, to dominate 
the institutions of higher education. 
The IRP, in spite of the factionalism within it (Rose 1982: 45-56), pursued two 
distinct aims: 1) to replace the authority of the left with that of the party. The difference 
between Khomeini and the IRP's aims reflects their different approaches (in April 1980) to 
the question of state power. At the time, Khomeini was playing the role of arbitrator 
between the factions and he considered their coexistence to be feasible. The IRP, however, 
was involved in a serious battle with all other factions and individuals outside the party and 
was conspiring for the solitary rule of the party; 2) to use the event to overthrow or, at least, 
seriously weaken Bani-Sadr's authority. The IRP v.as in a position to initiate, carry out, and 
finally, stop major chaos. Bani-Sadr, lacking authority over the Guards or Committees, 
would have remained helpless. The ICR was being utilized by the IRP to oust Bani-Sadr the 
same way U.S. embassy hostage-taking had served the purpose of toppling Premier Bazargan 
and his political line. 
Bani-Sadr was certainly against the domination of the leftist forces over the campuses. 
He had his own version of a cultural revolution but, at the time, he was neither interested in 
nor able to get involved in a military confrontation on the campuses. Although Bani-Sadr 
felt he had averted the threat to his power and had stabilized his power after the evacuation 
of the leftists, the IRP emerged as the winner. The Party achieved its aim of driving out the 
leftists and establishing its authority through the Islamic Associations (Anjumanha-ye 
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Eslaml)25. The second aim of the IRP (i.e., ousting Bani-Sadr) was not realized, of course. 
Bani-Sadr was able to push forward his idea of reopening the campuses till the end of the 
semester (June 5, 1980) and letting the IRP "engage in 'Cultural Revolution'" after this date. 
2.4.5 Implementation of the "Islamic Cultural Revolution": 
The End of the Struggle for University Autonomy 
As indicated above, the Islamic Cultural Revolution, which was planned and carried 
out by the Islamic Republic Party, succeeded in achieving its main objective, i.e., the closure 
of the universities as the only remaining centers of democratic activities. However, a simple 
purge of students could not secure the loyalty of the institutions. An extensive reform plan 
was, therefore, introduced under the rubrics of "Islamization" of the universities. However, 
the Islamic government and its various factions were not in agreement about the meaning, 
nature and scope of "Islamization". The focus of this section, thus, will be on the 
Islamization of the institutions of higher education. 
2.4.5.1 Islamization of the Administrative 
Structure of the University 
Following the attack on the universities, the government announced that the 
universities would be shut down indefinitely as of the last day of exams (June 5, 1980).26 
25
 "Islamic Associations" were set up by the government in all government and major non-
government offices and factories in order to keep the employees in full political and ideological 
control. The associations were composed of a small number of pro-regime employees who 
reported any oppositon to the government and were disliked by their colleagues. 
26
 See circular on the closing of the universities in Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of 
Culture and Higher Education 1983:233. 
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As a gesture of disapproval of the government's actions against the university, some of the 
university presidents, among them the government appointees, resigned. The Tehran 
University President, while resigning, requested televised debate with Khamene'i and 
Rafsanjani. Later, Khamene'i called him a traitor in the Friday pray sermon.27 The 
university councils also voiced their opposition to the government's attack on the institutions 
and called it an obvious violation of the university's political sanctuary, though they also 
emphasized the need for a drastic change in the higher educational system.28 
The government turned a deaf ear to all the objections and was determined to win 
control of the institutions. Thus, Khomeini appointed seven persons to form the "Cultural 
Revolution Council" (hereafter CRC) (Setad-e Enqelab-e Farhang!). They were: Dr. Javad 
Bahonar (clergy), Dr. Abd-al-Karim Soroush (clergy), Mehdi Rabani Amlashi (clergy), Dr. 
Ali Shariatmadari, Shams Ale-Ahmad (literary figure), Dr. Hassan Habibi, and Dr. 
Jalaloddin Farsi (see the complete text of Khomeini's decree in Appendix B). Of the seven, 
two were clergy, three were the Islamic Republic Party central committee members, and two 
were well-known figures in higher education circles. The Cultural Revolution Council's 
mandate was to recruit ("The Necessity of a Cultural Revolution, Decree by Imam Khomeini 
The Leader of the Islamic Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic," al-Qalam, 
Tehran, Iran: University Press, Cultural Revolution Council, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1981): 
faithful people most committed to the Islamic Republic from 
among Muslim professors and lecturers, employees and students 
27
 Paydm-e Jebhe-ye Mellt, 28 Urdibehesht 1359/May 18, 1980, p. 17. 
21
 See, for example, the circulars of Mashhad University and Azad University Councils 
in Andtshe-ye Azdd, No. 6, 15 Khurdad 1359/June 5, 1980. 
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and from among other faithful, committed and educated 
strata...to prepare programmes in different fields, to devise 
educational and cultural policies for the universities on the basis 
of Islamic Culture... 
The council resumed the reform of the higher education system while the universities 
remained closed and without any specific plan or program. In its first circular the following 
questions were asked: "Where to begin?"; "Where to go to?"; "Which path to take?"; and, 
"To what extent?" (/.£., 28 Khurdad 1359/June 18, 1980). Later, the goals and 
responsibilities of the council were determined as follows: 
1. To ascertain the cultural policy of the society in general and to determine specifically the 
policy of the higher educational system, its goals, and directions. 
2. To systematize the educational system of the country from kindergarten to higher 
education within the framework of the ascertained policy. 
3. To consolidate and to dissolve some of the institutions of higher education and to 
establish new institutions. 
4. To review and to determine the university curricula and its content with respect to the 
goals of the Islamic Republic. 
5. To review the needs for recruiting faculty and support staffs, 
6. To change the structure and substance of higher and secondary education. 
7. To invite the experts [loyal Muslim experts] to run the projects and to continue their 
services to the society. 
8. To coordinate plans between the faculty members and the students in order to carry out 
projects in the rural areas to the extent that students be prepared to fulfil the vital needs 
of the country after graduation. 
The first measure taken by the Cultural Revolution Council was in accordance with 
the provision of item number 7 above, i.e., the establishment of the "High Council of the 
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University Crusade" (Showra-ye 'Ali-e Jahad-e Daneshgahl).29 This Council was 
responsible for inviting the university experts to participate in constructing the new Islamic 
society. Figure 4 shows the structural organization of the Cultural Revolution Council one 
year after its formation. 
Figure 4. The Organizational Structure of the Cultural Revolution Council in 1981 
The CRC The Coordinating Council of Executives 
I 
The High Council 
of the University 
Publication 
The High Council 
of Planning 
1 
The High Council 
of the University 
Crusade 
The Educational Structure Committee-
Administrative Committee-
Basic Science Group-
Medical Science Group-
Engineering and Technical Group-
Agriculture Group-
Humanities Group-
Students and Faculty Members Selection Committee-
Source: D.E., No. 2, Murdad 1360/July-August 1981:63. 
The High Council of the University Crusade (hereafter HCUC) (Showra-ye 'All 
Jehad-e Daneshgah-I) became the strongest and most powerful organ within the Cultural 
Revolution Council. Gradually, the HCUC managed to be the executive body of the Cultural 
29
 For the best account of the history and development of this council see "takvin va 
takamul-e jehad-e daneshgahl" (The Genesis and Development of the University Crusade), 
D.E., No. 2, Murdad 1360/July-August 1981:53-54. 
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Revolution Council and monopolized its govern the administrative structure of the university. 
This sharply polarized the Cultural Revolution Council over the unsolved question of who 
should rule over the universities. The HCUC, following Islamic Republic Party leaders and 
the "Imam's line," known as maktabts30 became a strong advocate of Islamization of the 
universities through purging unfaithful and uncommitted elements in the system, appointing 
the politically and ideologically loyal presidents, Islamizing the curricula, and finally 
prolonging the closure of the institutions until the achievement of Islamization. The liberal 
element, on the other hand, demanded immediate reopening of the institutions under the 
leadership of new presidents who were to be appointed by the Ministry of Culture and 
Higher Education, not by the Cultural Revolution Council. Contrary to both of these were 
the views presented by the remnants of the faculty activists who organized themselves into 
councils called Independent Societies (kdnun-hd-ye mustaqel). Emphasizing the basic tenets 
of ruling the universities through councils, they perceived the Cultural Revolution Council as 
the government's means of suppressing democracy in the country and imposing its political 
power over the institutions. The outcome of the struggle between the Cultural Revolution 
Council (dominated by maktabts) and the Ministry (dominated by liberals) on the one hand 
and the resistance generated from the Independent Societies on the other, against any 
30
 There are numerous labels for this trend of ideological/political thought, e.g. 
"Fundamentalist," "hard-liners," "radicals," and "maktabts.'' In this study, they are 
identified as maktabts since they identify themselves as such in their main university organ, 
Ddneshgdh-e Enqeldb (University of Revolution). The maktabts consider themselves true 
followers of the maktab (Doctrine) and advocates of Khomeini's velayat-e faqth (the rule of 
the jurisprudent). While this trend is identified as "leftist" and "radical" by Western media 
and academics, Iranian leftists and nationalists consider them to be "reactionaries" and 
extremist conservatives. 
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administrative autonomy of the university finally shaped the present administrative structure 
of the institutions, to which we will turn below. 
2.4.5.2 Who Should Rule the Universities? 
The University Crusade versus The Ministry of Culture 
and Higher Education-The Maktabis and the Liberals 
As indicated above, the High Council of the University Crusade acted as the executive 
body of the Cultural Revolution Council. The HCUC opened a chapter called "The 
University Crusade" in each institution. The chapters consisted of a faculty member, a 
student and a member of the support staff. In most of the institutions the faculty member 
was also the president of the institution. Lacking a minister as well as ideological 
competency, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education was totally excluded from the 
planning processes of the Cultural Revolution Council. The Ministry was constantly 
criticized by the "University Crusade" for its cumbersome bureaucracy and as an institutional 
symbol of the Shah's regime. Nonetheless, the Ministry managed to exercise its power in 
one realm. It utilized its legislative power to obstruct ratification of the bills forwarded to 
the parliament by the Cultural Revolution Council. After all, the Ministry was part of the 
Shah's state apparatus inherited by the Islamic government which remained functioning as 
before. To solve this conflict the Cultural Revolution Council put forward a plan for joint 
cooperation between the "University Crusade" and the Ministry in ruling over the 
universities. Figure 5 shows the organizational structure of this plan. The Minister, 
according to the plan, became a member of the Central Committee to oversee the universities 
administration as well as being responsible for issuing the appointment orders of the rest of 
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the members. Also, as the secretary of the council, he became responsible for notifying the 
institutions of laws ratified by the Cultural Revolution Council. 
Figure 5. The Administration and Organization of the Universities 
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Development 
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Councils Affair j 
Cultural Unit 
Planning and 
Programming Unit 
Educational and 
Students Unit 
Administrative and 
Financial Unit 
Institutions of Higher Education 
Source: D.E., No. 10, Farvardin 1361/March-April 1982, p. 14 
This plan lasted for only six months. The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 
opposed the intervention of the Cultural Revolution Council and the University Crusade in 
the administrative affairs of the universities, and asserted that as a government organ, the 
executive affairs and administration of the university ought to be under its jurisdiction. But 
the Cultural Revolution Council maintained that it was an organ appointed by the Imam and 
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relied on "Imam's Line" and as such, was the only organ capable of implementing a "true 
cultural revolution." Moreover, the Cultural Revolution Council and, to a greater extent, the 
University Crusade, questioned the legitimacy of the Ministry. They argued that ministries 
basically were products of Western-style government bureaucracy and, therefore, were in 
sharp conflict with "Revolutionary organs." The dispute among the three groups involved 
eventually brought the plan to a halt. Once more Khomeini himself had to intervene in the 
matter of who should run the university. 
Khomeini issued a circular in which he specified the responsibilities and obligations of 
the Cultural Revolution Council and the Ministry, as well he outlined the duties of the 
University Crusade.31 Nonetheless, even Imam's intervention could not solve the dispute 
among the three groups. Therefore, later in Tir 1362/June-July 1983 another plan known as 
"The Plan of the High Council of Culture" (tarh-e showra-ye 'ali-ye farhang) was submitted 
to Parliament by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. The basic principles of this 
plan were: First, the administrative policies of the university were to be determined only by 
the members of the Cultural Revolution Council, three ministries (The Ministry of 
Education, The Ministry of Islamic Guidance, and The Ministry of Culture and Higher 
Education), the Prime Minister and, finally, the Islamic Republic's President. Second, the 
Ministry of Culture and Higher Education was the only government organ to be accountable 
for implementing policy in the institutions of higher education. Above all, this plan 
suggested the dissolution of the Cultural Revolution Council. Eventually, however, after 
11
 See the circular in Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 
(1983:250-252). 
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several months of delay in parliament, the plan was ratified with minor changes and, of 
course, the CRC was not dissolved. 
The High Council of Cultural Revolution (HCCR): The ratification of the above-
mentioned plan did not put an end to the rivalry among the CRC, the University Crusade, 
and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education concerning who should rule the 
universities. A year later (on 19 Azar 1363/December 30, 1984), once more the Imam with 
his power as the valt-ye faqth, ordered the formation of a new organization called The High 
Council of Cultural Revolution (HCCR). Figure 6 depicts the organizational structure of the 
High Council of Cultural Revolution. First of all, veldyat-e faqth, for the first time, became 
the highest authority in the administrative organization of the university. Second, the CRC 
was officially dissolved. Thirdly, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education was 
assigned as the sole government organ accountable for university affairs. Finally, all the 
activities of the University Crusade were henceforth contained under the auspices of the 
Ministry. Thus, this re-organization of the leadership of the ICR amounted to the 
ascendency of the Liberal-dominated Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. 
Today (1987), the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education rules over the 
universities and more than ever is striving to restore its pre-Revolution function, i.e., to 
obtain formal authority over the entire higher educational system. Nonetheless, governance 
of the system in the Islamic Republic is bestowed, more than in the Shah's era, upon various 
webs of councils with overlapping and often conflicting functions and responsibilities. The 
Ministry is also trying to re-establish the dissolved board of trustees (K.H., May 10, 1989, 
p. 1). 
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The struggle between the Ministry and the University Crusade over the question of 
university governance is yet another example of the differences between the liberals (The 
Ministry) and the Maktabts. On the one hand, the liberals are vigorously attempting to curb 
the Islamic laws and regulations concerning university administration. For instance, they are 
emphasizing the expertise, rather than the piety, of the appointed university presidents; they 
are re-establishing the board of trustees; they are decreasing the presence of the clergy at the 
executive level of the administration. On the other hand, the University Crusade, which 
strongly advocates the restructuring of university governance according to the traditions of 
the Islamic seminaries (Howzes), found itself to be another victim of the increasing 
liberalization policy of the liberals. In an analogy, the University Crusade regards itself as 
the "unwanted child" of the Ministry and, as such, it concludes that no parental affections 
could be expected (D.E., No. 38, Murdad 1363/July-August 1984, p. 64). 
2.4.5.3 The Councils: An Alternative Suggested by 
Independent and Democratic Societies of the University 
The Independent and Democratic Societies (IDS) (Jame'eha-ye Mustaqel va 
Demukrafik) of the university was formed after the downfall of the National Organization of 
Iranian Academics.32 The IDS remained active for a short while after the shutdown of the 
universities in April 1980 and they argued strongly against the monopolization policy of the 
government with respect to the universities. The IDS advocated the idea of the councils as 
the ultimate authority in ruling over the campuses. The four basic tenets of the plan for the 
32
 More detailed discussion on the formation of the IDS will be presented in Chapter 
Three. The emphasis in this section will be only on their position on university governance. 
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reform of the higher education system suggested by the Democratic Society of faculty members 
at Shiraz University (one of the most active universities) were: a) the universities ought to be 
anti-imperialist/exploitation by governing the institutions through the establishment of councils at 
the levels of departments, divisions and the university as a whole; b) the councils ought to seek 
the autonomy of the university as well as to forbid any military presence on the campuses. This, 
they suggested, could only be accomplished through the following: the protection of the 
democratic rights of the individuals; political, ideological, and military training; the organization 
of seminars, workshops, and public discussion sessions; the encouragement of universal political 
participation; the purging of all SAVAK agents and supporters of the Shah; c) the university 
ought not to be an elitist institution. The workers' and peasants' children ought to have access 
to higher education too. The necessary financial support ought to be provided for them as well; 
d) the universities ought to be decentralized so that people from different geographic regions 
could have access to the institutions, and e) the academic program of the institutions ought to be 
in accordance with the socio-economic needs of the country. 
An important point in the Societies' policy for the reform of higher education was their 
emphasis on the relationship between the University Councils and those of the workers and 
peasants. They argued that the councils, as the ultimate source of power in any institution in 
society, ought to resist the monopolization tendencies of the Islamic state. The societies' main 
slogan became "Councils Everywhere" and they suggested that (Amuzesh va Farhang, No. 5 & 
6, Spring 1980 & Winter 1981, p. 142): 
Universities and factories, as relentless sites of anti-imperialist and 
anti-exploitation struggle, have the potential to carry on these 
struggles. Through the strengthening of their councils and their 
unity they will eventually be able to play an important role 
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historically in this struggle. The survival of the councils, as an 
alternative to state power, and as the only arena left for sustaining 
the achievements of the Revolution, is very crucial. All the 
democratic forces in society ought to support the councils in the 
universities and factories and the slogan of "Councils 
Everywhere"... 
Nevertheless, with the consolidation of the Islamic state power, the societies were 
crushed and (practically) the government and its Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 
gained exclusive control of the higher education system. 
2.4.6 Islamization of the Structure of the University 
Once the system of dual power in the administration of the institutions was quickly 
replaced by the solitary rule of the Islamic state, the leaders of the ICR undertook a number of 
measures to consolidate state rule over the campuses. Some of the measures taken were easy to 
carry our (e.g. Islamizing the names of universities and re-grouping the institutions) while the 
most ambitious plan, known as the "Union between Howie and the University", i.e., 
restructuring the modern secular institutions along the pattern of traditional religious institutions, 
failed. All these reforms, especially the latter, became a site of conflict between two factions 
sharing state power-the Liberals and the Maktabts. 
2.4.6.1 Islamization of the Names of the Institutions 
The most noticeable change in the structure of higher education was the title changes of 
the institutions during and after the revolution. These title changes became an indicator of 
opposition to the government. In the Shah's era all the public buildings and places were said to 
be a "gift" from the Shah to the people, and thus had to carry the Pahlavi dynasty's 
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designations. The universities, as government-owned institutions, were no exception. In 
fact, they were among the prime sources of the Shah's propaganda machinery in selling the 
idea of moving the society toward the "Great Civilization." Thus, it is no surprise that most 
of the institutions founded in the 60's and 70's had Pahlavi-associated names in their titles 
e.g., Aryamehr Industrial University, Pahlavi University and Farah Pahlavi University, Reza 
Shah The Great University. 
During the revolutionary uproar of 1978-79, omission of Pahlavi names from all the 
public institutions, buildings, public places, i.e., streets, parks, etc., came to be a sign of 
defiance. Prior to that the government, and in most cases, the Shah himself, assigned the 
titles of the institutions. Therefore, for the first time, students, faculty members, and 
support staffs were able to rename their institutions through their councils. 
Generally speaking, the new names fell within three categories. First, the names of 
the institutions' student martyr(s) replaced monarchical titles. For instance Farah Pahlavi 
University came to be called Mahbube Mottahedin University.33 In other cases such as 
Tehran Polytechnical University, although a monarchical name was not included in its title 
they renamed the institution Nejatollahi University in order to commemorate the assassination 
of faculty member Nejatolahi by the Shah's military. In the second category were the 
institutions which omitted the monarchical titles and chose instead the local name of their 
location, i.e., Pahlavi University and Reza Shah the Great University became respectively 
Shiraz and Mazandaran University. Finally, the third category included those institutions 
33
 Mahbube Mottahedin was a woman martyr of Mujahedm Organization. 
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which decided to dedicate their titles to well-known Iranian literary and scientific figures. Thus, 
as an example, Mashhad University chose Ferdowsi, Iran's famous epic poet, and came to be 
known as Ferdowsi University. 
Nonetheless, with the consolidation of the Islamic government and the events of the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution, the titles of the institutions once more were revised and the 
government became the sole authority in naming the institutions. After the implementation of 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution, several changes in the titles of institutions took place. First, all 
the names of martyrs belonging to opposition groups were omitted and were replaced by Islamic 
names. As such, Mahbube Mottahedin University became Alzahra University. Second, more 
often the names of high-ranking government officials assassinated by opposition groups were 
used. For instance, National University of Iran came to be called Martyr Beheshti University, 
Ahvaz University was changed to Martyr Chamran University, and Kerman University became 
Martyr Bahonar University. Finally, the newly established institutions either all carry directly 
Islamic titles, such as Imam Sadeq University, or they have titles with religious connotations, 
e.g., the Witness University (Shahed) which belongs to the martyrs' families and those who 
became disabled during the Iran-Iraq war. To give another example, the Message of the Light 
University (Payame Nur) is a correspondence institution. Table 6 summarizes the title change of 
selected institutions over three time periods; the pre-revolution period, the revolution, and the 
period since the Islamic Cultural Revolution. 
In the Islamic Republic, as in the Shah's regime, the designation of the institutions' titles 
is a government prerogative. The High Council of Cultural Revolution is the only government 
body with the power to name the institutions. As one could easily detect from the examples 
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above, the naming of the institutions came to be another sphere of political and ideological 
confrontation between the Iranian governments and dissident citizens. 
Table 6. Institutional Name Changes as a Reflection 
of Political Change 
Founding Title 
Tabriz University 
Shiraz University 
Jundi Shabpour University 
Rezashah Kabir University 
The Revolutionary Corps 
University 
Girls College of Iran 
Razavi University 
National University of Iran 
Aryamehr Industrial 
University 
Imperial Medical Center of 
Iran 
1 p0iy,~-K»u.i tj-jver^y 
• 
Monarchical Period 
Azarabadegan University 
Pahlavi University 
Farah Pahlavi University 
Mashhad University 
Revolutionary Era 
Hanifiiezhad University 
Shiraz University 
Ahvaz University 
Mazandaran University 
Abu-Rayhan Bironi 
University 
Mahbobe Motahedin 
University 
Ferdowsi University 
Tehran Industrial University 
Medical Centre of Inn 
K^sssSsia Unive»ir/ 
Post-Islamic Cultural 
Revolution 
Tabriz University 
Shiraz University 
Martyr Chamran University 
Mazandaran University 
Abu-Rayhan Birouni 
University 
Alzahra University 
Ferdowsi (Mashhad) 
University 
Martyr Beheshti University 
Sharif Industrial University 
1 Amir iCaoir inuu*uiai 
University 
Source: Based on government and opposition publications 
2.4.6.2 The Grouping and Dissolution of the Institutions 
The rapid expansion of higher education in the 70*s led to an increase in the quantity 
of institutions at the expense of quality as will be shown. The institutions were mainly 
concentrated in major urban areas. Thus, raising academic quality and the dispersal of 
institutions to economically underdeveloped regions of the country passed into the higher 
education reform policies of almost all radical groups. Although the Islamic government 
recognized these issues, it had its own agenda. First, the Islamic government continued the 
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centralization policy of the Shah in order to have more efficient political and ideological control 
of the institutions. Thus, in late 1979, fifty-three colleges were all re-grouped under four 
university complexes dealing with Literature and Humanities, Business and Trade, Engineering 
and Technology, and the Arts. Second, since traditionally more social and academic prestige is 
attributed to the university than, for example, colleges, the Islamic government began renaming 
the colleges as universities or simply, grouping one section of an institution with a new 
institution and calling it a university. The creation of Medical Science universities all over the 
country is the best example of this. Finally, in terms of the concentration of the institutions in 
major urban areas, the Islamic government has failed to implement any substantial changes. 
Still, as shown in Figure 7, most of the universities are concentrated in the Tehran Province. 
In establishing a new institution in Iran, no specific criteria such as the number of the 
students, faculty members, size of the institution, ratio of instructors to students, the amount of 
budget, diversity of academic program, etc. have been taken into consideration. That is 
precisely why within a four year period from 1983 to 1987 the number of universities alone has 
more than doubled, from 20 to 44. However, it is important to note that the increase in the 
number of universities does not always imply the establishment of a new university, rather it is 
often the nominal upgrading of an existing college to a university. As an example, the total 
number of university complexes rose from 4 to 20 in the academic year of 1984-85 and once 
more gradually declined until the academic year of 1987-88 when there were only 12 complexes. 
Furthermore, this grouping of the institutions might also explain why the total number of the 
institutions has declined from 254 in 1980 to 85 in 1987 (for a complete list of these changes see 
Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 1987:z-t). 
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In general, the Islamic Cultural Revolution did not alter the trend set by the Shah's policy 
of limiting access to higher education to more affluent urban dwellers. Even when tuition fees 
are minimal, the rural population's access to higher education is limited because adequate 
primary and secondary education is not available in the countryside and housing and other living 
expenses in the large urban centers are a main obstacle. As a matter of fact, the Islamic regime 
has become even more centralist in terms of concentrating the institutions in large urban areas 
and merging them altogether for the purpose of effective political and ideological control. 
2.4.6.3 The Re-emergence of Private Institutions 
The re-emergence of the private institutions or "non-profit" institutions (gheyr-e entefit't), 
as they have been officially called, occurred at a time when the country was going through 
turbulent years of political and economic turmoil. The Iran-Iraq war had devastated the 
economy, universities had been shut down for two years, unemployment had increased especially 
among the youth, and the number of applicants for the university seats had increased. 
Therefore, to divert the growth of dissatisfaction among educated youths, the government 
initiated the idea of establishing private institutions ("Guzaresh-e 'amalkard-e dan sale-ye 
amuzesh-e 'all..." [Report on the 10-year operation of higher education...] Khabarndme-ye 
Pazhaheshr-ye Shartf, Vol. 5, No. 44, Tir 1368/July 22, 1989, p. 4). These institutions were 
named "Free Islamic University" and soon branched out to different regions of the country. As 
early as 1983 the Free Islamic Universities started to admit students who were able to afford the 
tuition fees while their constitution was not ratified until four years later, in 1987. Powerful 
government cabinet members and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education were among the 
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strong advocates of these institutions. The founding members included: Ali Khamene'i (then 
President); Hashemi Rafsanjani (then speaker of the parliament); Mousavi Ardebili (Head of the 
Supreme Court); Hussein Mousavi (then Prime Minister); and Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah 
Khomeini's son. Furthermore, provision for the resurrection of the board of trustees (they were 
abolished after the revolution) was included in the constitution of the Free Islamic Universities. 
The board had nine members including four full-time faculty members, three founding members, 
a representative from the Ministry, and the Governor General of the province. 
As was the case in the Shah's government, private institutions remain effectively under 
the same government control as the public institutions. The difference, however, is manifested 
in the budget. The budget of the Free Islamic Universities comes from tuition fees, private 
investments, and limited government funds. Nonetheless, the government controls all the affairs 
of the institutions and they should comply to the laws and regulations set forth by the Ministry of 
Culture and Higher Education (Rdhnamd-ye Azman-e Sardsarf-ye Ddneshgdh-e Azdd-e Esldmt 
Sdl-e Tahstlt-ye 1366-67 (Guide to the Central Entrance Exams of the Free Islamic University, 
Academic year 1987-88, Tehran: Daneshgah-e Azad-e EslamI, 1366, p. 26). 
Generally speaking, the Free Islamic Universities have more relaxed criteria in terms of 
student admission than do other institutions. For instance, no age limit is imposed on applicants 
who are allowed to select more than one discipline in the entrance exam, and even no high 
school diploma is required (Ibid., p. 1). The Faculty members of these institutions also enjoy 
higher salaries and better working conditions as opposed to their colleagues in other institutions. 
In fact a member of the High Council of Cultural Revolution criticized the administration of the 
Free Islamic Universities in their attempt to attract faculty members from government-owned 
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institutions and said, "You are putting a burden on the government institutions while your 
mission was elevating this burden" ("Enteqad az Daneshgah-e Azad," (Criticism of the Free 
University), Adtne, No. 35, Khurdad 1368/May-June 1989, p. 6). 
The Free Islamic universities are expanding very rapidly. The president of the university 
(Tehran chapter), Dr. Jasebi, announced in the first graduation ceremony that the total number 
of students in the Free Islamic Universities were 180,000 (almost as much as all other 
institutions combined) and within the next five-year development plan the campuses of the 
universities will grow gradually from 120 to 150 and eventually 180. Respectively the number 
of the students will increase to 300,000 to 400,000, and finally, 500,000. The total number of 
full-time faculty members will double and scholarship funds and financial aid will be provided 
for poor students (Ibid.). One of the faculty members of the universities states the reason for the 
rapid growth of the institution as follows (Ibid., 64-65): 
Getting a degree is the primary motivation of the students. We give 
it to them easily...let's face it, after all the establishment of these 
institutions saved many female students who were suffering from 
unemployment and saved many male students who were striving to 
pursue their education abroad. 
A point to consider here is the fact that the idea of Free Islamic University as a private 
institution was pursued mainly by the liberals. They have been staunch supporters of these 
institutions, especially Rafsanjani himself. He even described the opponents of the institutions as 
"mercenaries" and "ignorants" in a Friday prayer congregation. He was directly referring to 
maktabts, especially the University Crusade who had a completely different agenda for the 
university. 
In a plan called "The plan for the formation and activities of the Free Islamic University" 
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which was drafted as early as 1983, the University Crusade proposed the creation of a university 
modelled after Islamic seminary schools. Item number 10 of the plan states that "a close 
relationship between expertise and commitment could be establish if the university relies heavily 
on the might/bulwark of Islam (clergies)" (D.E., No. 15, Shahrivar 1367/August-September 
1982, p. 23). Also, item 11 suggests that the educational system of the university should be 
based on the seminary system, i.e., the simultaneous training in knowledge and piety, bearing in 
mind that education is a form of prayer, continuity and infinity in learning, and abolishment of 
degree-receiving fever (Ibid.). Furthermore, as in seminaries, the public was expected to meet 
the financial needs of the institutions, and in terms of governance, it was suggested that the 
institutions were to be autonomous with a decentralized administrative body. In sum, the 
University Crusade attempted to create a university with a new identity and based on the 
seminary system instead of copying the already existing Western models. They argued that in 
order to "sustain the revolutionary spirit and outlook, the existing university system must be 
avoided...In other words, the Free Islamic University ought to be based upon the rich 
educational experiences of the seminaries (Howies) and the flourishing Islamic civilization of the 
past" (Ibid.). 
In conclusion, certain political and economic considerations caused the creation of private 
institutions under both the Monarchial and the Islamic regimes. Increasing public pressure, 
especially among the youth in times of economic hardship when the upgrading of training 
through higher education seemed a viable option, together with the government's fear of the 
spread of dissatisfaction among this politically vulnerable group led both regimes to relax, to a 
limited extent, their monopolization policy. Thus, those individuals who comply with the 
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political and ideological criteria of the government have been permitted to found an 
institution under direct supervision of the government. Needless to say mostly middle- and 
upper-class individuals would have access to these institutions because of costs which 
eventually cause a widening of class differences. Above all, both regimes intended to 
generate a new type of higher education institution in the hope that they could demote the 
political weight of the universities. 
2.4.7 The Union of the Howzes and the University 
Taking their lead from Khomeini's views on Iranian universities, the maktabts argued 
that an ideal Islamic higher education system radically different from that of the West and the 
East could be established only if the institutions were restructured on the basis of the 
traditional Islamic seminaries known, in Shiite Iran, as Howze-ye 'Elmt-ye,3* 'scholarly 
centers'. Gradually, a policy of radical Islamization was put forward under the "Union of 
Howie and the University" (vahdat-e howze va ddneshgdh) by the maktabts who were 
organized in University Crusade, "Bureau of Consolidating Unity" (Daftar-e Tahkim-e 
Vahdat; see 3.11.0) and the Islamic Republic Party. The maktabts rationalized the necessity 
of the union on the basis of these arguments: 
a) the university is a Western phenomenon and an apparatus of the modern state 
which is itself a product of the West, 
b) the training of civil employees and skilled labor are the main functions of the 
university. This educational function of the state is, however, usually overshadowed 
by the politicized climate of the universities. The politicization of the university [as it 
34
 For a brief account of Howze see D.E., No. 10, Farvardin 1961/March-April 1982, 
pp. 34-36. 
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happened under the Shah] puts at risk not only the educational process but also the state. 
Thus, the university plays an oppositional role, 
c) the relationships between the state and Howze is markedly different than that of the 
state and university. The Howze is both an educational and political institution because 
there is no separation between religion and politics. The politics of Howze stems from 
religion, Islamic ideology, 
d) Howies are more attached and attuned to the public than the universities. The former 
are under the control of velaydt-e faqth while a complicated net of bureaucracy is 
controlling the latter; therefore, access to universities is limited to the public and public 
money is wasted, 
e) the university offers learning in natural and material sciences while Howze teaches 
spiritual and religious knowledge. They can, therefore, complement each other if they 
unite. 
Based on these perceptions, the Unionists argue that the university must be restructured 
along the pattern of the Howies. The only way to achieve unity is to demote the organizational 
(tashktldtt) power of the universities and to promote it to an organization that acts as a conduit 
for implementing revelations of God's judgement. Thus, true unity means "the fusion of science 
and faith otherwise the science will remain in Tehran [where most of the secular universities are] 
and the faith will remain in [the holy city of] Quia [where most important Howies are located]" 
(Faker 1983:56). 
Accordingly, the unified university will not move beyond the limits set by the Islamic 
form of stats, velayat-e faqth. The university will be a "translator" and popularizer of the ideas, 
verdicts and words of \he faqth (the ruling theologician-jurisprudent). There will be no room 
for alternative views. The university will have no mandate for philosophizing (i.e. determining 
what is right or wrong) about the policies, rules, laws and decision of veldyat-e faqth (Rahimi 
1982:83). These views, whether practical or on paper, envisage complete subordination of the 
university, organizationally and ideologically, to the Islamic state. 
115 
The Liberal version of Union was much more limited compared to the maktabts total 
fusion of the university and the ruling Islamic power. The Liberals argued for "cooperation" 
between the University and Howze. They thought the Howzes were capable of playing a 
significant role in the Islamization process of the higher education. For example, Liberals 
asked the (ulldbs (Howzes students) to participate in curriculum planning especially in 
establishing Islamic courses and revising the humanities. They also invited tullabs to teach at 
the university and vice versa. Finally, the Liberals attempted to create an atmosphere of 
"cooperation through the organizing of workshops and conferences.35 
In practice, however, neither "union" nor "cooperation" between the university and 
Howze took place. At the request of the Cultural Revolution Council, Ayatollah Montazery 
designated several of his representatives to the universities in 1984.3i Also, an office was 
established at the headquarters of the Cultural Revolution Council in order to coordinate 
activities among Montazery's representatives, and Montazery himself was appointed as the 
head of the office. The main responsibility of the representatives was to act as the "eyes and 
ears of Islam" on the campuses and as judges in the cases of disagreement among interest 
groups such as the university administration, the University Crusade or the Ministry of 
Culture and Higher Education. 
The presence of these representatives, however, did not contribute to bringing together 
35
 For more discussion on the Liberal's point of view see: Najafi and Khamene'i's 
opening message to the one week-long seminar on the Union of Howzes and the University 
in al-Samardt: PtrOmuh-e Vahdat-e Howze va Ddneshgdh, Tehran: University Crusade, pp. 
48-56 and 80-86. 
36
 Detailed description of the duties of Ayatollah Montazery's representatives is given in 
D.E., No. 39, Shahrivar 1363/July-August 1984, p. 64. 
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the university and the Howzes; on the contrary they exacerbated the disagreement among the 
rival organs disagreements over the Islamization process. To the extent that Montazery 
summoned all his representatives and requested their cooperation in keeping an atmosphere of 
"healthy" thinking and avoiding "disputes" (D.E., No. 46, Mehr 1366/September-October 1987, 
p. 60). Furthermore, Montazery declared (27 of Azar/December 18) the anniversary day of the 
assassination of Dr. Muhammad Mufatteh, as the "Day of Union Between the University and the 
Howze." Every year at this date new rounds of discussion about the significance of this unity is 
discussed while in practice nothing has taken place. 
By the mid-1980's, the issue of unity between the university and the Howzes had been 
limited to a few insubstantial activities such as recruiting modarrestn to teach Islamic courses at 
the university, or organizing conferences, seminars, workshops, etc., to further discuss the role 
of Howzes in the Islamization process of the university. Liberals are well aware of the scientific 
function of the university and ever-increasingly they propagate the importance of "expertise" 
without mentioning "commitment." Thus, they strongly emphasize the fact that the Howzes are 
not equipped with modern knowledge and, as such, are not qualified to be a part of the 
university. 
Failing to incorporate the university into the Islamic educational systems, one of the 
Howzes decided to establish its own university-type institution. In 1987, one of the Howzes 
announced the establishment of its affiliated medical school and started accepting applicants 
through advertising in the national press. The Minister of Health, Therapy, and Medical 
Education reacted (Kayhdn, 28 Azar 1366/December 19, 1987): 
1. This is an illegal action and the Howze has no legal authority in this respect. 
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2. The provincial university has not committed itself to any cooperation. 
3. This ministry will not recognize the admitted students as medical science students. 
As it is clear from the ministry's reaction, the Howze was over-reaching itself by intruding upon 
the realm of the university. The Minister's ability to oppose the Howze in 1987 when the 
maktabts still had the upper hand demonstrates not the power of the Liberals but, rather, the 
deep-seated position of the university in Iranian society. In fact, a medical school operated by 
the Howze would have failed to achieve acceptability let alone prestige among the public. 
2.5.0 Summary 
The role of the state in shaping the administrative structure of the university has been the 
focus of this chapter. A decisive factor in determining the nature of the administrative structure 
of the institutions has been shown to be the ideological and political loyalty of the university to 
the state. 
The Administrative reforms of the university over the following historical periods have 
been reviewed: the Pahlavis (1934-1977), the revolutionary years (1977-1978), the victory of 
the revolution to the Islamic Cultural Revolution (February 11, 1979-March 21, 1980) and the 
period following the ICR. The data provided in the chapter indicate that the general 
centralization policy of the Pahlavis was also extended to higher education. For example, 
Tehran University, despite provisions in its constitution to the contrary, found itself under the 
direct political control of the government as early as its inauguration day. Ideologically too, the 
university functioned as a powerful state apparatus. Modernization/Westernization, 
secularization, anti-communism, and Persian national chauvinism were the dominant ideological 
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functions of the university. Any opposition to the political and ideological domination of the 
state was brutally oppressed. 
To secure the interests of the state on the campuses, the Shah had to, first, establish a 
body of loyal and high ranking officials as the administrators of the higher learning institutions. 
This body, which later formed the board of trustees, came to be the only decision-making 
authority with power over the institutions. The Shah himself, or a trusted member of the Royal 
Family, also chaired the board's meetings. Second, to ensure the implementation of its policies, 
the state had to employ its repressive mechanisms, i.e., the secret police (SAVAK) as a unit 
within the administration and the army or guards with their headquarters on the campuses. 
Nonetheless, the campuses did not submit to the state's ideological and political control. 
During the revolutionary upheaval of 1977-78, the students, faculty, and administrative staffs 
rose against the rule of the Monarch on the campuses. The boards of trustees were abolished, 
the appointed presidents and vice-presidents were dismissed and SAVAK and the campus guards 
were dismantled. Instead, they established a "council system" in which all university groups 
were represented. Radical, nationalist, and liberal ideologies also surfaced on the campuses. 
The period from the victory of the revolution until the consolidation of power of the 
Islamic state was regarded as a "transitional period." It was a transition from a "dual power" 
system to a monolithic one. The councils of students and faculty were administering the 
institutions during this period. Liberal and Radical/leftist ideologies were represented in the 
councils. The decision-making process was directed from the bottom up and administrative 
positions were filled through elections. In other words, the university, for the first time, 
experienced autonomy, and students, faculty and support staffs governed many institutions. 
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However, the state also attempted strenuously during this period to bring the university under its 
control. Failing to obtain the political and ideological loyalty of the institutions, the Islamic state 
ventured upon employing force. Thus, the government launched a nation-wide attack on all the 
campuses and swept away opposition forces. The state called its consolidation of power over the 
campuses the "Islamic Cultural Revolution." 
According to the evidence provided in this chapter, the primary goal of the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution was a political one, i.e., state control over the autonomous institutions. 
However, the secondary aim of the state was the replacement of non-Islamic ideologies of the 
institutions with conservative Islamic ideology. Thus, to implement the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution, the Islamic state launched a massive political and ideological transformation, better 
known as the "purification" and "Islamization" of the institutions. 
The policies of the ICR were formulated by a group appointed by Khomeini and 
implemented by various organs of the Islamic state including security and coercive forces. At 
the top of this complex bureaucratic system were Khomeini and the Islamic Republic. The 
Islamic Societies (anjumanhd-ye esldmt) were substituted for the SAVAK and the campus 
guards. Clergymen were appointed to the president's office to ensure the proper "Islamization" 
process. Veiling became the only acceptable uniform for women on campuses. Khomeini's 
pictures, as well as those of high-ranking government officials who were "martyred" by the 
opposition replaced the Shah's and the Royal family's posters in the classrooms and in fact all 
across the campuses. Islamic graffiti, slogans, emblems, etc., replaced those of the monarchical 
period. The institutions were re-grouped or dissolved to implement more effective political 
control. Finally, the state attempted to unite the university with the traditional Islamic schools, 
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Howze, so that the university could be fully integrated into the Islamic state structure. 
The Islamic state, nevertheless, has not been successful in achieving the objectives of the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution. Although, the state has succeeded in suppressing the autonomy of 
the institutions, it has failed in its "Islamization". The administrative system basically reflects 
the structure in place during the Shah's rule. The presidents are appointed from outside the 
universities; the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education has been revived; the boards of 
trustees abolished during the 1978-79 Revolution are being reinstituted; clergymen have been 
recalled from their administrative duties, etc. The verdict on the "Union of the University and 
Howze (the traditional Islamic school)" is being reversed. A major question to be addressed is, 
thus, the failure of the ICR in Islamizing the administrative structure of the university. Chapter 
Three will deal with the Islamization of the teaching process, the faculty and students and the 
failure of these efforts. The final chapter provides an explanation of the outcome of the ICR. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF FACULTY AND STUDENTS 
Chapter Two argued that, as a result of the 1978-79 Revolution, Iranian Universities 
achieved a considerable degree of ideological, political and administrative independence from 
the newly formed Islamic state. Thus, a situation of "dual power" dominated the 
universities: leftist students and faculty exercised considerable political, ideological and 
administrative influence over the institutions and the Islamic state failed to extend its rule 
over the academia. 
The Islamic Cultural Revolution sought to bring the universities under strict state rule. 
The government-staged armed attack on the universities succeeded in extending state control 
over the administration of the institutions. Driving leftist students off campus, security 
forces maintained the "law and order" desired by the Islamic state. This move enabled the 
state to undermine the authority of student and faculty councils that had run some of the 
universities. The state was therefore able, eventually, to maintain full control of the 
administrative structure of the institutions. 
The administrative control of the university did not, however, bring about the political 
and ideological loyalty of the institutions. This was the case because universities, unlike 
government offices, are not primarily administrative institutions. The main elements in the 
universities are the students and the faculty, their ability to engage in intellectual work, and 
to organize and act consistently with their intellectual and political commitments. This was 
clear during the monarchical regime when the administrative structure of the universities was 
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closely tied to the regime while the student body remained ideologically and politically 
dissident.37 
Determined to gain the political and ideological loyalty of students and faculty, the 
Islamic state closed down the universities in order to plan the reformation of the student body 
and faculty. The administrative structure was, thus, used as a means of establishing political 
and ideological control over the institutions. It is the purpose of this chapter to throw light 
on these aspects of state-university relations. 
3.0.0 The Faculty 
This section examines the policies adopted by Monarchical and Islamic states for the 
ideological and political control of the faculty and the political activism of the professoriate 
against the state. Also examined is the reform of teaching methods and curricula. 
3.1.0 The Employment Policy of the State 
The employment of the faculty, since the establishment of Tehran University, was the 
responsibility of the administration. According to the constitution of Tehran University and 
"The Policy of the Selection of Assistant Professors" which was ratified in 1935 by the 
University Council, all the faculty appointments from the rank of assistant to full professor 
were under the jurisdiction of each department with the permission and final approval of the 
president. Nonetheless, all the employees had to comply with the requirements of The 
37
 By contrast, in the U.S. the universities are administratively independent of the state 
but ideologically and politically the faculty and students by and large support the state (except 
in particular cases such as the anti-war movement in the 1960s and the early 1970's). 
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General Employment Law of the country. 
With the establishment of the Civil Service Commission or the High Council of 
Administrative Affairs in the early sixties, all government appointments were centralized 
within this organization. The only exceptions were the appointments of full professors and 
assistant professors, which continued to be under the jurisdiction of the University. All the 
other appointments e.g., associate professor which was regarded as an entry level position 
and required a Ph.D. degree, had to be ratified by the High Council of Administrative 
Affairs (Afzal 1971:371). 
Another implication of employment centralization was the establishment of a method 
of political and ideological screening of potential faculty members. The nationalist and leftist 
tendencies among the faculty members in the early 1940's made the Shah worried. Thus, he 
decided to exercise his power over the universities by reducing its decision-making and 
administrative power. In 1963, the Employment Bill for Academics was ratified. Based on 
provisions in the Employment Bill, the office of the General Auditor of Tehran University 
was established.3' Among the duties of the General Auditor's Office were the promotion of 
faculty to the ranks of full and associate professor as well as the approval of the academic 
merit of applicants for the assistant level. Nevertheless, the political and ideological 
qualifications which guaranteed employment, were under the jurisdiction of the National 
38
 The faculty strongly opposed the bill and stated, "...it defeated its purpose as instead 
of persuading the teaching staff to devote all their time to academic pursuits, studies, and 
research, it made civil servants of them and gave them higher government posts" (Echo of 
Iran 1963:384-5). 
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Security and Information Organization (SAVAK).39 
In an attempt to recruit loyal faculty members, the Shah's regime focused more on the 
pool of recent Iranian graduates, especially from American universities. These young 
graduates were of the post-Mossadeq-era generation who, presumably, had not been under 
the influence of the nationalist/democratic struggles of the early 1950's and the early 1960s. 
Nonetheless, contrary to the regime's expectation, this young and educated generation, under 
the influence of the Iranian student movement abroad, especially in the U.S.A., was 
converted to a mighty academic and political power which was instrumental in the downfall 
of the Shah's regime.40 In the academic year of 1972-73, the Imperial Inspectorate 
(Bazrasl-ye Shahanshahl)41 conducted a survey focusing on "academic qualifications", 
"teaching experience" and the "moral and personal qualifications" of faculty members across 
the country (Oannadan 1973). The survey concluded that the newly employed and young 
faculty members were inexperienced in convincing their students on the importance of being 
loyal to the government. A faculty member from Tabriz University was quoted as follows 
(Ibid., p. 90): 
39
 This organization which was established in 1957 with the collaboration of the CIA was 
responsible for the suppression of potential opposition. "SAVAK had the power to censor the 
media, screen applicants for government jobs, and, according to reliable Western sources, use 
all means necessary, including torture, to hunt down dissidents" (Abrahamian 1982:8). 
40
 The role of the powerful Iranian student movement in Europe and the U.S. has not 
received research attention. A Ph.D. dissertation is in progress on "The History of the 
Iranian Student Movement Abroad" by Afshin Matin-Asghari, University of California, Los 
Angeles. (Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 2, December 1989, p. 
303). See, also, IUrtaeo (forthcoming). 
41
 The Imperial Inspectorate was another security organization, besides SAVAK, which was 
established in 1958. Zonis describes it as "an Iranian variant of the ombudsman reporting to the 
Shah" (1971:65). 
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The hiring of young instructors has caused confusion and 
perplexity among the students. How can young instructors who 
have not developed socially and have not psychologically 
established yet guide their students? This, especially is 
applicable to newly hired foreign educated faculty members. 
They have good academic credentials but are poor in terms of 
nationalism or adjusting to the social life in the country. 
Although the Shah's employment policy greatly affected the faculty members, i.e., 
demoralized and depoliticized them, nevertheless, the employment of young scholars 
revitalized the academic life of the university in the 1970s. 
3.1.1 The Revolutionary Years: 
Faculty Autonomy in The Employment Policy 
Generally, these years could be perceived as a struggle for political ascendancy 
between the state and university the faculty members. As of the mid-1970s, university 
autonomy was the key focus of the struggle of faculty members. During the short period 
from the fall of the monarchy until the consolidation of the power of the Islamic government, 
the university experienced an "incomplete autonomy." No basic changes occurred in the 
policies of the University but the academics, on their own initiative, altered the practices. 
The most obvious one, for instance, was the hiring practice. 
The faculty members raised two demands with respect to employment: no 
interference of SAVAK in the screening of academic applicants and the re-instatement of 
faculty members who were forced to retirement due to their political activities.42 
42
 See, for example, the following articles in the daily newspapers: Kayhdn, 14 Shahrivar 
1357/September 5, 1978, "ultimatums sad-u-sT-yu chahar ustad-e daneshgah-e Tehran" 
(The Ultimatum of One Hundred and Thirty-Four Faculty Members of Tehran University); 
Kayhan, 3 Aban 1357/October 25, 1978, "Qat'name-ye kadr-e amuzeshi-ye madrese-ye 
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Immediately following the victory of the 1979 Revolution, each department autonomously, 
i.e., without even approval of the presidents, engaged in hiring at the associate professor and 
lecturer level. The hiring criteria were totally revised to exclude ex-members of SAVAK, 
the Monarch loyalists, ex-members of Resurrection Party and anybody proven to be affiliated 
with the Shah's regime. Therefore, those employed during this period were mainly foreign 
educated graduates who, because of their political affiliation with the Confederation of 
Iranian Students, were not able to go back to Iran even after completion of their degrees. 
Also, among them, were ex-members and activists of Tudeh Party, National Front, etc. who 
had been forced into exile after the CIA coup of 1953. Finally, a major group of faculty 
members who were actually re-hired in this period were political activists who were either in 
jails, were forced to retire, or were deported to government offices and were not allowed to 
assume teaching positions. 
It is, however, important to point out that most of the appointments during this period 
were contracts (peymdnt) and as such, as we will see below, they were the prime target of 
the Islamic Republic's political repression; most of the contracts immediately after the 
Islamic cultural Revolution were cancelled or never renewed. 
Another significant hiring practice in this period was termination of employment of 
faculty members who had cooperated with SAVAK in identifying defiant students, 
participated in international and national conferences on behalf of the government and taken 
advantage of teaching and research facilities to oppose the anti-monarchical struggle of the 
*atl-ye Pars (The Resolution of Teaching Staff of the Pars College) and "Khast-ha-ye hay'at-
e *elmi-ye madrese-ye 'aH-ye bazarganl" (The Demands of the Teaching Staff of College of 
Business). 
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people and the students. Finally, for the first time, faculty members and students held sole 
authority in hiring and firing within their own departments which was unprecedented in the 
history of Iranian higher education. 
3.1.2 The Islamization of Employment Policy 
Soon after the establishment of the Cultural Revolution Council the employment 
policy of higher institutions was totally revamped. Ideological and political loyalty to the 
Islamic regime and an ever more centralized employment system characterized hiring policy. 
The "selection of qualified professors" became one of the major duties of the Cultural 
Revolution Council. Within the Council a special hiring body called the "Central Faculty 
Selection Body" (hey'at-e markazt-ye guztnesh-e ustdd) was created (see Figure 6). This 
body was composed of representatives from the Islamic seminaries, the Cultural Revolution 
Council and the High Council of the Selection. 
The mandate of the Central Faculty Selection Body was very limited; they would only 
recommend the qualified candidates to the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education who 
was the final authority in approving any hiring. This Body also had two committees, 
Professional (takhassust) and Moral (akhldql), which were responsible to review the 
applicants separately. The general qualifications for hiring faculty members set forth by the 
Moral Committee were as follows (D.E., No. 45, Esfand 1363/February-March 1984, pp. 
72-73): 
1. Citizenship of Iran. 
2. Permanent exemption from military services. 
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3. No deprivation of civil rights which could adversely affect the 
employment. 
4. No renunciation for debauchery and libertinism ifesq vafujQr) 
and/or any acts against public prestige (shu'uh-e ejtemd'i). 
5. Religious piety and practical obligation to the Islamic decrees; no 
affiliation with the previous regime, SAVAK, and freemasonry; no 
affiliation with the misleading religion [Baha']; and no past record of 
effective propaganda for the foreign countries or anti-Islamic schools 
of thought. 
6. Faith in and commitment to the Islamic Revolution, Veldyat-e Faqth 
and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Dr. Habibi, member of the Cultural Revolution Council, defines the aims of the 
Central Selection Body as one of assuring the moral and ideological qualifications of the 
applicants as well as centralizing the hiring system. He emphasized that the Shah's regime 
failed to control the religious and moral backgrounds of the applicants. "Today," Dr. Habibi 
boasted, "our faculty selection policy is even tighter than selecting the judges for our 
Supreme Court. Even when I mentioned this to the Imam, he declared, 'that is the way it 
should be, because teachers are even more important than judges'" (D.E., No. 12, Khurdad 
1361/May-June 1982, p. 13). 
Prior to the implementation of the new hiring policy for faculty, the Cultural 
Revolution Council decided to "purify" the institutions, i.e., purge the defiant faculty 
members. As such, quite a considerable number of faculty activists were expelled from 
universities across the country (Amuzesh va Farhang, Vol. 3, Summer 1359/1981, P. 6). In 
some of the institutions, however, none of the limited term and sessional appointments was 
renewed (Ibid.) The identified faculty activists were the prime target of the Islamic 
government's offensive on the higher education institutions in the summer of 1981. Among 
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hundreds arrested and jailed was Dr. Farzad Beiglari, faculty member of Tehran Industrial 
University and one of the founding members of National Organization of Iranian Academics 
(NOIA) and Democratic Societies, who was arrested in April 1361/1982 and executed a year 
later (Kavoshgar, No. 1, Spring 1366/1987, p. 23). Also, female assistant professor, 
Ma'suomae Rasekhi Langaroudi was executed by the firing squad in 1983.43 The 
continuing atmosphere of terror forced thousands of the faculty members into exile. 
The purge policy had a devastating impact on higher education. The Minister of 
Culture and Higher Education in a seminar on "The Study of the Human Resource Needs of 
the Islamic Universities of Iran", described the situation as follows (Khabarndme-ye 
Pazhuhesht-ye Sharif, year 2, No. 15, 30 Khurdad 1364/June 20, 1985, p. 3): 
In 1966 we had about 2,300 faculty members in our 
universities...In 1971 the total number rose to 2,709 which 
indicates an increase of 24 percent. Again, in 1976. the total 
number for faculty members skyrocketed to 6,354, i.e., a 37 
percent increase. In 1980, a year after the Islamic Revolution, 
1/3 of the faculty members left the institutions. Some have been 
convicted, others did not come back by their own preference. 
What we have today are a total of 6,000 faculty members who 
are mainly concentrated in medicine; and only 1,340 of them are 
in the social sciences and 85 in technical and engineering fields. 
According to Table 7 the total number of teaching staff decreased from 16,877 for the 
academic year of 1979-80 to 9,042 in the academic year of 1982-83. In other words, within 
a two-year period, the universities were short of 7,835 faculty members. Nonetheless, the 
government, until very recently, was reluctant to fill the vacant faculty positions. 
43
 Committee for Solidarity with the Iranian People 1986:33. 
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Table 7. The Distribution of Teaching Staff in the Institutions of Higher Education of 
Iran, Academic year 1976-77 to 1987-88 
Academic Year 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-86 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
F 
2,058 
2,372 
2,214 
2,415 
1.424 
1.822 
2.141 
2.281 
2.293 
2,654 
M 
11.894 
13,081 
14.008 
14,422 
7,618 
9.672 
11.557 
12,409 
12.048 
13,296 
Total •• 
3 3 B 
13,952 
15.453 I 
16,222 | 
16,877 
9.042 
11,494 
13,698 
14,690 
14,341 
15.950 
Source: Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 1988:19 
** All full-time, part-time and sessional teaching staff are included. 
Based on the progress report of the Central Faculty Selection Body until 24 Azar 
1363/December 15, 1984, more than four years after the Islamic Cultural Revolution, a total 
of 4771 applicants were filled. Only 1231 applicants were accepted and 1035 were 
absolutely rejected because they did not meet the moral and professional criteria. The 
selection process was so slow that the High Council of the Cultural Revolution had to come 
up with a very limited time frame for the Selection Body and stated that (High Council of the 
Cultural Revolution 1985:163): 
If the Central Faculty Selection Bodies fail to review all the applicants within a year 
after the issuance of this circular, the Selection Committees within each institution 
will be independently responsible for hiring. 
Besides the Central Selection Bodies who were directly reporting to the Cultural 
Revolution Council, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education established its own 
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Auditor General Office for evaluating the academic credentials of the applicants. 
The Auditor General Office was composed of loyal and devoted professors and 
associate professors who were recommended to the Ministry by their presidents for a two-
year term. The Ministry, however, possessed the final approval on all the decisions taken by 
the Auditor General Office (Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture and Higher 
Education 1984:44-52). 
In comparison one could conclude that the Islamic government hiring policy has been 
more centralized than that of the Shah's regime. None of the institutions is autonomous in 
terms of hiring practices. They are, however, allowed to comment on the academic 
credentials of the applicants. Furthermore, the highest decision-making body of the higher 
education system, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, now is part of the multi-
layered hiring system. Also, the ideological criterion, i.e.. devotion to Islam and velayat-e 
faqth, has played a determining roles in the employment of faculty members. 
The hiring policy of the Islamic Republic, however, is shaped by the political 
domination of one faction over another. The centrality of moral/ideological criterion reflects 
the views of the maktabt faction. Since the liberals have predisposed other factions, 
especially with the formation of the High Council of Cultural Revolution and subsequent 
victory of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education in establishing itself as lbs authority 
in the realm of higher education (see 2.4.5.2), some bending of rules and regulations in 
hiring policy takes place (for more on this see the entire 2.4 section). The circular 
requesting a shorter time frame for evaluating the applicants which was mentioned above 
reflects this compromise. 
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The sudden decrease in the number of faculty members has greatly affected the 
quality of higher education in Iran (AUNazhad 1987:6-7). According to government data, 
46% of all faculty members are lecturers and the majority of the remaining 53% who were 
promoted to associate professor rank have master degrees only (D.E., No. 47, Aban 
1366/October-November 1987, p. 61). The projected needs for hiring faculty members, as 
have been shown in Table 8 indicate the severe shortage of faculty. 
Table 8. Projected Needs of Teaching Staff According 
to Field of Study In the Early Eighties 
Field of Study 
Medicine 
Technical and Engineering 
Agriculture 
Basic Scien 
Humanities 
Total 
Needs 
70,889.00 
216,748.00 
36,166.00 
- « j@< no 
23,528.00 
382,816.00 
Source: Calculation is based on Tables 1 and 2 in Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture 
and Higher Education, "Barrasi-ye mlzan-e niyaz be nlru-ye ensanl-ye mutakhasses dar 
guruh-ha-ye mukhtalef-e amuzeshl va dar nahad-ha-ye amuzesh-e 'aft" (The Study of 
Human Resources Need in Different Field of Studies in Institutions of Higher Education), 
n.d. 
The Islamic government, facing these extreme shortages of teaching experts, has 
taken several initiatives to solve the problem. The establishment of a specialized faculty 
training program, sponsorship of international program of study, the rapid expansion of 
graduate and doctoral programs within Iranian universities and finally attempt to attract 
foreign-educated Iranian graduates, all indicate the government's attempt to deal with the 
vacuum created in the universities since the implementation of the Islamic Cultural 
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Revolution. The most significant of all the initiatives, however, is the creation of a study 
program for training "Muslim" teaching staff. This program, as we will see in detail below, 
reflects two points which have important implications for our later analysis of the relationship 
between the state and higher education in Iran. On one hand, the Islamic regime has realized 
that the universities cannot operate by relying on the traditional sources of knowledge, i.e., 
teaching personnel from the seminaries. On the other hand, the socio-economic structure of 
today's Iranian society cannot develop without the existence of modern universities, which 
depend on teaching traditions and modern scientific knowledge as developed in Western 
capitalist societies. 
3.1,3 Faculty Training University 
Following the implementation of the "Islamic Cultural Revolution," the Islamic 
government decided to Islamize the faculty population. The government believed that the 
majority of faculty members lacked moral and religious qualifications, and therefore, they 
could not be entrusted to educate the minds and the souls of the young generation (this line 
of thinking is best formulated in Iran. Islamic Republic. Central Office of University 
Crusade, n.d.:2). Thus, the Cultural Revolution Council in Esfand 17, 1360/March 8, 1981 
ratified the first constitution of the Faculty Training School. Some amendments were added 
to the constitution a year later and the School officially began recruiting students as of the 
second semester of academic year of 1982-83 . Table 9 shows student enrolment in the 
school according to field of study in three academic years. Two features could be noted 
from the Table. One is the concentration of students in Medicine and the other is the low 
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rate of female participation. The school, nevertheless, became The Faculty Training 
University (Daneshgah-e Tarbiyat-e Mudarres) on 5 Murdad 1365/July 27, 1986, under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education.44 
Table 9. Students Enrollment in the Faculty Training 
School According to Field of Study and Sex (1982-1984) 
Field of Study 
Humanities 
Medicine 
Technical and 
Engineering 
Agriculture 
Basic Science 
Arts 
Grand Tola! 
First Period 
M 
95 
. 
-
-
. 
-
F 
17 
. 
-
-
. 
-
Second Period 
M 
-
72 
13 
17 
30 
. 
F 
-
18 
1 
-
1 
. 
Third Period 
M 
57 
34 
29 
15 
16 
7 
F 
10 
25 
1 
-
5 
-
463 I 
M: 385 
F: 78 
Source: D.E., No. 45, Esfand 1363/April-March 1984, p. 73 
The establishment of the Faculty Training School at the outset caused a dispute 
between the two ruling factions. The supporters of the plan were the maktabts of the 
Cultural Revolution Council and the University Crusade. The Ministry of Culture and 
Higher Education, representing the liberal faction, strongly rejected the plan. Thus, the 
Ministry, despite the fact that the school was under its auspices, withdrew its support. As 
44
 The constitution of The Faculty Training University has appeared in High Council of 
Cultural Revolution (1986:106-109). 
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such, the Ministry did not provide and/or encourage (in practical terms) the use of existing 
facilities in the universities, and made the recruitment process of faculty members for the 
school very cumbersome and unrealistic. The University Crusade accused the Ministry, as 
they did before, of advocating pro-Western ideology in giving preference to "expertise" 
rather than "commitment" and "piety." The Ministry admitted repeatedly the shortages of 
faculty members since the beginnings of the "Islamic Cultural Revolution." Its solutions, 
however, involved sending even more students abroad, especially at the graduate level, and 
inviting foreign scholars to assume teaching responsibilities for a certain period of time in the 
institutions of higher education in Iran. These solutions were strongly criticized by maktabts 
(represented by the University Crusade) and some of their supporters in the Cultural 
Revolution Council. They argued, once more, that Western educational philosophy and 
ideology have no credibility in training committed and pious individuals. The Ministry's 
policy of sending students abroad came under attack by the maktabts from a different angle, 
too. They argued that as long as the country is at war, the foreign currency must be spent 
on purchasing armaments and not on the education of Iranians abroad. 
Despite these differences, the Faculty Training University grew steadily and by the 
academic year of 1986-87 had a total of 837 students and offered Ph.Ds. and Master degrees 
in more than seventy fields of study. Nevertheless, in the course of its growth, several fields 
of study had to be closed down due to inadequate facilities and the lack of enough capable 
faculty to carry programs at the master and doctoral levels, e.g., Haematology and 
Midwifery (Shaffaf 1987:26). 
The objectives of the Faculty Training University, according to its constitution, are to 
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train loyal and accountable Muslim teachers and researchers. The graduates of the 
University are expected to contribute to the dissemination, preservation and promotion of 
state ideology and politics at the higher education level. Nonetheless, although more than 
five years have passed since the establishment of the program, which has produced hundreds 
of graduates, no scientific evaluation or report of its achievements are available and thus the 
measure of its success remains to be determined. 
To sum up, the faculty hiring policy of the Islamic regime (emphasis on 
moral/ideological qualification, government control of hiring and faculty training program) 
demonstrates one major pre-occupation-ideological and political control of the 
teaching/training process. This policy was formulated and implemented primarily by the 
maktabt faction in the Islamic state. The Liberals, pre-occupied primarily with academic 
qualifications, advocated a less stringent ideological screening and opposed the technically 
inadequate Faculty Training University set up by the maktabts who aimed at training 
instructors who were both committed (muta'ahhed) and expert (mutakhasses). 
3.2.0 Faculty Activism 
The history of faculty activism and its role in the anti-monarchical/anti-imperialist 
struggle of the Iranian people has yet to be written. Although the faculty has traditionally 
opposed the Pahlavi regime since 1930, the active and often pioneering involvement of the 
academic staff in the 1978-79 Revolution was certainly a new phenomenon in Iran. Despite 
the fact that the university was the birth-place of most of the opposition groups, and also 
some of the most prominent opposition leaders came from the rank of professoriate, the 
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involvement of faculty members as a group in opposing the Shah's regime was minimal and 
the students were the dominant dissident power, politically and numerically, on campus. 
Among the prominent opposition leaders were Dr. Ali Sanjabi, Dean of the Faculty of Law 
in the 1950's and the leader of the National Resistance Movement (Nehzat-e Muqavemat-e 
Melli) and Mehdi Bazargan, a faculty member at the College of Science and Technology at 
Tehran University and the founder of the Iran Party. Later, Bazargan became the first Prime 
Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Generally, until the late 1970s, faculty members were not a unified body and they had 
rarely shown their opposition to the Shah's regime on a mass scale and in an organized 
fashion; there was nothing in the least comparable to the student movement. However, there 
were individual faculty members who often strongly opposed the regime and criticized it in 
classes. These individuals often faced some form of punishment, depending on the 
seriousness of their "offense" to the government. Among them was one of the most 
prominent Iranian sociologists, Dr. Amir Hussain Aryanpour. According to one of his 
former students, Dr. Aryanpour's classes were always packed, not only by students, but also 
by teachers and other interested individuals from outside the university (Interview with Azad 
March 19, 1987). 
The Shah's regime had the faculty members under its political and ideological 
scrutiny. As we have seen with regard to the employment policy, the major, and probably 
the only consideration for the government was the political background and ideological 
orientation of the faculty members. In the classes of the suspected faculty members SAVAK 
agents were present in order to monitor the content of the lecture. There were, however, a 
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number of faculty members who were closely associated with the Shah's regime. The 
politically active students generally knew the pro-regime faculty members and idetified some 
professors as SAVAK members.45 Nevertheless, generally speaking, the majority of faculty 
members were anti-government, and were in favor of democratic rights and freedoms, and 
freedom of speech and expression. But, faculty demands were basically limited to their own 
interests as an intellectual guild. It was not until the late 1970's that a major shift occurred 
in the role of faculty members. They became instrumental in voicing the long-endured 
objection of the Iranian people to the Shah's regime. 
The majority of the faculty members joined the mass protest against the Shah's 
regime in the 1977-78 revolutionary upheaval years. One of the first organized opposition 
movements of faculty members was that of the Aryamehr Industrial University. The strike 
of faculty members of this university paved the way for the formation of a faculty 
organization and above all made university autonomy a national issue. The events of this 
period had a major impact on shaping the policies of the Islamic regime with respect to the 
rights of academia. As such, they deserve a careful analysis which will be pursued in the 
following sections. 
3.2.1 Formation of the National Organization 
of Iranian Academics (NOIA) 
As indicated above, the strike of faculty members at Aryamehr Industrial University 
in the spring of 1977 was one of the first organized attempts by faculty to actively oppose the 
45
 Information based on interviews with students, administrators, faculty members and 
revelations in 1979 about SAVAK activities on the campus. 
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government. Faculty members of other institutions gradually supported their colleagues at 
Aryamehr Industrial University and asked for the expulsion of all of the Shah's appointed 
members of the adminstration and faculty at universities throughout the country. Not long 
after the beginning of the strike at Aryamehr Industrial University, the demands of the 
strikers went much further than just the individual needs of the faculty and the institution. 
This was itself a major breakthrough for the faculty members in terms of relating their 
interests to wider national issues such as the establishment of democracy and independence. 
Also, the expansion of the concept of university autonomy to include the national economic 
and political independence of the country, brought down the walls around the universities, 
which had become fortresses during the Shah's regime. This allowed the people to join the 
students and faculty members in their struggle. 
A few months after the beginning of the faculty strike at the Aryamehr Industrial 
University, the wave of strikes and protests swept across all other campuses. The 
similarities of demands and needs among institutions plus the intensification of the people's 
protest against the Shah's regime made some of the more active faculty members think about 
the creation of a unified and national faculty organization for the first time. In July 1978, a 
group of ten faculty members got together and after several meetings, they came up with a 
plan for a university guild (senfi) organization. Later, on Murdad 3, 1357/July 25, 1978, 
they presented their plan to a group of approximately one hundred faculty members from 
different institutions around the country. It was at this gathering that the National 
Organization of Iran's Academics (NOIA) was formed (Kavoshgar, No. 2, Winter 
1366/1987, p. 4). Soon chapters of NOIA opened on several different campuses. The 
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pioneers were Tehran University, Industrial University, Free University, Polytechnical, 
National University, Science and Technology University, and Shiraz University. 
In the Charter of NOIA, faculty members opposed dictatorship and wanted to work 
for the transformation of both the dependent economy and the university system and they 
demanded independence, democracy and the freedom of the university.46 
With the aggravation of the political crisis and the continued progress of the anti-Shah 
struggle, NOIA raised demands whose political significance went beyond the campus, e.g., 
the end of martial law, the release of political prisoners, the return of all deportees, etc. The 
activities of NOIA during the fall and winter of 1978 included: relief aid to the victims of 
the Tabas earthquake in the summer of 1978, organizing "National Solidarity Week" in 
October 1978, active support of the sit-in by the families of the political prisoners at the 
Ministry of Justice (January 19791. summit of the Dress strike during the military government 
of Prime Minister Az-hari, organizing two major sit-ins (at Tehran University in December 
1978, and at the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in January 1979), and finally, the 
reopening week of the universities in January 1979. Of all of these, the National Solidarity 
Week, the sit-in at the Ministry, and the Reopening Week of the Universities had a 
significant impact on enhancing the struggle of Iranian people. 
3.2.1.1 National Solidarity Week: 
(6-13 Aban 1357) October 28-November 2, 1978 
During National Solidarity Week, tens of thousands of people from all walks of life 
46
 For the complete text of the Charter see Kavoshgar, No. 2, Winter 1366/1987. 
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participated in the daily activities (demonstrations, speeches, rallies, sit-ins, etc.). Demands 
for the overthrow of the Shah's regime were voiced loudly everywhere. It was at the end of 
National Solidarity Week that the troops opened fire on high school students at Tehran 
University. The event shook the nation after it was televised by the state. The Shah gave a 
television address and admitted "past mistakes," the National Conciliation Government 
resigned, and the Monarch appointed a Military Government on November 5, 1978. 
Members of NOIA at Tehran University began a sit-in on December 20 to protest the 
military encirclement of the universities, to protest the closing of the universities to students, 
administrative and faculty staff, to protest the silence of the appointed chancellors and to 
condemn the chancellor's acts which were insulting the faculty (Kavoshgar, No. 2, Winter 
1366/1987, p. 8). The sit-in took place in the Ministry of Science and at the Tehran 
University Administration Building. The strike turned into a major political event. People 
from all over Tehran gathered near the building in support of the strikers, and messages of 
solidarity were sent from all leftist political groups, the clergy and other striking groups. 
In response the Military killed one of the striking professors, Kamran Nejatollahi, on 
December 26. This added more fuel to the flames of revolution and greatly enhanced the 
prestige of the academics. The next day, the most important figure next to Khomeini among 
the clergy, Ayatollah Taleqani, attended the funeral procession in which tens of thousands 
participated. The troops opened fire on the procession and killed a number of students 
(Ibid.). 
3.2.1.2 The Reopening Week: January 10-17, 1978 
The National Solidarity Week was the last major event that led to the downfall of the 
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Military Government (December 29, 1978) and the departure of the Shah (January 16, 1978). 
Soon, NOIA took the lead in the struggle by announcing January 10-17 as "The Week of 
Total Reopening of the Universities and Institutions of Higher Education." The week was a 
period of rich political struggle and made the campus of Tehran University and all other 
campuses the center of activism in the country. It is important to note that all NOIA 
chapters emphasized that "reopening" did not mean "resumption of classes"; the intention 
was to use the campus to continue the nation-wide struggle for the overthrow of the regime. 
The fall of the Monarchy on February 11, 1979 marked the rise of the faculty as a major 
political force united with a predominantly leftist student body (on February 11, 1979, p. 8 
Kayhdn reported the great uprising of Tehran University which ended 2500 years of 
monarchy). 
3.2.2 Suppression of the National Organization 
of Iranian Academics (NOIA) 
NOIA had emerged under the conditions of national struggle against the Monarchy. 
With the fall of the enemy and the coming to power of a new regime, the organization was 
faced with a new and very complex situation. 
Most faculty members of all the institutions of higher education were united in NOIA 
by February 1979. The membership consisted of nationalists, Marxists, and Muslims. The 
general political line of the organization was, however, leftist and nationalistic. Although the 
nationalist forces were represented in the first cabinet of the new Islamic regime, the 
majority of NOIA members were unhappy with the political conservatism and anti-nationalist 
zeal of the clergy. NOIA was very critical of the restrictions on the freedom of the mass 
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media, restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, and the "exclusivist" and 
"monopolistic" policies of the new rules. Relying on its prestige (won through anti-Shah 
activism), the numerical strength and student and staff support, NOIA cautiously defied the 
policy of governance from above and was able to form Coordinating Councils on many 
campuses and elect chancellors and deans in many institutions (see Table 3). 
NOIA members demanded the active participation of the universities in building post-
Revolutionary Iran. But, the government always turned a deaf ear to these demands. 
Despite all the hurdles imposed by the government, a group of academics formed a 
specialized Research Center of Revolution to investigate the problems of Iran and to make 
proposals to the government for the solution to these problems (Kayhdn, February 22, 1979). 
Also, the faculty, students and staff of the Engineering College of the Industrial University 
declared their readiness to help reorganize the assembly industry of Iran along the lines of a 
national industry (Kayhan, March 3, 1979). 
Another important measure was the decision of a group of faculty members of one of 
the provincial universities to build a university in Kurdistan, an underdeveloped area of Iran. 
The idea was new. The university's aim would be to serve the needs of the region, to avoid 
unnecessary investment in magnificent buildings and a huge bureaucracy, to admit students 
mostly from the region and to train them to deal with local problems thereby combining 
theory and practice in a balanced and creative manner. 
The first draft of the plan for Kurdistan University was discussed at a meeting in 
Mahabad; representatives from all Kurdish towns and one of the prominent figures of NOIA 
participated. Below (Figure 8) is the plan for the Kurdistan University which envisages an 
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institution radically different from existing ones. 
By mid-summer, the final plan was drawn up and locations were determined. A large 
number of faculty members from all over Iran volunteered to teach at the University at 
subsistence salary only. A meeting was scheduled for August 29, 1979, to announce the 
admission of students for the coming academic year beginning on September 29, 1979. 
However, the armed forces attacked Kurdistan on August 19, 1979 to wipe out the Kurdish 
autonomist movement. All the achievements of Kurdish cultural activity during the 
Revolution, together with the newborn university, were eliminated. To date, the government 
has not fulfilled any of its promises to develop higher education in this area and instruction 
in the Kurdish language. 
Figure 8. The Plan of Kurdistan University 
Higher DecIs ion-making Authority 
Universi ty Council 
Administrative and 
Financial Affairs 
Social Science and 
Kurdish Culture 
and Language 
Documentation and 
Resources Center 
Industry and 
Technology 
Medicine and 
Public Health 
Agricul ture and 
Animal Husbandry 
People Students 
Source: Ayandegdn, Khurdad 23, 1358/June 13, 1979, p. 8 
The new regime's opposition to the basic tenets of the charter of NOIA, i.e., 
university autonomy and administration through elected councils, was the first major 
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challenge to NOIA. Bazargan's appointment of four NOIA members to administer the 
"mother university," Tehran University, had the effect of encouraging a rift within the ranks 
of the organization (see 2.3.1). Also, the formation of the Islamic Community of Academics 
(Jame'e-ye Eslami-ye Daneshgahlyan) soon after the victory of the Revolution (announced 
in Ettela', February 1, 1979) further split the NOIA. This organization fully supported the 
regime. Nevertheless, the Muslim faculty members did not stay unified long. In June, the 
founding of a Society of Free Academics of Iran, a more liberal Muslim faculty organization, 
(Jame'e-ye Daneshgahiyan-e Azad-e Iran) was announced (Ayandegdn, June 4, 1979). 
They advocated, among other things, struggle against any form of autocracy in the 
universities, and struggle for university independence. 
On January 1, 1988, a group split from NOIA to form the National Society of Iranian 
Academics (Jame'e-ye MeUT-ye Ustadan-e Daneshgan-hay-e Iran), hereafter NSLA. The 
NSIA leaders acknowledged the active and effective role of NOIA in the overthrow of the 
monarchy but they believed the organization had stagnated. The NSIA strongly supported 
President Bani-Sadr and accused NOIA of leftism in opposing Bazargan's appointments and 
proposing coordinating councils (according to personal interview with the two founders of the 
organization, November 6, 1983, Paris). 
These splits and the continuing internal conflict within NOIA gradually, made the 
organization very inefficient. Three major political lines emerged within the organization by 
the summer of 1979. The first one was in support of the Islamic Government. The second 
line proposed some reforms of higher education system which were in line with the general 
political and economic plans of the Liberal Government. Finally, supporters of the third line 
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were more in favor of fundamental changes in the system of higher education. They saw the 
independence and democracy of the university as criteria and necessities for a dynamic 
higher education system (Kavoshgar, No. 2, p. 14). Therefore, because of the increasing 
inefficiency of NOIA's activities, the supporters of the third line decided to establish a 
dynamic, well-coordinated and efficient organization called The Independent Society of 
Academics (ISA) (Kanun-e Mustaqel-e Daneshgahiyan).47 With the formation of the 
chapters of ISA on different campuses, NOIA eventually came to an end. Although the 
demise of NOIA was never officially announced, by the beginning of the academic year 
1979-80 NOIA did not exist any more. 
3.2.3 The Formation of the Democratic Societies 
of Iranian Academics 
By the winter semester of 1980, it was clear for most of the radical and liberal faculty 
members that the government sooner or later would attempt to alter the course of events at 
the institutions of higher education. That is, the government would attempt to establish its 
political control over the universities, which remained the only source of open opposition and 
a serious threat to its integrity and stability. By the spring of 1980, under the pretext of 
closing down the offices of political organizations, the government attacked the institutions 
and then called the military occupation of the campuses "The Islamic Cultural Revolution." 
47
 The umbrella organization of ISA was called The Democratic Societies of Iranian 
Academics (Kanunhay-e DemukrauTc Daneshgahiyan-e Iran). Although some institutions 
slightly modified the name of their local group, they were all different chapters of one 
organization. Among them, for instance, was The Society of Radical Professors of Shiraz 
University (Kanun-e ustadan-e Mutaraqqi-ye Daneshgah-e Shiraz). 
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The formation of The Independent Society of Academics (ISA) at different institutions 
started slowly in the winter of 1980, but was quickly expedited by the spring of 1980. The 
Islamic Cultural Revolution and the anti-democratic policies of the government at the 
university were the sparks which ignited ISA's activities. 
However, with the closing down of the higher education institutions and the absence 
of the students after April 1980, faculty members felt the responsibility of safeguarding the 
university. Thus, they formed a committee called the Center for The Democratic Societies 
of Academics (Markaziyyat-e Kanunha-ye Demukratik Daneshgahiyan) which was 
responsible for coordinating the activities of all the chapters of ISA. The major activities of 
the Societies is shown in Table 10. 
One of the most important endeavours of the Societies was their publishing activities. 
Publication was the best means for disseminating the news and coordinating the activities of 
the Societies. Some of their major publications are listed in Table 11. 
The richest of all these publications in terms of its contents and variety of issues 
covered was the quarterly Amuzesh va Farhang (Education and Culture). Altogether six 
volumes were published. A number of analytical articles regarding the educational system in 
Iran and the rule of councils in a democratic society appeared in this publication. For 
example, in the second volume (Spring 1980) there is an article on "Councils and the 
Council System in the University"; in the third volume (Summer 1980) two articles, 
"Educational Revolution or Educational Reform" and "What Problems are we Facing?" 
appeared; in the fourth volume (Fall 1980) there is an article entitled "Some Points on 
Democratic Organizations"; finally in the last combined volume (volumes 5 and 6 together) 
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Table 10. The Major Activities of the Independent 
Societies of Academics 
Date Place Activity 
16 Azar 1359/ 
Dec. 7, 1980 
Tehran University Celebration of the Student 
Day Memorial 
5 Day 1359/ Dec. 26, 1980 Beheshte Zahra Cemetery Memorial of the second 
anniversary of Dr. Kamran 
Nejatolahi's assassination 
by the Shah's troops. 
23 Day 1359/ Jan. 13, 1981 Different Campuses Call for a demonstration, 
celebrating the anniversary 
of the "Reopening" of the 
Universities 
20 Esfand 1359/ 
March 11, 1981 
Tehran Industrial University Demonstration 
1 Urdibehesht 1360/ 
April 21, 1981 
Tehran 
I 
Distribution of leaflets for 
the anniversary of the 
Government's attack on the 
I universities 
Source: Based on the Kavoshgar, No. 3, Spring 1368/1989, p. 6 
Table 11. List of the Major Publications of 
the Independent Societies of Academics 
Publication Publisher 
Amuzesh va Farhang (Education and 
culture) 
The Radical Society of Faculty 
Members at Shiraz University 
Peyvand (Connection) The Independent Society of Faculty 
Members National University 
Khabamdme-ye Daneshgdhe San'att 
Tehran (Tehran Industrial University 
Bulletin) 
The Independent Society of Faculty 
Members at Tehran Industrial University 
Peyke Azdd (Free Messenger) The Independent Society of Faculty 
Members at Free University 
Source: Kavoshgar, No. 3, spring 1368/1989, p. 7 
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there are two articles called the "Educational system of Iran" and "Councils and the 
University". There are also a number of translations of critical studies e.g.,by Martin Camoy 
and Paulo Freire and articles about the educational system of socialist countries such as Cuba 
and Vietnam. 
3.2.4 The Suppression of the Democratic Societies 
of Iranian Academics 
With the escalation of political oppression in the country during the summer of 1980, 
the university authorities followed the Government strategy of crushing any opposition within 
the universities. Students had been sent "home" (see 4.1.0), and student academic activities 
were stopped, thus, it was time to crack down on the faculty and support staff. In some 
institutions faculty salaries were cut off and faculty members were suspended; in others, 
faculty activists were not allowed to enter the campuses and the formation of any faculty 
gathering was banned. 
The Cultural Revolution Council through its main organ at the universities, the 
University Crusade, started the implementation of the Islamic Cultural Revolution in the 
institutions of higher education. These objectives included the dispersal of the politically 
committed faculty. Purging, execution, dispersion and imprisonment were among the 
methods used.4* 
** The dispersal policy of the Government has been described in a pamphlet published by 
the Democratic Societies of Iranian Academics, titled: Jehdd-e Ddneshgdht: chtst? va die 
mlkunad?... che bayad kard? (University Crusade: What Is It? And What Does It Do?... What 
Is To Be Done?), Aban 1359/October-November 1980. The faculty activists argue that the 
"University Crusade" is attempting to scatter faculty by assigning them to irrelevant offices at 
different ministries, e.g. assigning a physicist and a microbiologist to the Center for Fighting 
Drug Addiction; a linguist to a psychiatric clinic; a pediatrician to an adult sanatorium; and 
finally, assigning university faculty to teaching positions at the elementary and secondary levels 
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This political pressure and the dispersal of the faculty members resulted in of low 
morale among members of the Democratics Societies and eventually caused the dissolution of 
the Societies itself. Faculty members soon realized that standing against the political power 
of the Government without student support, (students were totally banned from the campuses 
and, more importantly, without the support of the masses, who were severely suppressed, 
would be fruitless. By the summer of 1981 when the Government's general suppression had 
started and by which time some faculty members and activists within the societies had been 
arrested and imprisoned, these short-lived faculty organizations in Iran came to an end. 
3.2.5 The Islamic Government and The Control of Faculty Activism 
Since the demise of the Democratic Societies of Iranian Academics throughout the 
country, there has not been any organized faculty opposition to the Islamic government. 
Following the purge and dispersal of a large number of faculty members nothing remained of 
the faculty organizations. Also, a large number of faculty members abandoned the 
universities and sought refuge in institutions abroad. Those who stayed, however, and 
continued to work for the government, were either supporters of the government or old, 
liberal, often prominent, faculty members who were unwilling or unable to oppose the 
state.49 They remained, however, the targets of government harassment. In recent years 
some of these prominent professors have shown their frustration and anger at the ideological 
and political control of the state. One such person is Shafi'i-ye Kadkani, a well known 
(pp. 10-11). 
49
 Information is based on extensive interviews with faculty members in exile in the U.S., 
Canada and France. 
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Iranian literary figure. According to one of his former students (interview with Mina, March 
19, 1988): 
On the first day of his class on the great poet Hafiz, Professor 
Kadkani entered the class, holding the complete works of Hafiz 
and started walking back and forth without looking at the 
students. Then he went to the podium, still not looking at the 
students, and as was his tradition, opened the book to have a 
sorts with Hafiz. Then he looked up at the students to recite a 
poem. Suddenly he noticed the curtain in the middle.of the 
classroom separating male and female students. He paused for a 
moment. Then, he closed the book and said, "This class is not 
worthy of Hafi; this class is filled with hypocrisy and 
dissimulation", and he left the classroom. 
Women faculty members were facing even harsher control and harassment. Not only 
were their teaching practices under the scrutiny of the government, but also their appearance, 
their manners, and even the intonations of their voices could have easily caused the loss of 
their positions. Muslim students who were ardent supporters of the government often 
supported the proper veiling of female instructors (Ibid.). 
The government and influential clergy, however, are not unanimous in their policy of 
the political and ideological control of the academics. The liberals argue that the country is 
in great need of experts, and thus, compromise is necessary on ideological values. They, 
however, emphasize that the compromise must not cause any serious damage to the Islamic 
values or pose any political threat to the Islamic government. The strongest and the most 
influential supporter of the liberals was Ayatollah Montazery. In his widely read address to 
the members of the Cultural Revolution Council and the representatives of the University 
Crusade, Montazery pointed out repeatedly that the country is in great need of experts, and 
therefore everybody should respect academia; no one should interfere with their affairs. 
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Finally, he warned (D.E., No. 25, Tir 1362/June-July 1983, p. 48): 
If, let's imagine, a faculty member whom we do not approve of 
[political and ideological], has now changed, students should not 
ostracise him! We have a shortage of experts. If we ostracize 
our own academics, then we have to hire American experts 
who, while engaged in teaching, will spy too. 
The more conservative group, the maktabts, put more emphasis on "piety" than "expertise". 
Thus, they argue one who has failed to prove his or her loyalty to Islam and to the Islamic 
government in the past has no place in the higher education system. Following Khomeini's 
line that "if you want to amend a country, you must amend the university" or "the danger of 
the university is worse than an atomic bomb", the conservatives did not approve of the 
conciliatory tone of the liberals. 
Altogether, as indicated above, the government is taking all necessary measures, from 
political screening during the recruitment of faculty members to controlling what they teach. 
all to assure "the existence of a truly purified Islamic atmosphere" in the institutions of 
higher education. These pressures have caused a great deal of frustration and feeling of 
powerlessness among the faculty members. In one interview, a faculty member who was 
visiting his family in North America summarized his situation as follows (Manuchehr, 
March 24, 1989): 
Every moments of your life is under the control of the 
government, from your bedroom to your classroom, from what 
you say to your children to what you say to your students. You 
can not trust anyone, even your old colleagues. Personal 
survival is at stake. Any sense of nationalism will be destroyed 
in you when your very sense of humanity is denied. They treat 
you as an object, as an animal. 
The consequences of the government political and ideological control of faculty 
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members have included the desertion of the universities by the best and most qualified 
Iranian professors. That, in turn, has caused a great damage to the quality of higher 
education and its long-term effect remains to be seen. 
3.3.0 Teaching Methods: From the Shah to the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution 
The research studies on higher education in Iran prior to the 1979 Revolution 
unanimously characterize the methods of teaching in the universities as follows (see for 
example Manzoor (1971:78); Eicher et al. (1976:51); Samii et al (1978:34); and Taban 
(1979:68): 1) the classroom instruction is similar to religious education, i.e. the instructor 
(ustad) is the only and ultimate source of knowledge which is considered to be undisputable; 
2) the predominant method of teaching is lecturing. There is virtually no dialogue or 
interaction between the professor and the students. Student participation in the classroom 
discussion is neither required nor welcomed; 3) the learning occurs through memorization 
only. Students are not equipped with problem-solving skills. Critical thinking and 
analytical evaluation are not taught. Also, in the disciplines of science and technology, 
laboratory experiments and exercises are often ignored due to lack of equipment and 
facilities; 4) the exam system is a criterion for measuring the students' memorization ability 
only. Term papers are not generally required. There are usually mid-term and final exams; 
5) the principal teaching resource consists of mimeographed materials. Books are scarce and 
quite often outdated. The university libraries suffer severe shortages of books. Scientific 
journals are a rarity. As such, reading assignments are limited to some classroom notes 
dictated by the instructors a well as some mimeographed materials. Although reading 
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foreign books, mainly in English, is greatly encouraged, a lack of sufficient knowledge of the 
language among students hinders that process; 6) research, as it is commonly practised in 
many Western universities, does not exist at Iranian universities. There is neither motivation 
for conducting research nor necessary and sufficient means to accomplish it. 
All these studies, however, fail to identify the reasons for embracing these inferior 
teaching methods. The Iranian higher learning institutions were initially established primarily 
to train military cadres (during Qajar dynasty) and were later used to train technocrats and 
bureaucrats (during the Shah's regime). Such a mission does not require trained critical 
thinkers and investigators, rather, subservience to the system suffices. Furthermore, the 
political and ideological control of the university during the Shah's government virtually 
made any lively and fruitful intellectual interaction and exchange of ideas impossible. Most 
of the faculty members would go to a class, dictate their teaching materials and disappear 
until next time. If an instructor became popular, usually because of the politically attractive 
subject matter, (s)he would have immediately been subject to the SAVAK interrogation and 
in many instances either the course would be dropped or that particular faculty member could 
be barred from repeating the course any more.50 
With the expansion of higher education during the 1970's, and the recruitment of 
mostly Iranian graduates from abroad as faculty members, gradually some improvements 
occurred in teaching methods. Young faculty members often tried to eradicate the old notion 
of ustad as an authoritarian figure in the classroom by, for instance, not appearing in tie and 
50
 In my interviews with most of the graduates of Tehran University, names of two 
faculty members, Dr. Aryanpour and Dr. Shariety, both sociologists, were often cited as 
examples. 
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suit, joining the students for lunch in the student cafeteria, participating in the students' 
extracurricular activities such as the theater, sports, literary and art clubs, etc. As such, 
there were more open discussions in the classroom and the instructor (ustdd) was no longer 
the sole speaker. By the late 1970's, the revolutionary upheaval years, classrooms often 
became a hot-bed of political discussions. Analyzing, theorizing, and criticizing social 
change and revolution became the discourse in the classrooms, this was prevalent until the 
outset of the Islamic Cultural Revolution. 
After the victory of the 1978-79 Revolution, students were not willing to accept any 
ideas without challenging them.51 Students demanded, among other things, drastic changes 
in methods of teaching and teacher-student relationships. Authoritarian behaviour on the part 
of instructors was not welcomed and accepted by the students. Students argued, in many 
instances, that the respect for and approval of faculty members depended solely on the extent 
of their knowledge in their specific fields, or their political stand and on their attitudes 
toward the students.32 
3.3.1 The Islamization of the Teaching Method 
The democratic atmosphere did not last long. After the political stabilization of the 
Islamic Republic and the implementation of the Islamic Cultural Revolution in the institutions 
51
 While teaching "The Third World Educational System" in Iran during the first fall term 
after the Revolution (fall 1979-80), I had to spend three sessions on the controversial and 
politically significant issue of the meaning and the political implications of the term "Third 
World". 
52
 As a newly recruited faculty member after the Revolution I was briefed by the 
students' representatives on their expectations. 
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of higher education, a drastic shift occurred in the methods of teaching. The government 
intention was to eliminate the so called "Westernized," and "secularized" teaching methods 
and instead install the Islamic seminary system which was similar to the Medieval European 
religious schools. The Islamic method of teaching is based on seminaries in which the teacher 
is the pivot. The pupils (tullab) are expected to circle around the teacher (ustad) and not 
only learn what the teacher teaches, but also absorb the moral excellence and human 
benevolence of the ustad. This system of learning is called talabegt. A teacher, in other 
words is a model to be emulated. According to Islam, teachers are responsible for moulding 
the character of the students in accordance with the Islamic moral code. Thus it was not 
only what teachers taught that mattered, but also the way in which they presented themselves 
both in the classroom and outside. They were all expected to exemplify the ideal Islamic 
man, i.e. a virtuous and a pious man. 
In short, the free and open interaction and dialogues which were the dominant way of 
teaching during the Revolutionary upheaval years were replaced by the old religious methods 
in which ustdd possessed God-like authority, i.e. unquestionable, certain and the omnipotent. 
Thus, lecturing has now become the predominant method of teaching once more and reading 
assignments have become even more limited to mimeographed materials (Takhayyuri 
1990:94-95). Probably the front cover of the magazine DOneshgOh-e EnqelOb (The 
University of Revolution), published by University Crusade, best portrays the existing 
classroom situation. In this picture an instructor who has at his back not even in his mind— 
an old library (notice the mice and torn books) is talking authoritatively to a collection of 
tape recorders, supposedly students (see Figure 9). 
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Teaching is one area in which Islam boasts not only a long history of experience but 
also a unique approach claimed to be superior to that of the West. It is in this area, 
however, that Islamization of the university has most obviously failed. 
Teaching is especially important because the Islamic regime uses ideology and 
ideological training as the most powerful tool for desecularizing a society that is largely 
secular. It is indeed in the realm of the generation and transmission of knowledge that 
Islamic tradition should prove to be superior to its secular, experimental, materialist and 
Western counterpart and should be capable of replacing it. Again it is on this battlefield that 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution has clearly lost the war. 
3.4.0 Curricula: From the Shah to the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
In his study of the University curricula in Iran, Manzoor started by quoting foreign 
experts on the Iranian University curricula who describe it as "being rigid, imposing, heavy, 
and irrelevant to the needs of a transitional society characterized by continuing change, 
unpredictable diversification and regional heterogeneity" (Manzoor 1971:87). Iranian 
students and faculty members also repeatedly expressed their concerns about the content of 
teaching. For instance, in a survey, 95 per cent of the respondents recommended that "the 
curricula should be changed to better meet the needs of today's society" (Naderi 1977:75). 
The Government, through its Ministry of Science and Higher Education, regulated the 
curricula in the Iranian universities. Faculty members were not included in curriculum 
planning or in the evaluation process. They only taught what was assigned to them. 
Generally, since the 1960's, the curriculum was modeled after American graduate and 
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Figure 9. Cover Page of Daneshgah-e Enqelab 
Source: D.E., No. 60, 15 Azar 1367/November 6, 1988 
Original Caption: "Pretence of Science and the Shakiness of the 
University Teaching System" 
159 
undergraduate programs. In the majority of the disciplines Western subject matter was 
covered. For instance, the disciplines of social science were often over-loaded with outdated 
Western theories. Most often students scorned the instructors and the teaching materials. 
One student complained about a history instructor who boasted "he would teach history in an 
American way (i.e. using the multiple choice technique) and he was more familiar with the 
modern history of America than Iran".* 
In more technical disciplines such as Agriculture, Medicine, and Engineering, the 
rigidity and irrelevancy of the curricula was even more extensive. First of all different 
institutions located in different regions of the country with substantially diverse climate, 
culture and regional needs were using more or less the same curricula. For example, in 
Agriculture, the school located on the northern part of the country with a rainy, 
Mediterranean climate overall offered the same agricultural programs as the schools in the 
southern provinces with a dry or semi-arid climate. Medical programs provide another 
example. The local diseases and medical needs of a region were not included in the 
program. "We would often go to a hospital ward as a first year residence and would not be 
able to diagnose most of the diseases. Simply because all we learned was very general 
involving known cases in our English textbooks," said a graduate of the Medical School at 
Shiraz University (interview with Soheila, October 10, 1982, Shiraz). 
Furthermore, while about 70 percent of the total population were living in rural areas, 
the university curricula were exclusively oriented to the urban-modem sector of the 
53
 "Efazat-e ustad-e tarikh" (The Blessings of the history professor), Ferdowst, No. 1075, 
Year 24, 16 Murdad 1351/August 7, 1972, no page. 
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economy. 
The ethnic diversity of the nation was also not incorporated into the university 
curricula. The language of instruction was Persian (Farsi) and in newly-established 
institutions such as Shiraz University, English was heavily used as a medium of instruction. 
The language, culture, literature, art, etc. of national minorities, i.e., Turks, Kurds, Arabs, 
Baluchies, and Turkmans who constitute 50 per cent of the country's population were never 
included in the university curricula. 
Reform of the university curricula had priority in the list of demands for university 
autonomy during the Revolutionary period. Most of the institutions, immediately following 
their success in gaining control over the administration formed a special committee in each 
department to specifically revise the curricula. It was felt that the curricula ought to 
acknowledge the socio-economic structure of the country as well as assist in nation-building 
following the Revolution. Second, the curricula ought to correspond to the cultural and 
ethnic needs and economic disparities of the country. The experience of the Economics 
Department at National University54 and the Medical College at Shiraz University best 
reflects the reform of the curricula in this period (for a complete account of the curricula 
reform at the Medical College at Shiraz University see Farabi and Sina 1980:47-66). 
In the Economics Department a; National University two antagonistic camps, one 
leftist and one Muslim, were formed among students as well as among faculty. Therefore, 
the department, in order to satisfy all, decided to offer two separate theoretical approaches to 
the economic structure of the country, the Marxist approach and the Islamic approach. At 
54
 the account at National University is based on personal observation. 
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the Medical College at Shiraz University, on the other hand, special research committees 
consisting of both students and faculty members were formed. The results of the 
committees' studies were forwarded then to the Central Academic Council (Showra-ye 
Markazl-ye Amuzesh) in order to be analyzed and to passed on to the Administrative 
Council of the department (Showra-ye Mudiriyat-e Daneshkade) to be implemented 
according to the recommendation. The results of the study showed -that: (Ibid. 52-53): 
1. The entire health system of the country is based on the prevalent 
class division. 
2. The health system is a profit-making business and is alien to the 
needs of the individuals and the society. 
3. Medical students are passive practitioners of scientific learning. In 
pre-medical courses they are taught an immense amount of 
memorized material which later, during clinical practice, cannot be 
utilized. The learning process and the content of the learning 
materials impede the students' creativity. 
Based on these findings, the Central Academic Council presented an "ideal" plan for 
medical education. The plan had four major points: (Ibid., pp. 54-55): 
1. The "ideal" medical education plan could only be implemented in a 
society if there is a fundamental structural change in all aspects of 
it. 
2. Problem solving and participant observation approaches should be 
used as teaching techniques. 
3. The students' clinical practices should be extended to other parts of 
the province. This practice will put students in direct contact with 
the patients, the environment and society. 
4. Co-operation among different departments such as Veterinary Science, 
Agriculture, Engineering, etc. should be attained through the co 
-ordination of educational programs. 
Nevertheless, the desired reform plans at neither of the institutions were implemented. 
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Faculty members of the Medical College at Shiraz University describe the reasons for the 
defeat of the plan as follows (Ibid., p. 61): 
The reform movement at the college struggled to exist at the 
time when the Revolution deviated from its objectives. In this 
circumstance any attempts to reconstruct the educational system 
would have been unauthentic. We wished this small step could 
have had a positive impact on the road to the people's 
revolution. Unfortunately, however, the plan was eliminated 
owing to the incompatibility of it to the ways of the ruling 
Islamic Government. 
Another significant attempt at reforming the University curricula was the 
establishment of Kurdistan University (see 3.2.2). The regional and ethnic needs as well as 
the specific socio-economic structure of the area were given precedence in the planning 
program. Furthermore, for the first time, minority languages, culture, literature, art, etc. 
were included in the core curricula and, above all, the language of instruction was also to be 
Kurdish rather than the dominant and imposed Persian language. 
The stabilization of the Islamic Government, however, marked the end of this trend of 
secular and radical curricula reform. Later, after the Islamic Cultural Revolution, the 
Islamic Government initiated a huge campaign of "Islamization of the curricula" which will 
be discussed below. 
3.4.1 Islamization of the Curricula 
"De-Westernization" and "desecularization" of the university curricula received 
special attention by the Council of Cultural Revolution. In 1981 the Committee of Islamic 
Culture (Kumite-ye Farhang-e Eslami) or the Islamization Committee of the University 
(Kumite-ye Eslami kardan-e Daneshgah-ha) was formed within the Cultural Revolution 
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Council. The agenda of the Committee included a) identifying the goals and methods used at 
an Islamic University and b) providing a general Islamic education for the students. In this 
regard two textbooks, Islamic Education, Parts 1 and 2 were published. Supplementary 
readings such as An Analytical Approach to History of Islam and The Arabic Language (parts 
1 and 2) were also reprinted. 
During the reshuffling of the Cultural Revolution Council on 15 Day 1362/January 5 
1983, the Council of Cultural Planning became the sole authority in terms of Islamizing all 
the disciplines. The Council consisted of three sub-planning groups: The General Culture 
Planning Group (Guruh-e Barnamerizl-ye Farhang-e *Umumi), Islamic Culture and 
Education of University Planning Group (Guruh-e Bamamerizi-ye Farhang va Ma'aref-e 
Eslami Daneshgah-ha), and Research in Basic Sciences From An Islamic Point of View 
(Guruh-e Barnamenzl-ye Tahqiq dar Mabanl-ye "Ulum az Dldgah-e Esiarri). 
The revision of the Social Sciences curricula had top priority for all of these groups. 
Dr. Soroush, the leading figure in Islamic Education and a member of the Cultural 
Revolution Council, explained this urgency by arguing that Social Sciences, as opposed to 
Experimental Sciences, were subjective, and as such they had roots in the land of their origin 
and the mind of their creators. Experimental Sciences, on the other hand, are "rootless", 
they are sciences with "no land" (Soroush 1981:10-11). For example, he said, "Mathematics 
does not have East and West. It is the same in Germany, London, Moscow and 
Washington," but, he concluded "social sciences, just like a plant, will be fed on the soil and 
the water of the land in which it has been planted. For us, then, the question is how can we 
insert the taste and the smell of Islam into these sciences" (Ibid., pp. 10-11). Although most 
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of the members of the planning groups were in agreement with the basic tenets of Dr. 
Soroush's arguments, nevertheless, not everybody agreed on the meanings and methods of 
"Islamization". 
The reform process of some of the disciplines, therefore, was halted later because of 
the lack of consensus among the Islamic experts. In an interview Dr. Soroush pointed out 
some of the obstacles (Soroush 1981:6-8 and 58-59): 1) a lack of Muslim expertise in each 
field; 2) the sophistication of the Islamization process which was not predicted by the 
committee members; 3) the existence of a variety of interpretations of "Islam" among the 
members; 4) an inadequacy of research into the "Islamization" process and scarcity of 
models.55 Thus, most of the committees, among them those dealing psychology, sociology, 
history, economics, and the laws halted their process altogether. The government policy was, 
55
 Prior to the coming to power of the Islamic Government, Islamic universities were 
established in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, India and Tunisia. 
Furthermore, the dilemma of Islamic education versus modem education has been a favorite 
topic among Muslim (and non-Muslim) intellectuals (see for example Tibawi 1972; Hussain 
1979). However, it is important to note that the Islamic government does not rely on these 
sources due to sectarian differences. The only related article on the subject which appeared 
in Ddneshgdh-e Enqeldb (University of Revolution) was a translated article originally written 
by Prof. Haj Esma'il al-Faroughi, an Islamologist from Temple University in the United 
States. However, at the very beginning the journal editor cautioned readers about the content 
of the article ("Eslami kardan-e 'ulum-e ejtemaV (Islamization of the social sciences), 
D.E., No. 19, Day 1361/December-January 1982, p. 26): 
An important point worth mentioning here is that Western social sciences and 
Humanities are "problematic" for our society in the present Islamic Revolution 
and the Cultural Revolution. Although the text below does not reflect in detail 
all the aspects, problems and deficiencies of Western social sciences and the 
Humanities, nevertheless altogether it contains some shared points of view and 
solutions. The other point is that although the researcher, Mr. al-Faroughi, is 
a Muslim and his observation of the outcomes of Western social science and 
the Humanities is based on Islam, nonetheless his text is not free of 
ambiguities and we do not consider it an ultimate text. 
165 
as stated by Dr. Soroush, "if we cannot Islamisize a discipline, it will remain closed" (Ibid., 
p. 59). 
Two opposing views later developed regarding the Islamization of the university 
curricula, those liberals and maktabts. The supporters of the liberal view argued that 
Islamization of the curricula does not mean the creation of new sciences, rather it means the 
incorporation of the Islamic ideology and world view into the existing curricula. They also 
argued that desecularization should not only be aimed at the Social Sciences, but rather the 
experimental sciences should be subject to revision too. The following quotation by one of 
their ideologists, Dr. Nasrollah Pourjavadi, reflects their point of view (Pourjavadi 1981:17): 
Unfortunately, all the attacks have been directed, these days, on 
the problem of the Humanities and this has led to the neglect of 
the experimental sciences and the danger [this might create]. It 
is true that there is, in principle, the possibility of the 
intellectual deviation of our youths in the Western Humanities 
and Social Sciences; however, this possibility exists also in the 
experimental sciences and, in engineering there has been much 
more deviation of the students than in the Humanities in recent 
years in our country. Most of the students in our universities 
who have become secular (btdtn), materialists, and worldly 
(dunyd-zade), have studied in industrial and technical 
universities and colleges. To some extent, this has been the 
reason: by acquiring [expertise in] the natural and experimental 
sciences and engineering, the students in these fields have 
unconsciously accepted the principles of these sciences which 
are inherently (zdtan) contrary to the principles of religion and 
faith, This danger has been less pronounced in the humanities 
because materialism and naturalism have penetrated there to a 
lesser extent. 
The conservatives, on the other hand, were strongly advocating "pure" Islamic 
disciplines. They argued that the foundations of the Social Sciences and Humanities are 
based on secularism and blasphemy, and as such they ought not to be taught and studied in 
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an Islamic university. Further, they argued that in Western social sciences methodology is 
an integral part of the discipline which, in turn, requires experimentation. This involves 
matter and subsequently requires deviation from divinity and the supernatural which is 
inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. Thus, the scholarly efforts, they suggested, must be 
directed toward the revitalization of long suppressed and forgotten Islamic Culture and 
knowledge. 
The rhetoric concerning the meanings and methods of the Islamization of the curricula 
lasted a long time. Finally, it was decided to postpone the "reopening" of the social science 
disciplines until a desired program was fully in place. This was not realized either. 
Although these disciplines were among the last to be renewed, no major change was apparent 
in the curricula. What was new, however, was the addition of some required general courses 
on Islamic culture, history, world view, etc. in all the social and experimental science. 
The University Crusade proposed a number of plans to reform the curriculum. 
Apparendy, none of these proposals was implemented. In education56, for instance, the 
following subjects were suggested as required courses: Anthropology in Islam; Education in 
the Koran; Education in Nahj al-Balaghe"; Education in Religions; the Educational 
Methods of the Prophet Mohammed and the Fourteen Innocent Ones;58 Sciences and 
56
 The examples cited below are drawn from several plans for the reform of curricula 
(see, for example, D.E., Nos. 2, 3, 20 and 23 on Art; No. 13, on Persian language and 
literature; No. 17, on English; No. 20, on History; Nos. 12 and 13, on Economics of 
Agriculture). 
57
 Nahj al-Balaghe is a compilation of the lectures, letters, and sayings of Ali, Prophet 
Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law and the first of the Twelve Imams. 
58
 i.e. Mohammed, his daughter, and the 12 Imams. 
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Scientists under Islam; the Family in Islam; Children's Education in Islam; Islamic 
Mysticism and its Educational Role. In a three year program of Persian Language and 
Literature, a total of 384 hours of studying the Koran, 128 hours of Islamic Science and 
Culture and 64 hours of Islamic Science and Educational Thought were required. In other 
words, 16% of the total course time during the three year period was devoted to the study of 
the Koran, 5% to Islamic Science and Culture, and finally, 3% to Islamic Science and 
Educational Thought. In English, Islamic Culture constituted 320 hours of the three year 
program, i.e. 16% of the total course time, and Arabic received 240 hours, i.e. 12% of the 
course time. Finally in Geography, 448 hours of Islamic Culture (14%); 192 hours of 
Arabic (6%); 288 hours of Islamic Education (9%); and 128 hours of the Political Geography 
of the Islamic World (4%) were required. 
The Islamization of the curricula in the Arts was even more complicated. Not only 
were the general required Islamic courses given prominence in their curricula, but also 
Islamic ideology was expected to be portrayed in artistic productions. As an example, a 
graphic student explained her one year experience at Farhang Saray-e Niyavaran (a highly 
modem and sophisticated art institute founded by Queen Farah) in the academic year of 
1982-83 as follows (Personal interview with Mina, Toronto, March 19, 1989): 
We were constantly, but randomly, inspected by the 
representatives of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. They 
would enter the drawing or painting classes, without the 
instructor's permission, and would go around and inspect our 
works. Any drawings and sketches of an uncovered women's 
body, for instance, were questioned. Any naturalistic works 
would have been objected to. One day our assignment was the 
drawing of outdoor landscaping. I was painting a blue sky 
when one of the inspectors said, "In an Islamic country fighting 
infidels [Iraq] a blue sky is meaningless. You should paint it 
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red and the trees should be the hands of the martyrs who will be 
revenged in the next world." 
At the end of the year we had an exhibition. Among all the 
portraits we had were Charlie Chaplin, Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, 
Samad Behrangi59, etc. but not even one portraits of Khomeini 
appeared. The Ministry strongly objected to the administration 
and the instructors. 
To sum up, the curriculum in experimental sciences, engineering, and medicine has 
not changed except for the addition of required Islamic ideology courses. In the social 
sciences, disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, geography, sociology and 
archaeology continue the Western tradition. While philosophy and history departments 
incorporate more Islamic content, the ICR has generally failed to develop Islamic curricular 
for the social sciences and the Humanities.60 Fields of study, course offerings and textbooks 
clearly bear the mark of the past. As in the past, the curricula of social sciences and 
Humanities do not address the linguistic, cultural and religious heterogeneity of Iran. The 
culture, music, literature and language of non-Persian peoples forming 50% of the population 
are left out. The tribal and peasant production systems are ignores in the curriculum of 
economics. The bias toward urban economy and culture and the need to train technocrats 
and bureaucrats to serve the urban economy and the government continue to shape the 
curriculum of the universities. 
59
 Samad Behrangi (1939-1968), leftist revolutionary writer and teacher, assassinated by 
the Shah's secret police. 
60
 The considerable work about the Islamization of social science discipline produced by non-
Shi'ite schools is ignored in Iran, see, for instance, the "Islamization of Knowledge Series" 
produced by the International Institute of Islamic Thought which has published, among others, 
Toward Islamization of Disciplines (Hemdon, Virginia, USA 1989). 
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3.5.0 Research 
Institutions of higher education in Iran are not research oriented institutions. The 
reason for this is embedded in the political and economical structure of the country. The 
spread of capitalist relations and significant imperialist-backed "development" and 
"modernization" have made Iran a dependent country. Samii explains (Samii et at 1979:39): 
The industrial sector has not reached the level of maturity and independence which 
would necessitate setting up research units within a business enterprise. Furthermore, 
Iranian industrial concerns, with the exception of the oil industry which has its own 
research and development network, are either dependent on their counterparts in the 
West for any industrial improvement, or if they do not act independently, they simply 
imitate what is produced elsewhere - which effectively dampens the need for any 
independent research the universities might carry out. 
It has been widely agreed upon that research projects conducted at Iranian universities 
are not consistent with the essential needs of the country; co-ordination among institutions, 
between the Government and the university system and between the university system and 
industry do not exist; and, above all, the result of research studies are unknown to the public 
and access to the collected information is almost impossible.61 According to a survey 
study, nearly 80 per cent of the Iranian university students responded negatively to the 
question, "Do Iranian universities make any effort to analyze the socio-economic and 
political problems and processes of the country?" (Manzoor 1971:95). 
It was the impact of this prevailing attitude that brought a major change in research 
practices during the revolutionary upheaval years of 1977-79. As soon as government 
61
 For instance see Mohseni (1968:31-33) and Manzoor (1971:103-131). 
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dominance over the institutions of higher education was curtailed due to the political unrest 
on all the campuses, younger faculty members generally began to exercise a more open 
dialogue and interaction with their students. The investigation of immediate and urgent 
social problems such as drug addiction among Iranian youth, prostitution, divorce, etc. were 
assigned to the students. Students stormed hospitals, factories and schools to assess the 
current situation and to plan for the restructuring of the economy. At several institutions 
faculty members, mostly members of NOIA, volunteered to establish a center for studying 
the post-Revolution socio-economic needs of the country (See 3.2.2). 
The Islamic Government, however, did not utilize these forces. Instead, The 
University Crusade became the only organization responsible for research. In other words, 
research was monopolized by this organization and all proposals were expected to receive the 
University Crusade's approval. The results of one year research plans and activities of the 
University Crusade was later published during the celebration of the third anniversary of the 
Revolution (Iran. Islamic Republic. Executive Council of Cultural Revolution 1980-81). A 
total of 677 research plans and activities were reported. Tables 12 and 13 indicate the 
numbers of these plans and activities listed according to disciplines and institutions 
respectively. The first fifty pages of the book include 306 names and some pictures of 
university martyrs since the Islamic Cultural Revolution.62 The rest of the book, from page 
65 to 408, is devoted to describing the researches. Each research item consists of brief 
information i.e., the name of the plan executive, the person in charge, the collaborators, a 
62
 All are young Muslim male students who were either killed in the war with Iraq or 
during the Islamic Cultural Revolution clashes at the universities. 
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summary of the research, the budget, the function, the exporting country, the import 
expense, the internal production expense, the result, a progress report, and the participating 
organizations. The focus of all the plans are on the manufacturing of small items needed by 
industry hurting because of the Iran-Iraq war and the U.S. economic blockade. Similar 
reports were published almost every year by the University Crusade. 
Table 12. Research Plans and Activities of 
the University Crusade According to Disciplines 
Discipline 
Technical and Engineering 
Basic Science 
Medicine 
Agriculture 
Social Sciences and Humanities 
Total 
Total f of Research Projects 
175 
167 
153 1 
147 | 
3 5 
677 | 
Source: Iran. Islamic Republic. Executive Council of 
Cultural Revolution (1980-81:6) 
One of the objectives of the Islamic Cultural Revolution was to change the orientation 
of the universities from purely teaching institutions to research institutions as well. 
Nevertheless, today, it is generally agreed that this goal has not been achieved. Students 
have no motivation for research, they are so trapped in the red-tape of registration, exams, 
finding affordable housing, coping with financial difficulties, etc. that research seems to be a 
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luxury, far-fetched and unattainable goal.63 As for instructors, classes are overcrowded due 
to the government policy of admitting more students than space dictates; instructors have 
very heavy teaching loads-an average of 24 hours per week; and there is a scarcity of 
resources, especially lab equipment and books. These factors have hampered any serious 
attempts at genuine research on the part of the teaching staff. 
Books and scientific journals, an essential research tools, have been in short supply in 
the country and this has turned into a national problem. Finding a required textbook has 
been an important issue for the students. In an interview about "scarcity of books", students 
in different disciplines voiced their concerns. "The truth of the matter is," said a science 
student, "that in basic science hardly ever can one find a Persian text. Translated books are 
outdated and access to the recent translations is difficult. English books are either hard to 
find or are net available or. the market" (interview with students in D.E., No. 47, Aban 
1366/October-November 1987, p. 58). Other students, in the same interview, listed the 
problems of short supply of books as follows: A shortage of paper for xeroxing or offsetting 
books; the high prices of books and duplicated materials; censorship and the bureaucratic 
procedures that students or instructors have to go through so that they can order a text from 
abroad; and the inadequacy of the libraries (Ibid.). 
Faculty members are also suffering from what they call "the crisis of textbooks." A 
math professor at Tehran University says (Takhayyori 1990:94-95): 
63
 See the following interviews in K.H., "Interview with the head of the Medical Group 
of the University Crusade," April 12, 1989, p. 17; "Interview with the Minister of Culture 
and Higher Education," May 23, 1990; and "The Decennial action report..." in Khabar-
nOme-ye PazOhesht-ye Sharif, No. 43, 30 Khurdad 1368/June 20 1989. 
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Table 13. Research Plans and Activities of the 
University Crusade According to Institution 
Institution 
Tehran University 
Shiraz University 
Sharif University 
Oroumieh University 
Mashhad University 
National University 
Tehran Polytechnic University 
Iran Science and Industry University 
Isfahan University 
Gilan University 
Isfahan Industrial and Labour University 
Tabriz University 
Science Complex 
Teacher Training University 
Sistan and Baluchestan University 
Kerman University 
Literature and Social Science Complex 
University Crusade of Isfahan University 
Mottahedin University 
Ahvaz University 
Babol Technical University 
Art Complex 
Total 
=================== = = = = = 
Total # of Research Projects 
173 
67 
49 
41 
38 
38 
38 
35 
28 
27 
26 
II 
16 1 
15 | 
11 
9 
8 
7 
7 
6 
1 
1 
1 
677 
J i .ii... - . = = = ^ = = 
Source: Iran. Islamic Republic. Executive Council of 
Cultural Revolution (1980-81:6) 
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Instead of a lively class discussion and instruction, we spend the time on dictation and 
calligraphy. I give the students dictation and students are progressing on the art of 
writing. Under this circumstance, the instructor's knowledge will be constricted and 
no more room will remain for creative research. The ultimate result, also, will be the 
decline of the quality of higher education. 
The person in charge of Tehran University Publications identifies the following factors as the 
main causes of the "crisis of the textbooks": only ten to fifteen per cent of the faculty 
members are willing to be engaged in publication and translation; the publication facilities 
are very limited, papers are scarce, and finally no central organization is responsible for 
publication of textbooks (Ibid.). 
Other obstacles to research include insufficient libraries in terms of the size of their 
collections, lack of scientific journals, inadequate library services and outdated library 
holdings. Table 14 shows the total number of libraries in selected institutions as well as total 
number of Persian, Arabic, and Latin books in each case.64 The total number of books in 
Persian, however, does not indicate the total number of titles published in Persian. The total 
numbers in the Latin collections also, as indicated in Table 14, are far greater than those in 
the Persian collections. A comparative study of the size of the library collections at different 
institutions according to discipline shows a great disparity among the institutions as well as 
the disciplines. As shown by Table 15, Agriculture holds the least number of books, although 
economically it is expected to play a significant role in building a self-sufficient economy. 
Disparities among the institutions in terms of the numbers of books in their collections in 
specific disciplines is also indicated in Table 15. The total number of medical books, as an 
64
 Latin here refers to all the books written in Latin or Roman alphabets, i.e., English, 
French, Italian, German, Spanish, etc. 
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Table 14. The Total Number of Books and Libraries 
at Selected Universities 
Institution 
Isfahan 
Ahvaz 
Tabriz 
Tehran 
Shiraz 
Mashhad 
Melli 
#of 
Libraries 
11 
10 
12 
36 
13 
12 
10 
Total # of Persian 
and Arabic Books 
95873 
86481 
66923 
203634 
62598 
94377 
50361 
% 
49 
43 
44 
32 
25 
54 
41 
Total # of 
Latin Books 
92858 
112432 
82728 
435757 
181838 
80911 
72400 
% 
49 
56 
55 
67 
73 
46 
59 
Source: Dayani (1983:37) 
Table 15. Total Number of Books According to Discipline63 
Institution 
Isfahan 
Ahvaz 
Tabriz 
Tehran 
Shiraz 
Mashhad 
National 
= = = = = 
Medicine 
P 
-
6543 
4540 
31751 
5132 
22136 
1127 
L 
. 
14298 
5206 
67295 
39797 
14689 
3508 
======== 
%P 
-
31.3 
4.6 
32.0 
11.4 
60.1 
32.1 
Science 
P 
5761 
6139 
9850 
24078 
3220 
4601 
1212 
L 
18693 
24304 
12609 
62698 
31427 
22925 
%P 
23.5 
20.1 
43.8 
27.7 
9.2 
16.7 
3227 | 27.3 
Agriculture 
P 
500 
11060 
3390 
13460 
. 
700 
-
L 
800 
9771 
4329 
25241 
-
4500 
= = B B 
%P 
38.4 
53.0 
43.9 
34.7 
-
13.4 
-
Percentages provided. P = Persian L = Latin 
Source: Ibid., p. 37. 
65
 The collections in the central libraries of each institution are not included. 
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example, at Shiraz University is 44,929 while at Tabriz University there are 9,746. Also 
note the size of the Science collection at Tehran University, i.e. 86,776, compared to those 
of National University, 4,439, and Tabriz University, 22,459. 
The higher educational system in Iran has encountered an implacable financial squeeze 
since the 1978-79 Revolution. "Three national indicators of educational efforts" (Coombs 
1985:140) are used here to examine the higher education expenditure in Iran. First, the ratio 
of Higher Education Expenditure to the Gross National Product (HEE/GNP) which was about 
0.8 per cent for the decade 1968-78. This ratio, as indicated in Table 16, rose to more than 
1.0 per cent by the late 1970s and dropped sharply again after the Revolution. A second 
indicator, the ratio of Higher Education Expenditure to the Total Public Budget (HEE/TPB), 
shows a decline, too (see Table 16). A third indicator is the ratio of Higher Education 
Expenditure to the total number of the students or the per capita expenditure on higher 
education (HEE/per capita). This amount, as shown in Table 16, increased steadily in the 
1970's and has increased since the Revolution. 
Table 16. Financial Indicators of Higher Education 
(%) 1949-1983 
FISCAL YEAR 
HEE/GNP 
HEE/TPB 
HEE/PER 
$TUDEfCr» 
69 
0.80 
2.43 
73.1 
70 
0.74 
2.26 
67.3 
71 
067 
2.09 
66.1 
72 
0.76 
2.09 
82.2 
73 
0.76 
2.37 
114.8 
74 
0.70 
1.40 
153.3 
75 
0.89 
1.73 
186.7 
76 
0.85 
2.04 
231.2 
77 
1.7 
2.45 
284.5 
78 
1.18 
2.46 
300.6 
79 
0.90 
2.60 
274.6 
82 
0.4 
I J 
240.3 
83 
-
1.4 
275.9 
* 1000 Rials 
HEE Higher Education Expenditure 
TPB Total Public Budget 
Source: Vahid (1985:61) 
The financial limitations imposed on higher education, were primarily caused by the 
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Iran-Iraq war, and they have greatly affected the quality of education and research. 
Although the Government attempts to allocate more budget to research, particularity since the 
war has come to an end, nevertheless, higher education institutions are still severely under-
funded. 
Explaining the obstacles to research in terms of technical problems such as the lack of 
books, journals, labs and other facilities would be superficial. The need for research has 
been voiced since the 1970s and especially during the ICR years but little has been done to 
reverse the trend. Historically, the universities were not designed to engage in research 
activities funded by the government or business. The dictatorial nature of the state, the 
absence of academic freedom, and the dependent nature of the economy are some of the 
factors that inhibit a strong research component similar to the modem Western universities. 
For instance, government policies are rarely based en research findings, inquiring or 
hearings. Parliament has always been a show-case of democratic rule and parliamentary 
debates and decisions are not based on informed inquiry. The Iranian army, gendarmerie 
and police were "modernized" by European and American advisors under the Monarchist 
regime. Secrecy dominates government policy making and action. 
The other source of financing research, i.e the economy, has failed to operate 
effectively. First, the state owns major sectors of the economy, the oil industry, the 
fisheries, air and sea transportation, railroads, major mining enterprises, etc. The national 
economic development plans under the monarchy were all developed by U.S. development 
agencies. The oil company had its own research facilities developed by the British oil 
company which started the oil operations. Second, the private sector of the economy, like 
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the state sector has been dependent on Western economies. Agriculture is still based on pre-
industrial tools and methods of production. Where machinery has been introduced, the 
whole enterprise is simply copied from the West. The industry is no more than assembly 
plants established by Western consultants and, quite often, joint investments. The steel mill 
industry was imported from the USSR, relies on the exporting country and has been an 
unsuccessful enterprise. Other areas of economic activity, e.g. construction enterprise, are 
generally staffed by engineers trained in Iranian universities and Iranian graduates of foreign 
institutions. These activities rely on the Western knowledge taught in the universities and 
based on tools and machinery imported from the West. Still, major construction projects 
such as dams and irrigation systems and air and naval bases were built by foreign companies. 
The pattern of dependency and underdevelopment has not been changed by the ICR, 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the University Crusade promoted self-reliance in war efforts in 
order to break the cycle of dependency. The Crusade publications, mentioned above, 
provide numerous descriptions of inventions and improvements of machinery and tools and 
research projects in medicine, agriculture and social sciences (see, for example, Iran. Islamic 
Republic. Executive Council of Cultural Revolution, 1980; 1981). The opponents of the 
University Crusade complained, however, that their research efforts, innovations and 
inventions were simply "service-oriented plans and research" and lacked "top research 
quality" (Ibid., 1982:18-19). 
The fact that by the late 1980s, the Iranian universities were no more than "big high-
schools," as one faculty member put it (interview with Manuchehr, March 24, 1989), should 
therefore be explained by viewing the university in its historical context. The research 
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function of the Western university emerged and gradually developed with the rise of 
industrial capitalism. In Iran, structural, political and ideological factors that have shaped 
the development of higher education continue to undermine the research potential of the 
institutions. 
3.6.0 The Students 
Students have offered the most continuous and persistent challenge to the Iranian 
state. Even when all opposition political parties were effectively suppressed (1930-41, 1953-
1960, 1963-1979) and despotism was ruling unrivalled, the students held the banner of 
struggle. While this situation is not unique to Iran and is found in many Third World 
countries it invites more reflection (see, for example, Bowers and Bader 1977:4275). 
No government organ (even a single army garrison) or private institution provides 
such a concentration of men and women as that which is found at Tehran University or other 
major campuses. While the quantity of students is in itself significant in a country where 
freedoms of association and peaceful protest are denied, it is the nature of these individuals 
that turns them into a formidable political force. First, students are engaged in intellectual 
work which gives them both leisure time and conceptual/theoretical tools with which to 
reflect on major national and international issues. Second, unlike the military garrison or the 
factory where individuals are under strict scrutiny and given assigned duties, the university 
cannot easily monitor the student body, which is mobile throughout the campus. Third, the 
young aspiring generation, not yet bound by job comitments and parenting obligations, is 
more readily prepared to risk its own privileges for a political cause. 
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In Pahlavi Iran where no form of opposition was allowed, students organized and 
challenged both the state and the university administration (for economic gains such as lower 
or no tuition, for better dormitory facilities, etc.). However, the struggle against the state 
was predominant and overshadowed economic demands which were often used as a pretext 
for raising major national political issues-the demand for democracy, freedom and 
independence. Two distinct stages in the evolution of student movement can be 
distinguished. Before the late 1960s, the student movement followed the reformist line of the 
political opposition which demanded that the Shah act as a constitutional monarch. While 
there was extensive anti-state activism especially during the 1959-63 period (no less than 27 
demonstrations in the six years ending May 1963 amounting to 213 days of closing Tehran 
University (Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts 1964-65, p. 513), the student 
m A i ' A m A A f A\A **/** /w»M {/%«- » K A AtiAf4K«v^ur svf r k ^ *ttK«-»f> *\s\1*f>t/">1 *\z%ti«»f T T i * m o t n C I A O O U C 
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were: "Reform Yes, Shah's Dictatorship, No!", "The Shah Must Reign, Not Rule!" and 
"Free Elections!" Thus, the students approved of the Shah's reforms including land reform, 
women's suffrage, etc. (these, collectively, were called the "White Revolution.") Underlying 
these slogans was a reformist or legalistic point of view which believed that the despotic 
state's main problem was its violation of the constitution which stipulated a constitutional 
monarchical state rather than an absolutist monarchy. This political line was in full accord 
with the underlying politics of the professoriate which demanded the financial autonomy of 
the university during this period. 
After the June 5, 1963 massacre, a radical change occurred in the political line of the 
opposition. A young generation of revolutionaries replaced the slogan of "The Shah Must 
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Reign, Not Rule!" with "Down with the Shah." The campuses were the springboard of this 
radicalization. This change of direction was evident in the 1966-67 student protests which 
raised their slogans: "Down with the Whiteness of the [White] Revolution!", "No More 
Colonialization [of Iran]," "The Peasants Have Been Destroyed by the [White] Revolution," 
"Police Hands off the Campus!" Anti-imperialist slogans dominated the struggles of the 
1970s. 
State policy, under the Shah, aimed at uprooting student opposition. The policy was 
implemented in the form of a "stick and carrot" in which the stick was more prominent and 
the last resort. The carrot included tuition-fee waivers and promises of employment after 
graduation, provision of welfare and part-time jobs in government offices, housing, co-ed 
summer camps, tours, sports facilities, health insurance, significant discounts on airlines and 
u c u u a , v i v . A V I I V I V O n v i v < U J V a u v p i v u m v i u v i us g v ^ v u u v i t v uiw j i u u w i n o . t v/» w u u n ^ , 
increasing the proportion of female students and the provision of female housing close to 
male dormitories was considered to contribute to this depoliticization. These were the 
carrots. The stick took the form of shooting at demonstrating students, imprisonment and 
torture, drafting into the army and dismissals. The campuses were militarized (see 2.1.3.2) 
by the secret police (SAVAK), and by university Guards in charge of maintaining "law and 
order. The Shah's policy of "stick and carrot" failed to ensure student loyalty to the state. 
Students were a major force in the struggle to overthrow the monarchy. 
The first indication of an approaching nation-wide crisis appeared in the summer of 
1977. A major protest activity, the gathering of some 15,000 at a poetry reading session on 
October 24, 1977, consisted primarily of students. This was followed by another gathering 
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at the Industrial University which ended in a clash with the police resulting in a wave of 
protests on other campuses in which universities protesters were joined by secondary school 
students and teachers (November 1977). Thus, by 1978, students were no longer the only 
active force to openly oppose the regime. Soon, they were joined by the entire nation. 
The revolutionary upheaval of 1978 opened new arenas of anti-state struggle-the 
streets, factories, government offices, religious schools. The students were the first to 
attempt to topple the statute of the Shah (on November 4, 1978) at Tehran University. The 
troops shot to kill and for the first time in Iran's history an anti-state struggle was televised-
an event which shook the nation. The universities were closed down, a military government 
was installed and die media were put under strict control. 
The closing of universities added more fuel to the fire. Ceremonies commemorating 
the massacre and the struggle tc reopen the institutions turned into major anti-regime events 
(see 3.2.1.2). The most prominent clerical figure, Ayatollah Taleqani, took part in re-
opening ceremonies. From then on, the university was in the hands of the students and 
faculty and was turned into a major center of anti-state activism. 
Leftist students were the major force in the armed uprising of February 11, 1979 
which put an end to the monarchy. By this time, students belonging to different 
revolutionary organizations had set up their headquarters on the campus. Tehran University 
campus was used for military and political training. 
The prominent place of the universities, especially Tehran University, in the 
revolution enhanced the status of leftist students and faculty. This resulted in a concerted 
effort by the Islamic regime to control the university. A major step in this direction was the 
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decision to use the campus of the secular Tehran University as the site of the most important 
religious event- the Friday noon prayers. This allowed the government to be in full control 
of the campus on Thursdays and Fridays. 
In spite of government efforts to control the most important campus (Tehran 
University), students continued to exercise power in many ways. Student councils were 
formed to run the offices of departments and colleges. Students denounced the anti-
democratic practice of administrating the institutions from above and advocated, instead, an 
administrative system from below based on councils elected by students, faculty and staff. 
Students took other initiatives which showed their independence from the state-in a number 
of cases they conducted trials of pro-Shah students and faculty members, they occupied 
hotels and the offices of the secret police and campus guards and turned them into 
dormitories, and they occupied some campus offices as well and used them for their 
headquarters. Campus facilities were used for the printing, storing and distribution of 
revolutionary literature. Other campus activities included displaying banners and wall 
newspapers, playing revolutionary music, organizing political activities, lectures, and 
discussions. The new regime which had inherited the despotic monarchical state questioned 
the "legality" of these actions and continued denying Iranians freedom of association, 
freedom of speech and other freedoms. 
The situation on the campus was one of "dual power" where the new regime owned 
the universities but was not in full control and the students were continuing the revolution 
against a theocratic regime which showed signs of conservatism and despotism even before it 
officially took power in February 1979. After the Islamic regime set the "club-wielders" on 
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the free press and publishers and took control of the print media in summer of 1979, the 
students continued to protect the campuses as islands of democracy within a sea that was 
being increasingly controlled by the "pirates" of democracy-i.e. the Islamic regime. Thus, 
by late summer 1979, the situation had returned back to the pre-revolutionary years when 
open political opposition outside the campus had been stifled but the campus continued to 
challenge the state. After the army attack on the Kurdish autonomist movement in August 
1979 and the take-over of the independent print media by the government, the campuses were 
the only public places where the news of Kurdish resistance and the defeat of armed forces 
was distributed. Under the circumstances, Khomeini and other rulers called the students 
"terrorists," "communists," and "counter-revolutionaries" who had turned the campuses into 
"war rooms" against the Islamic state. 
A major objective of the Islamic Cultural Revolution was to suppress the student 
movement permanently in order to extend state control over the institutions. The Islamic 
state's policy was different from the Shah's "carrot and stick" approach only in that the 
"carrot" was removed and excessive forms of repression were used to maintain political and 
ideological control of the students. The Islamic leaders were aware of the failure of the 
Shah's regime to silence the students and they had experienced their own failure to achieve 
the same objective under the situation of "dual power." Their policy was, therefore, to 
uproot student opposition once and for all. 
In order to put an end to the student movement, the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
conducted a protracted effort spanning several years. In the first few days after the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution began, when armed gangs attacked the campuses, hundreds of the most 
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active students were wounded, killed or arrested. Later, during the closing of the 
universities, a thorough search was conducted to trace anti-government activists and to 
dispose of them. Policies were developed aimed at removing all anti-government students 
from all the universities. Ideological and political loyalty was monitored through admission 
procedures and, after admission, through intelligence and security watch-dogs composed of 
Muslim Students of Party of God (Daneshjuyan-e Hezbullalu). 
3.7.0 The Student Admission Policy: Purges and 
Political/Ideological Screening 
The immediate task of the Islamic Cultural Revolution was to eliminate anti-
government students. In the repressive atmosphere of 1982, thousands of active students did 
not apply for re-admission because they feared arrest and punishment. Students who dared to 
apply for re-admission went through a process of ideological and political screening 
(depending on the extent of course work finished before the Islamic Cultural Revolution, 
students were divided into three groups each facing a different set of requirements). 
The main requirement for re-admission was the student's "lack of any organizational 
connection ["dependence"] on [political] parties serving the East and West; no involvement in 
armed struggle; no activities within grouplets and the non-partisanship of these groups."66 
According to one purged student, he and a group of students from his university were 
accused of anti-govememnt activisim and could be re-admitted only after a long process of 
66
 For more on this see an interview with Jalaledin Farsi in D.E., No. 16, Mehr 
1361/September-October 1982, p. 6. In the Islamic regime's propaganda discourse, 
"grouplet" (guruhak) refers to leftist political parties which oppose the state. 
186 
investigation. As s first step, they were required to go to the notorious Evin Prison (in 
northern Tehran). On entering the prison, they were blind-folded and led to a room and 
seated there on chairs facing a wall and watched by a number of "Revolutionary Guards." 
They were ordered not to talk to each other, not to move and not to look at anyone behind 
their backs. After reading lines from the Koran, a speaker would talk about the significance 
of protecting Islam and the Islamic regime and the government's determination to suppress 
the "traitors" and mundfeqtn, "Hypocrites", i.e. those who are Muslims in words and 
appearance but not in deeds and practice (munOfeqtn, was a label used by maktabts when 
they referred to Mujahedln Organization). The students were then instructed to fill out 
questionnaires detailing personal, political and ideological information about the respondents. 
Some of the questions were:67 
- Were you active in the Student movement before the islamic 
Revolution? 
- How and through what (political) groups did you get involved in 
political activities? 
- What do you think about the Islamic Revolution? 
- What do you think about the Islamic Cultural Revolution? 
- What do you think about the grouplets? 
- What did you do after the Islamic Cultural Revolution and the 
closure of the universities? 
- Write down the names and address of three of your university 
friends. 
67
 This information is based on interviews with nine students who had gone through this 
process in three cities of Tabriz, Shiraz and Tehran. 
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- Write down the address of your residences in the last ten years 
and provide a sketch of your present place of residence. 
After a period of at least six months, students were either dismissed and permanently 
denied access to higher education or their situation was labelled "un-resolved" (bela-takltf). 
In the unresolved cases, the students, were denied certain rights such as travelling abroad, 
employment in government offices, applying for business permits, etc. Under these 
conditions, many students preferred to be considered dismissed. 
After the elimination of the politically dangerous students, a new phase of admission 
began under the rubrics of "New Opening" (now-gusha't) of the university. The central 
exams were conducted in 1983 under a new policy of combining academic performance with 
ideological and political loyalty to the state as criteria for admission. Thus, students who 
passed the academic tests would be admitted to the universities only if they passed 
ideological and political tests and investigations. For each applicant, "local investigations" 
(tahqtq-e mahallt) were conducted in the neighbourhood where the applicant had lived 
(consulting neighbours who knew the applicant). The mosque would furnish information 
about whether the female applicant was veiled, modest, etc. or if the applicants attended 
prayers or observed fasting. The neighbours were also asked similar questions on the 
devotion of the applicant to Islam and the Islamic state. The applicant's high school was 
required to provide similar information. Also, the "Revolutionary Guards" and the Kumttes, 
"Revolutionary Committees", would provide security-related information. 
Dissent against ideological/political screening together with the ascendency of the 
liberal trend in the administration of Islamic Cultural evolution (see 2.4.5.2) led to a 
relaxation of "local investigations" in the late 1980's. In 1987-88, for example, the 
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"penitents" (tawOb), i.e. anti-government students who had repented while in jail, were 
allowed to take the entrance exams. Not surprisingly, the Students of the Party of God 
(DdneshjOydn-e hezbulldht) and their headquarters, known as the Bureau of Consolidating 
Unity [between Howze and university] (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat) protested the change and 
warned that the relaxation of control would lead to "the revival of the conditions that existed 
in the university prior to the Cultural Revolution... and would force out the devoted and 
committed forces [to Islam and Islamic Republic] from the scene (D.E., No. 39, Shahrivar 
1963/August-September 1984, pp. 65-66). 
3.7.1 The Quota System 
While excluding non-loyal students was an important tool of the control policy, the 
Islamic state also adopted a policy of admitting applicants who had proved their devotion to 
the regime. Thus, quotas were established to admit applicants belonging to these groups: 
1. Members of various armed groups organized by the government to 
take part in the war with Iraq (23%) 
2. Members of the families of martyrs-sons, daughter, brothers, sisters 
or spouses of martyrs (5%) 
3. War veterans (2%) 
Changes were later introduced in the system. For example, a quota was established for 
released prisoners of war and applicants with a longer period of participation in the war were 
given more points towards their admission (High Council of Cultural Revolution 1986:15). 
The quota policy pursued two objectives: the admission of applicants devoted to the 
Islamic regime would create, among the unruly student body, a safe social base for the state; 
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it also provided a very important material incentive to those who participated in a war that 
had become extremely unpopular. It must be noted that access to higher education is a major 
means of social mobility in Iran especially for rural and urban lower class applicants. By the 
end of the 1980's, no less than 40% of all admissions belonged to the quota groups. 
3.7.2 The Admission of Female Students 
Regulating male/female relations on the basis of Islamic values is one of the 
objectives of the Islamic regime. The constitution of the Islamic Republic calls for a return 
of women to the honourable position of motherhood. Education, especially on the higher 
level, is used as an instrument of this policy. Thus, women's main function in islamic 
society is to bear and raise children and to support husbands and the family structure. 
Working outside the family threatens the very foundation of Islamic society. 
Admission policy is, therefore, geared towards the ideal of helping women to devote 
themselves to family-raising duties and to the segregation of males and females. The 
admission policy was, therefore, to close certain fields of study to women and to open new 
fields to both men and women. 
Since women are considered to be "emotionally and physically weak,"6' certain 
fields such as the law were closed to women. Islam rates women as inferior to men in their 
ability to judge. Thus two women witnesses equal one male witness. Similarly Women 
68
 The emotional, physical and intellectual weakness of women is discussed in virtually all 
the Islamic literature on women. See, for example, the former Prime Minister of the Islamic 
Republic, Muhammad Javad Bahonar (assassinated in 1981), HuqOq-e Zan dar EslOm (The 
Rights of Women in Islam), Qum: Entesharat-e QTyam, n.d. 
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cannot be good judges or lawyers. 
Other fields-e.g. agriculture and engineering-were closed to women because these 
professions require women to be away from home and family. Moreover, they require more 
contact between women and nOmahram ( one with whom a Muslim woman is not supposed 
to associate with) males. Barring women from the agricultural field is often justified in 
terms of women's physical weakness and their so-called inability to engage in tough work. 
This justification is, however, untenable because rural women throughout the Muslim world 
form a major part of the agrarian labor force. 
Another objective of the policy is male/female segregation. Thus, nursing has been 
opened to men, admitting 50% males, but certain fields of medicine, e.g. gynaecology and 
midwifery have, however, been restricted to women only. The objective of this policy is to 
train female nurses, midlives and doctors tc treat female patients only and males to treat 
males (Mojab 1987:9). Table 17 summarizes the total number of fields of study closed to 
women). 
Table 17. The Total Number and % of the Fields of Study 
Closed to Women According to Test Groups, 1983-86 
Academic 
Year 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
TEST CROUPS 1 
Math and Technical Soma 
Total # of 
Dfadpfioat 
75 
73 
74 
Number 
OoMd 
to 
Women 
25 
44 
52 
* 
33 
60 
70 
Science 
Total fof 
Dfadptmes 
35 
34 
40 
Number 
doted 
10 
Women 
3 
3 
6 
% 
9 
9 
15 
Arti 
Total/of 
Dudplme* 
— 
-
-
Number 
domed 
to 
Women 
— 
-
-
« 
-
-
-
HimmntiM J 
Total 
DbdpBnes 
5 
5 
35 
Number 
ClOMd 
to 
4 
4 
H 
* 
8 
0 
8 
0 
"I 
Source: Based on Mojab (1991:42-45) 
191 
In spite of these restrictions on women's access to higher education, statistics 
published by the Ministry of Higher Education does not indicate any decline in the proportion 
of female students in the post-Revolutionary period. According to these data, the number of 
female students in Iranian universities was more or less constant between 1977 and 1987 
(Mojab 1991:52-53,** see also Table 18). In fact, the trend in the Islamic Republic is quite 
similar to that in both the Third World countries and the developed world where the majority 
of women students are in the Social Science fields and are under-represented in engineering 
and agriculture (Ibid., 52, 54-58). 
3.8.0 The Post-Admission Mechanism of 
Ideological/Political Control 
In spite of extensive political/ideological screening of students admitted to the 
universities, the Islamic regime did not trust the students. Fear of anti-government student 
activism is traceable in official writings of the Islamic government. In one document dealing 
with political activism in universities, student activism in Western countries, the Third World 
and Socialist countries, the reasons for activism in Iran were summed up Cultural Revolution 
Council n.d.:37-40): 
1. Students have a inquisitive souls and minds. 
2. Students have psychological and personality problems. 
3. Students do not have financial and job obligations. 
4. Students have a lot in common. 
69
 Similarly, women's participation in fields such as Agriculture, Engineering and Law 
has not visibly changed. 
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5. Students live in an relatively free environment, compared with society 
in general. 
6. Students are more informed and better capable of analyzing the 
problems of society. 
7. Admission to university is a great leap in the life of high school 
students and some of them cannot control themselves. 
Based on these considerations, it was decided that students should get involved in 
political activism in support of the Islamic regime. Debates and controversies should be 
condoned but only within the framework of the constitution of the Islamic Republic-loyalty 
to the state, respect for Islam, and protection of the territorial integrity of the state (Ibid., p. 
52). Political groups, if they exist, should be barred from political activity on campus. 
Political/ideological activities should be conducted under the supervision of the university's 
Cultural Committee. Disciplinary by-laws were formulated in order to punish deviation from 
these principles. 
3.8.1 Disciplinary By-Laws 
According to the Disciplinary By-Laws of 1982, disciplinary action can be taken 
against misbehaving students guilty of three different kinds of unacceptable activity. The 
first and second kinds of rule violations relate to university property, insulting university 
staff and non-observance of the principles of shar", Divine Law. Punishment range from a 
warning to temporary suspension from one to four semesters. The third kind of activity is 
political (Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of Culture and Higher Education 1984:191): 
1. Forming student associations without the permission of the university 
administration. 
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2. Forming political associations or gatherings on the campus of the university or 
any adjacent facilities. 
3. Political activity in support of a group or party that is against the regime of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran or action or propaganda in the interests of one of the 
superpowers. 
4. Forming literary, artistic, sports, scientific and other student groups for the 
purpose of political activity. 
Punishment for these offenses include (Ibid., p. 192): 
1. Deprivation of all students privileges, e.g., student discounts, health insurance, 
military exemption, etc. 
2. Deprivation of continuing study in the attending university. 
3. Deprivation of entering any other university in the country. 
More detailed versions of these by-laws were adopted listing anti-state activities such 
as writing subversive slogans and leafleting and moral transgressions such as drinking 
alcohol, theft, breaking the fast (during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan), insulting 
Islam and the Islamic principles, and disobeying the Islamic veil. In spite of revisions, the 
main elements as outlined above were retained. 
The disciplinary system is clearly designed to prevent and punish any individual or 
group action or even statement against the state, Islam or the university system. As is 
mentioned in the 1984 Disciplinary By-Laws, discipline and order, and submission to the 
Islamic State are seen, according to Khomeini, as a religious obligation (takltf). The By-
Laws are, therefore, Islamic laws which must be considered divine laws of a state that 
represents Allah on earth. Thus, opposition to the university is opposition to the state, and 
religion and politics and ideology mix (they are inseparable according to Khomeini). 
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3.9.0 Islamic Education: Control Through 
Persuasion and Propaganda 
In addition to screening and disciplinary measures, the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
undertook an Islamic indoctrination campaign aimed at Islamizing the students. Students who 
were re-admitted after the purge were required to take courses in Islamic ideology including 
"Islamic Learning," "The History of Islam," "Contemporary Iran and the Islamic Republic," 
"Logic and Methodology," and the Arabic Language. It is important to note that non-
Muslim students, those who believed in the specified religions in the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic [Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews] were also required to take one course 
on Islamic Learning." (Circular number 29146/34/1516, ratified on 2 Esfand 1361/February 
21, 1982). 
3.10.0 Organs of Control 
The political/ideological monitoring of students throughout their years on campus was 
conducted on a scale unprecedented under the monarchical system. Before the revolution, 
the secret police, SAVAK, and its agents among the students, faculty and staff identified 
anti-regime individuals while the Campus Guards were responsible for maintaining "law and 
order." In the post-Islamic Cultural Revolution period, a more intensive system of 
intelligence-gathering was devised. 
Control was conducted on two levels. First, university administration, using organs 
such as the "Cultural Committees" (kumite-ye farhangt), controlled all extracurricular 
activities and used disciplinary measures when necessary. Second, a student organization 
affiliated with the government, and with students who are admitted through the quota system, 
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closely monitored every student and faculty member and reported on dissident individuals. 
The Islamic Student Association (anjuman-e esldmt-ye ddneshjuydn). This student 
group emerged after the Islamic regime came to power (see 2.3.1). It was organized by 
Muslim Students of the Party of God in order to defend government policy at the 
universities, and to spy on anti-government and non-Muslim students, groups and 
organizations. Similar Islamic associations (Anjuman-e Eslami) with similar mandates were 
installed in all government offices, in military, industrial, and agricultural units, and in 
various neighbourhoods. The membership consisted of maktabt individuals allied with the 
ruling Islamic Republic Party. Even two years after the Revolution (1981) the membership 
made up a minority in public institutions, according to Ayatollah Beheshti (1981:2-11). 
However, during in the repression of opposition forces in June 1980, they played a 
fundamental role by providing information on anti-state activists. They soon became 
powerful, feared and hated. They were the only organized group allowed to operate on the 
campuses. In 1983, the Islamic Associations were re-organized by the Ministry of Interior 
under a mandate approved by the cabinet of Ministers (Iran. Islamic Republic. Ministry of 
Culture and Higher Education 1984:174-79). 
Each university has one Islamic Association with a central office and branches in 
every college. All the student associations are coordinated by the central office of Bureau of 
Strengthening Unity (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat). The Associations became so powerful that 
they even interfered in the administrative affairs of the institutions. Gradually, a conflict 
arouse between liberals and maktabts over the scope of power exercised by the associations. 
The former opposed interference in the management of the universities while the latter 
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considered any limitations on the association as a step towards "depoliticizing" the Islamic 
student movement and an indication of the re-emergence of Western values such as an 
emphasis on expertise rather than commitment. 
The intelligence gathered by the Islamic associations included moral/ethical 
subversiveness such as inappropriate (i.e. non-Islamic) clothing, male/female contact, failure 
to attend noon prayers, non-observance of fasting, etc. More importantly, the associations 
reported on non-Islamic and anti-state ideas, discussions and arguments. Based on these 
data, the list of dissident students were announced before registration every semester. The 
deviant student was informed about the exact date, time, and place where the offence had 
been committed. Based on the nature of the offence, the student would be punished 
according to disciplinary by-laws. 
The terror perpetrated by the Islamic associations resulted in dissent among the 
students and faculty. The maktabts, such as Prime Minister Mousavi, praised the role of the 
associations: "[Even] before our security and information forces take note of any dissidence, 
the untarnished heart of the Islamic Associations and their political sensitivity declares a 
warning and identifies the symptoms of danger; this warning and this sensitivity are vital for 
our Islamic regime (K. H., September 17, 1986). 
The liberals, however, complained about the extent of this repression. Even 
Ayatollah Montazeri, the designated successor Khomeini, warned that the narrow-mindedness 
of the associations would result in their isolation70. 
70
 On this conflict see D.E., No. 34, Farvardin 1963/March-April 1984, p. 54; No. 36, 
Khurdad 1363/May-June 1984, pp. 12-15,40,42; No. 37, Tir 1363/June July 1984, p. 9; No. 
47, Aban 1366/October-November 1987, p. 6; No. 48, Azar 1366/November-December 
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By the late-1980's, the Islamic Associations were gradually being isolated while the 
students they were monitoring had become depoliticized and disinterested in Islam. Efforts 
were made to attract more students in the associations in 1988 but the downward trend could 
not be reversed. 
In addition to the Islamic Associations, students who were admitted on a quota basis 
have performed a role similar to that of the associations. Interestingly, they have suffered 
the same fate; they are considered spies and, academically, incompetent. 
3.11.0 The State and the Students: Two Policies 
on Political and Ideological Loyalty 
The political loyalty of the students was the common objective of both the 
Monarchical and the Islamic states. The two states differed, however, in their perception of 
political loyalty, its scope and requirements. The Shah's universities, like the Islamic ones, 
organized one pro-government student association which was isolated, invisible, hated and 
ineffective. In practice, the Shah's state accepted student political inactivity as political 
loyalty. In other words, if students refrained from anti-state activity they were considered to 
be loyal. 
The Islamic regime (i.e. the maktabt line), however, defines political loyalty as active 
participation in support of the state. Students are required to support state policies not only 
on educational matters but also on national issues. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), for 
example, the universities, especially the students, were required to actively take part in the 
war effort. A loyal student was one who was willing to leave the school and join the forces 
1987, pp. 5-8; and No. 51, Esfand 1366/February-March 1988, pp. 5-9, 65. 
199 
as a soldier, specialists or propagandist. A loyal student was also expected to spy on fellow 
students, faculty and staff. 
Ideologically, too, both states require the loyalty of students if only because 
universities are major ideological institutions. Again, the two states had different 
expectations on the ideological battlefield. The Monarchical state used the media and the 
educational system (especially at the primary and secondary schools) to promote belief in the 
Pahlavi secular monarchy, shohparastt, as the only appropriate political system inherited 
from a "glorious 2500-year-old civilization." It insisted on a belief in the person of the Shah 
as the "Shadow of God," patriotism, mthanparastt, or, rather, Iranian national 
chauvinism,7' anti-communism and Westernization. The universities under the Shah, unlike 
the Islamic ones, did not develop an elaborate curriculum to train every student in the official 
ideology. If students or faculty members did not openly espouse non-official ideologies, they 
were considered loyal. 
The Islamic state requires students to be good Muslims, to oppose secularism and to 
propagate the official ideology actively. Even students who are members of religious 
minorities are required to take 25 unit credits of courses in Islamic ideology. The 
university's function is not to train experts only; experts must be committed too-committed 
to Islam and the Islamic state. 
71
 The idea here is that Iranians (as different from neighbouring Arabs and Turks) belong 
to the superior "Aryan" race who had built an ancient civilizations 2,500 years ago. It must 
be noted that non-"Aryan," Semitic, peoples built a much more advanced civilization in 
neighbouring Assyria Iang before the "Iranians" migrated to present-day Iran. 
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3.12.0 Contradictions within the State 
The Islamic state is not a unified homogenous state, politically and ideologically. 
What was identified above as the Islamic state's policy on students is, in fact, the policy of 
one of the two centers of power within the Islamic state, namely the maktabt. The other 
component of the state, the liberals, also expect political and ideological loyalty of the 
students but tend to limit their conception of loyalty to the absence of anti-state student 
activism. The liberals are content with raising experts who join the market and the civil and 
military bureaucracies and enable the state to function properly. 
The maktabts enjoying the support of Khomeini, promoted their policies in the first 
few years of the Islamic Cultural Revolution. By the late 1980's, however, their policies had 
clearly failed to achieve their objective of producing a student body actively involved in 
supporting the state. What is seen on the campus today is "indifference" and the 
"depoliticization" of the students. 
The liberals (represented by Rafsanjani, Khamene'i, and the Ministry of Culture and 
Higher Education) argue that students should pursue "serious learning" and "observe and 
protect Islamic morality." Khamene'i expects students to "protect purity, religion and 
righteousness in the university and to keep away from playing politics (siyOsat-bazf va 
siyOsat-kari) (D.E., No. 36, Khurdad 1363/May-June 1984, p. 54). They argue also that 
students should not interfere in the management of the university and in stale affairs. As 
conscientious individuals students should understand politics and develop analytical skills so 
that they can evaluate political issues for the people (Khamene'i quoted in K. H., October 
19, 1988, p. 20). It is argued that universities should train experts and because there are 
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mujtahed and faqth in the country, student interference in politics is irrelevant. If student 
activism is considered to be opposition to the state, students "are no longer motivated to be 
anti-government since the assumption of power by the Islamic state and this is a good 
thing..." (K. H., December 17, 1986, p. 13). 
The maktabts (especially the student followers of the Imam's Line, who were mostly 
activists in the University Crusade and the Bureau of Consolidating Unity) believe that 
depoliticization is largely a product of the liberalist policy which they consider to be against 
"Imam's Line" and opposed to velayOt-e faqth. They argue that the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution has remained unfinished and the only remnants of it are "... a memory of the 
political purge of the universities and possibly the addition of a number of courses to the 
students' course work together with a cold and 'safe' silence" (Mohamadi 1988:32-35). 
What is the source of depoliticization? According to the main print organ of the 
fundamentalists (Ibid.), the main reason for the failure of the Islamic Cultural Revolution was 
its sole reliance on "the rule of power" in conducting the Islamic Cultural Revolution and its 
failure to replace "the rule of power" by "the rule of thought" (hakemtyat-e andtshe). In 
explaining this argument, it is stated that the Islamic Cultural Revolution, in the heyday of 
conflicts [with the left] and the student activism of 1980 and 1960, was able to drive leftist 
students off the campus by relying on force. However, 
the truth is that the Islamic Cultural Revolution never put forward an adequate 
response to the current of thought of [leftist] groups...We do not want to say that our 
encounter with Fedayee Guerillas72 and their ousting of the university was 
wrong...We want to say that encounter in the sphere of power does not make it 
72
 Fedayee Guerillas were a Marxist-Leninist guerilla organization which sought the 
overthrow of the Shah's regime and later, opposed the Islamic regime (see 2.3.4). 
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unnecessary [to conduct] debates and controversies in the sphere of thought and that 
one hundred years of fighting [by force] against the "Marxists," right or wrong, does 
not inflict even a needlepoint's harm to the "thought of Marxism" (Ibid.). 
The writer then refers to the repressive environment where, after "tasting power," all 
oppositional thinking was stifled to the extent that opposition to the colour of the blackboard 
was considered opposition to Islam and the Revolution, and was against God and the prophet. 
This atmosphere of terror has led to depoliticization which, according to maktabts, breeds 
three dangers: the restoration of cultural decadence under the slogan of the need for experts, 
the separation of students from the clergy, and imperialism's access to the universities due to 
the indifference of students and their lack of commitment to Islam and the Islamic 
Revolution. 
In order to create an environment of debate, the University Crusade of Tehran 
University put up a bulletin board at the College of Medicine in order to post student letters 
in a section called "Free Column." Students could drop their letters, signed or unsigned, in 
a box to be examined, approved and sealed by the University Crusade and then could be 
displayed. One student who had signed his/her name as "A fellow-citizen, fellow-resident of 
the planet, a fellow-resident of the Galaxy" ended his detailed critique of the political, 
economic and social conditions of the country by writing: "This [free] column means that 
freedom must be thought, anonymously, on this column only, otherwise we know and you 
know..."(quoted in Adtne, No 31, Day and Bahman 1367/January-February 1988, p. 7. The 
sentence is not quoted in full). 
In a comment on the "alarming" depoliticization of students, a commentator in D.E. 
noted that only after government authorities became concerned did they instruct students to 
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interfere in politics; the authorities were warned, however, not to forget that since students 
did not ask for permission to become depoliticized, they will not ask for anyone's permission 
to became re-politicized (Mohamadi 1988:32). 
One may note that the Shah's regime considered student politicization as the major 
threat to the political stability of the state and an obstacle to the training of highly skilled 
labour. It seems that under the extremely repressive conditions of the post-Islamic Cultural 
Revolution period, the Islamic state considers student depoliticization as a form of struggle 
against the regime. 
3.13.0 Non-Political Demands 
A characteristic feature of the student movement especially in the Third World 
countries is the focus on national political issues rather that economic demands related to the 
educational and welfare issues of the student body. This is especially true in Iran where non-
political demands such as the cost of textbooks, tuition and housing have been used only to 
raise anti-state political demands or to begin a strike. 
The economic crisis, aggravated by the Iran-Iraq war, resulted in unprecedented 
deterioration of the welfare of all Iranians including students. The sky-rocketing cost of 
living, especially housing, in Tehran and other large cities where most of the universities are 
located has led to a serious crisis on all campuses. Provision of housing has been the main 
demand of the students who had to live in groups of seven to ten in small dormitory rooms 
designed for one and two occupants (Razazi 1983:51). In some cases, students were herded 
into basement of dormitories in groups of 60 to 70. Permanent lines were formed for access 
to washrooms and showers. According to one student, "even when we decide to take a 
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shower at 2:00 a.m., we see some thirty students lining up" (Ibid.). A similar situation 
prevailed even in remote provincial university of Sistan and Baluchestan (K. H., November 
8, 1987). The housing problems affected female students most negatively. Quite often 
students had to abandon their study because they could not find housing in the city where 
they had got admitted through nation-wide central exams (K. H, October 26, 1988, p. 13). 
Other problems relate to the shortage of textbooks, poor quality of food in dormitories 
and lunchrooms, and lack of library facilities. Libraries faced shortages of books, chairs, 
desks and space. The ever rising cost of living had to be met by the families of students. 
Financial difficulties were cited as one of the reasons for the suicide of a student who set 
himself aflame in a classroom in 1988 (D.E., No. 58, Mehr 1367/August-September 1987, 
p. 57). 
Under the conditions, depression and other psychological problems have taken their 
toll. In spite of censorship, news of suicide and protests appear in the print media. For 
instance, the students of Amir Kabir Industrial University had a confrontation with security 
forces when they occupied a building to use it as a dormitory. At Gilan University, students 
protested the quality of food services (these protests were only reported in the Islamic 
Propagation Organization confidential reports, KhabarnOme-ye Farhangt-Ejtema't, No. 39, 
p. 53, reprinted in Andlshe va Peykdr publication, June 20, 1989. 
3.14.0 Summary 
Three elements of the teaching process-the teachers, the methods of teaching, and 
what is taught-have been reviewed in this chapter. The focus of the review, primarily, has 
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been on the ideological and political control policies of the governments and their effect on 
these elements. 
In the first section, the policies of the Shah and the Islamic Government regarding 
faculty selection procedures have been studied. The data clearly indicated that the criteria 
for selection of a faculty member, for both governments, has been the ideological and 
political loyalty of individuals goj their teaching abilities. Numbers of politically and 
ideologically defiant faculty members were imprisoned, harassed and interrogated, during the 
Shah's regime. A considerable number of them were also purged during the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution and the prominent activists were either imprisoned or exiled. This has caused a 
deep shortage of faculty members since the implementation of the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution. To solve the faculty shortage crisis as well as ensuring their ideological 
credibility, the Islamic Government launched a special Faculty Training Program. The goals 
of the program have been to solve the problem of faculty shortages and to guarantee the 
ideological and political commitment of faculty members to Islam and the Islamic 
government. However due to several factors such as the lack of expertise among faculty and 
disagreement among the ruling power in terms of training faculty members at home or 
sending them abroad, the achievement of the goals has been delayed. 
Faculty activism has been the focus of the first section too. Iranian university faculty 
members have played a significant role in the anti-Shah movement. Though, historically the 
student movement was much more powerful and better organized, nonetheless the faculty 
members' involvement in the revolutionary struggle of 1977-79, profoundly affected their 
status in society. They became part of the people's movement and diverted all the university 
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services and resources toward fulfilling the needs of the people. The National Organization 
of Iranian Academics (NOIA) came into being during this period. University autonomy and 
academic freedom were among the basic tenets of NOIA's platform. NOIA, like most of the 
other democratic organizations which were the fruits of the Revolution, was suppressed by 
the Islamic Government. 
After the implementation of the Islamic Cultural Revolution, the Democratic Societies 
of Iranian Academics were formed at different institutions. Although, more or less, they 
followed the same plan as the NOIA at the institutional level they did not become a united 
and nation-wide organization like NOIA. These societies also had a short life and were 
suppressed as a result of the increase in political and ideological control on the part of the 
Islamic regime. 
By 1987. faculty members were working under the scrutiny of the Islamic 
Government. All aspects of their academic life, from their appearance in the classroom to 
the content of their teaching materials, to the way their knowledge was transferred to the 
students and their relationship with their students, all were under the sever control of the 
Government. The consequence of the Government's policy of control has been the spread of 
dissatisfaction among faculty and an increased desire to abandon their homeland. 
Sections three and four of the chapter were devoted to teaching methods and 
curricula. The focus of these sections, too, has been on the role of state ideology and 
politics in shaping the ways by which knowledge is transferred as well as the content of the 
knowledge. The secularization, Westernization, and modernization policy of the Shah 
manifested itself, on the one hand, in unilateral and alienated relationships which existed 
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between the instructors and students and, on the other hand, an educational program which 
had nothing to do with social needs. 
The Islamization of teaching methods and the curricula essentially has been a 
continuation of the previous policy. Except, however, for a slight change in their outlook, 
i.e. instructors are not only are the sole authority in the classroom, but religiously they are 
men and women of "piety" and "virtue" and therefore men and women to emulate. As far as 
the curricula are concerned, no major change has occurred besides the addition of several 
general required courses on Islam and Islamic studies to the core educational program of the 
institutions. 
The status of research studies in higher education has been the focus of the last 
section. There, it has been shown that research is not an intrinsic part of the system, as it is 
in the West. The economic structure of the country has not required such research because 
of its dependence on the West. More importantly, the total suppression of academic and 
intellectual freedom has made research, especially in the social sciences and the humanities, 
fruitless. The data provided also indicate a sharp decline in resources needed for research, 
notably a scarcity of books, the deterioration of lab equipment, budget cuts, and the poor 
conditions of the libraries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SUMMARY, ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The findings of this study demonstrate that the Islamic Republic's policy of 
Islamization of the universities, i.e. the de-secularization and de-Westernization of Iran's 
(secular and Western) institutions of higher education, has failed. In spite of some visible 
manifestations of Islamic values (e.g. the segregation of female and male students, styles of 
dress, pictures of Khomeini and other clergy and, the actual presence of clergymen), today's 
higher institutions are more similar to those of the monarchical period or those in Western 
countries than the traditional Islamic centres of learning. This chapter provides an overview 
and explanation of these reforms and a demonstration of the failure of these policies. 
4.0.0 An Overview of the Findings 
This section provides a synopsis of the findings of chapters two and three. It 
summarizes the Islamization of university administration, the faculty and the teaching 
process, and the student body. 
4.1.0 Administrative Reform 
Universities in Iran are part of the state structure. These institutions were founded, 
are financed and run by the state. The administrative hierarchy of the university has been set 
up by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education according to parliamentary legislation. 
The university has, however, been a major center of revolt against the state. Other 
state organs such as the ministries or the state radio and television, although modelled on 
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their Western counterparts, have not revolted against the state except during the last months 
of the life of the Pahlavi regime. By contrast, Jn universities, the students, faculty and, to a 
lesser extent, staff have challenged the authority of the state even at time periods when the 
ruling political power enjoyed stability. 
One form of revolt against the state has been the demand for university autonomy. 
The main power and source of the struggle for autonomy were faculty members who enjoyed 
student and staff support. Unlike the student movement which was present all the time, 
autonomy was sought when the regime was least able to exercise effective control over the 
people of Iran, i.e., during the crisis periods of 1941-53, 1960-63 and 1978-80. 
Political and Ideological Loyalty. The Iranian states-both monarchist and Islamic 
Republican-were highly centralized, etatist and authoritarian. The political and ideological 
loyalty of the citizens, of national and religious minorities and of the institutions of higher 
learning are of primary interest to the state. 
In order to increase the loyalty of the universities, the Shah's regime controlled their 
entire administrative structure. The old administrative system, based on the French model, 
underwent reform in the 1960s according to the American system of boards of trustees which 
were headed by the Shah, the queen or other members of the Royal Court. Unlike the 
American system, chancellors and deans were appointed with the approval of the Shah. 
However, the main feature of administration was not the boards of trustees but, rather, the 
direct and continued presence on campus of the Secret Service, SAVAK, and a military 
force, i.e. campus guards. Dissent was brutally repressed. Murder, jail, induction into the 
army, and the dismissal of students were common methods of suppression. 
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The universities were a major motive force behind the anti-monarchical revolution of 
1978-79. Led by leftist, predominantly secular forces, the campus played a major role in 
overthrowing the monarchy. As a result of this prominent role, the universities became 
totally independent of the Shah's state when the faculty, students and staff supported by the 
revolutionary masses reopened the campus in the final days of the Shah's regime. When the 
Islamic Government assumed power, the universities refused to be integrated into the new 
state structure and they set up their own administrative organs based on elections by a 
"system of councils." There was, thus, a system of "dual power" in the universities. 
The central government's policy was to attempt to quickly establish full control over 
the campus through administrative measures. The government first appointed the chancellor 
of Tehran University and then selected the Minister of Culture and Higher Education. This 
policy failed, however. Under the continuing revolutionary situation the universities were, in 
practice, run from below by leftist students and faculty. The appointment of non-
revolutionary and usually unknown individuals to top positions exposed the conservative 
nature of the new ruling power. In order to strengthen state authority, the new regime 
decided to conduct Tehran's Friday prayer on the campus of Tehran University. Even this 
move failed to bring the campus under effective state control. The top authorities repeatedly 
complained that the campus had turned into a springboard for anti-government subversion. 
Administratively, the Islamic Cultural Revolution aimed at setting up a structure that 
could provide a control system more effective than the Shah's. It removed the boards of 
trustees and appointed clergymen to sensitive positions in order to ensure both ideological 
and political loyalty. The isolated and clandestine use of the secret police as a method of 
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control by the Shah was replaced by an open and more massive network of Muslim Student 
Associations which monitored on faculty, students and staff on a regular day-to-day basis. 
The Islamic and monarchical states, thus, followed a similar policy concerning the 
administration of the university. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was a reform measure 
aimed at ending "dual power" on campus and replacing it with the solitary rule of the state— 
an administrative structure capable of combining coercion and ideological training to ensure 
the political and ideological loyalty of the campus. 
Autonomy: Liberal and Radical Policies. The faculty demanded autonomy at times 
of political crisis when the ruling power had been weakened usually as a result of an upsurge 
in the popular struggle against the Shah's regime- 1941-53, 1960-63 and 1978-79-and when 
the new Islamic regime had not consolidated its power throughout the country, 1979-mid 
1980. 
During these struggles for autonomy, two different approaches emerged. During the 
1941-53 and 1960-63 periods, the faculty demanded financial and administrative autonomy 
from the Ministry of Education. Budget funds were to be allocated by Parliament rather than 
by the Ministry, and chancellors and deans were to be elected by the faculty. This system 
(presupposing a liberal reformist view of the nature of state-university relations based on 
legalistic considerations) was consistent with the political and ideological line of the 
leadership of the anti-monarchist political parties, i.e. the National Front, the Tudeh Party 
?nd other political organizations. During this period, although the spontaneous struggle of the 
peasants and workers was quite radical, the political line of the opposition parties was both 
reformist and conformist. The essence of their political line was to force the Shah into 
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abiding by the Constitution and to "reign not rule", i.e. to be a Constitutional monarch like 
those in England, Sweden, etc. They did not call for the overthrow of the monarchical 
regime. 
By the late 1960s, however, a new leadership of the political movement, emerging 
from a young leftist generation mostly rooted in the universities, repudiated the reformist line 
and called for the overthrow of the monarchy. Guerilla operations, primarily in urban 
centers, conducted by these radical organizations, first appeared in the late 60's. Khomeini, 
himself a reformist, adopted an anti-monarchist line in 1973 in response to this limited but 
powerful leftist campaign. 
The radicalization of the political movement in the late 1960s left its mark on the 
autonomist struggle on campus. The autonomists, from 1978 to 80, argued that a 
democratically run academia can exist only in a democratic state. Thus, they tied the 
struggle for autonomy to the struggle for the overthrow of the Shah. In the same vein, the 
Islamic regime's policy of ruling the university from above was considered by academics and 
students to be a continuation of the policies of the monarchist regime. 
The Iranian experience shows that radical reform of the university was achieved in the 
absence of state power. State power, both Islamic and monarchical, was an obstacle to the 
democratization of university administration. For example, the situation in the 1979-80 
period was one of "dual power" on campus-the Islamic state owned the universities and tried 
to control them from above but leftist students/faculty were running it from below. In spite 
of innumerable obstacles created by the Islamic state, students and faculty were able to 
democratize the institutions and turn them into arenas for radical reconstruction in the post-
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Pahlavi era. It was also in the absence of effective state control that dozens of faculty 
members from all over Iran, helped by the people of Kurdistan, were able to set up a 
university with an entirely new and revolutionary mandate and structure. Similarly, the 
Democratic Autonomous Government of Azarbaijan (1946) set up the first provincial 
university in Iran. 
One may conclude that the Islamic and Monarchist regimes adopted a similar policy 
with regards to the administration of the universities. Three primariy similarities were: 
The universities are to function as state organs run by an administrative 
structure appointed from above and incorporating a system of open police 
control. 
Ensuring political and ideological loyalty of the institutions was one of the 
primary mandates of the administration. 
The university should function as an instrument of state-building and nation-
building i.e. consolidating and maintaining state power and providing skilled 
labor for the economy - a capitalist economy with a strong state sector and 
remnants of pre-capitalist relations in some regions of the country. 
In order to fully integrate the universities into the Islamic state structure, the maktabt 
faction (including the University Crusade, the Islamic Republic Party) within the ruling 
political power advocated a union between the traditional Islamic schools called Howze and 
the university. The program called for total restructuring of the universities which were 
expected to carry out, academically and organizationally, the policies, decrees and verdicts of 
the God and its representative the Islamic state, Velayat-e Faqth. Academically, the 
university is not allowed to "philosophize" (i.e. determine the right and wrong) on the 
policies and decrees of the valt-ye faqth, the ruling theologian-jurisprudent. The university's 
function is to "translate" and popularize the Islamic ruler's decisions. 
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In practice, however, the maktabts were not able to achieve this degree of fusion of 
the university into the state. Some of the measures taken aimed at the supervision of the 
institutions by clergmen appointed by the "leader". Although many clerics were appointed to 
such positions in the first few years of the Cultural Revolution, these appointments led to 
more factional conflict. This major Islamization effort has failed with the rise to power of 
the Liberal faction. The boards of trustees, abolished during the 1978-79 Revolution, are 
being re-instated and maktabts are being gradually purged. 
4.1.1 Faculty and the Teaching Process 
Putting an end to the state of dual power through the full control of the administrative 
structure of the universities was the most urgent and easy-to-accomplish objective of the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution. The leaders of the Islamic state were aware, however, that 
administrative control alone does not guarantee ideological and political loyalty of the 
students and faculty. This is the case because universities, unlike state organs such as the 
ministries and other large-scale offices, are not primarily administrative units. No matter 
how extensive university bureaucracy is, the main element remains the largest and most 
energetic body-the students-and faculty who can afford to engage in intellectual work and to 
organize to act politically. 
The policy of the Islamic Cultural Revolution was not only to uproot all university 
opposition to the Islamic state, but, more importantly, to transfer the university into an active 
pro-state institution. In order to achieve this impossible objective, once they were in full 
control of the administrative structure maktabts closed down the universities for two years 
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and planned the Islamization process. 
4.1.2 Activism and Recruitment of the Faculty 
Under the monarchy, university faculties were involved in anti-monarchical activities 
and comprised the major force in demanding university autonomy. During the anti-
monarchical revolution, the faculty of a number of institutions, especially Aryamehr 
University, openly defied the authority of the state. Aryamehr Industrial University revolted 
and, helped by students, faculty, and people outside academia, successfully achieved self-
government. This struggle led to the formation of National Organization of Iranian 
Academics which was able to lead major campaigns against the state. On the eve of the fall 
of the Pahlavi dynasty, NOIA, together with leftist students, were the unrivalled rulers on the 
campuses. NOIA was composed of predominantly nationalist and leftist faculty members. 
NOIA and the professoriate enjoyed enormous prestige and popularity throughout the 
country. 
One of the objectives of the Islamic Cultural Revolution was to get rid of this 
politically active and committed professorate. Purging, execution, and imprisonment were 
some of the methods used to this. Recruitment policy was revised and ideological screening 
was added to the old practice of political screening under the Shah. In the Social Sciences 
and the Humanities, the policy aimed at appointing, as much as possible, clergy who had 
teaching experience in traditional religious schools but were not familiar with modem 
sciences. The long-term policy has been to setup teacher training universities where 
instructors knowledgeable in Islam and loyal to the state would be trained. The policy aims 
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at training teachers who are both expert in their field and committed to Islam. 
None of these policies has yet led to effective Islamization. A large number of 
faculty members have, under conditions of repression, left academia and the resulting 
recruitment of Iranians graduating from foreign universities has not been successful either. 
4.1.3 Teaching Methods: Traditional and Modernity 
Teaching, under the Shah, was an eclectic mixture of 19th century European and 
earlier Islamic traditions. The professor was the ultimate source of knowledge and textbooks 
were equally important. Rote memorization, rather than inquiry and research, were the 
appropriate methods of learning. In spite of these limitations, the teaching process was 
different from those of the traditional Islamic schools, the seminaries (Howze). There was 
limited experimentation in the sciences, engineering and medical sciences and the social 
science courses had a secular orientation. 
Under conditions of "dual power" (1979-April 1980), leftist students and faculty 
transformed the teaching process into one of debate and controversy; radical ideas and books 
in both the exact and social sciences were debated, and academic freedom, unprecedented in 
Iranian history, prevailed in the institutions. 
The Islamic Cultural Revolution's policy was to bring about a union of the Howze, 
the traditional centres of Islamic learning, and the university in all aspects of academic life 
especially in teaching. The Howze, similar to Medieval European religious schools, 
developed a teaching practice useful for transmitting clerically verified and sanctioned 
knowledge contained in a limited number of books, usually centuries old, to students who 
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would become clergy. The subject matter remained unchanged during centuries and students 
were required to memorize this body of knowledge. The teacher and the book were the 
ultimate source of "truth". The teacher is not only seen as an epitome of knowledge but also 
an apostle of good manners, faith in Islamic god and all the virtues sanctioned by Islam. 
Being an expert alone leads to deviation and corruption. The Islamic teacher is both expert 
and committed. The approach was metaphysical and scholastic. Any manifestation of 
materialism was rejected as "blasphemy" (kuff). Experimentation and materialism are 
considered to generate secularism and irreligiosity. In fact, ideologues of the Islamic regime 
argue that the experimental sciences are more dangerous than the social sciences and 
humanities of the West because they are inherently in conflict with religions and faith. 
This Islamic teaching method is obviously most unsuitable for the transfer of modem 
experimental and materialist (social and exact) sciences. In medical schools, for example. 
anatomy was not allowed because it was against Islamic principles. Thus, howze-siylt 
teaching has failed to be adopted. 
4.1.4 Curriculum: Islamic and Secular 
Under the Monarchist regime, curriculum policy-making was centralized under the 
authority of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The Curriculum was based on 
the European pattern until the 1960s when reforms based on the American system were 
introduced. Curricula were designed to teach modem, secular Western sciences that were 
clearly distinct from the curricula of traditional Islamic centers of learning which did not 
include any modem scientific disciplines. Culturally, curriculum content emphasized the pre-
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Islamic culture and civilization of Iran and secular knowledge rooted in Western positivist 
traditions. The social sciences and Humanities promoted the legitimacy of the monarchy, 
Persian chauvinism, and private enterprise, and it attacked or censored revolutionary ideas, 
philosophies and traditions of thought. The only language of instruction was the official 
language, Persian, which is the mother-tongue of only 50% of Iranians. Textbooks were 
predominantly translations of Western literature. In order to further weaken the traditional 
religious schools, the Pahlavi regime established a Faculty of Theology at Tehran University 
which offered both undergraduate and graduate programs. Also, curricula such as Fine Arts 
including music, dance and painting that were never taught in religious schools were offered 
by some of the Iranian universities. With the increasing diversification of the economy in 
the 1970s, new courses of study such as hotel management, computer science, tourism, etc. 
were offered; during this decade, curriculum design aimed at training skilled human 
resources for the Shah's "Great Civilization" plan designed to turn Iran into the military, 
economic and political base of the United States in the Persian Gulf area. 
With the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, leftist students and faculty introduced a number 
of changes into the universities; they were not troubled by the secular or experimental nature 
of the sciences; their main concern was to replace the conservative, colonial curriculum 
content by revolutionary content that could serve the building of a new, democratic and 
independent society, economy and culture; however, under conditions of "dual power" on the 
campus when the universities were administratively part of the Islamic state but power was in 
the hands of leftist students/faculty, there was not any institutional or official support for 
reform along non-Islamic lines. 
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The policy-makers of the Islamic Cultural Revolution focused their attention on the 
contradiction between secular Western education and the Islamic tradition. Opinion was 
divided, however, over identifying where the main threat to Islam came from-the Social 
Sciences/Humanities or the exact sciences. According to one group the social/human 
sciences were more culture-bound and as a result more secular while another group 
maintained that the exact sciences posed the real challenges to religion because they were 
experimental. The former could be Islamized, the latter could not. 
The Islamic Cultural Revolution eliminated programs of study (e.g. hotel 
management, music, dance, etc) though some these programs were later reinstituted. It also 
introduced new courses of study, and promoted and increased courses on Islamic subjects 
required for all graduate and undergraduate programs. The Islamic Cultural Revolution 
failed, however, to Islamize the Social Sciences and Humanities; experimentation in some 
scientific areas, such as anatomy in the medical programs, was proscribed first but later 
reinstituted. 
4.2.0 Students 
Since the formation of the first university in the early 1930's until the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution, students offered the most persistent opposition to both the Monarchical and 
Islamic state. Student demands which could not be met by the state were democracy, 
freedom and independence on the national level. Demands relating to the students 
themselves e.g. lower or no tuition fees, affordable housing, and adequate facilities were 
always overshadowed by the political demands affecting the entire nation. The university in 
iran has been a hot-bed of revolution. 
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Student opposition to the state has changed in its objectives and scope. Before 1963, 
the student movement was reformist in that it demanded the Shah to act, according to the 
Constitution, as a constitutional monarch, "to reign not to rule." With the failure of this 
reformist policy after the government's massacre of opposition forces in 1963, the student 
movement took a radical direction and called for the overthrow of the Shah's regime. The 
student movement is distinguished from other opposition forces by its ability to challenge the 
state even when the entire opposition movement had been silenced throughout the country. 
The limited, occasional opposition of the religious schools, Howzes, has been dwarfed by the 
extensive and persistent struggle in the universities which were called by the entire nation 
sangar-e dzadt, "bastion of freedom." The student movement is also distinguished by its 
leftist, secular and, quite often, Marxist-Leninist aspirations. While religious Muslim 
students were present on the campuses, they were usually no more than study groups who 
often enjoyed the freedom of propagating Islam and rarely if ever got engaged in face-to-face 
confrontation with the Shah's regime. The only Muslim group that openly defied the 
authority of the monarchical state were the followers of Mujahedin Organization. 
In the revolutionary crisis of 1977-79 which led to the fall of the monarchy, the 
campus remained the hot-bed of struggle even when the entire nation was calling for the 
overthrow of the state. In spite of the fact that the revolutionary situation brought the 
Islamic movement and Khomeini to the leadership of the movement, the university, far from 
being overshadowed by Islam, continued to emerge as the most prestigious bastion of the 
revolution. Students played a leading role in the armed uprising of February 10-11 which 
led to the final overthrow of the monarchy. Not surprisingly, the Islamic state chose the site 
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of the secular, modem, Tehran University campus for the most important political-religious 
event of the week, i.e. Friday Prayers. 
Once it came to power, the Islamic state begun to suppress political freedoms that the 
Iranians peoples had achieved in the course of their struggle against the Shah. The Islamic 
Army was first deployed against autonomy-seeking Kurds, Turkmans and Arabs (Spring 
1979) and, soon, the independent print media, book-sellers, publishers, and political 
organizations were suppressed. Thus, when political freedoms were suppressed throughout 
the country, the campuses continued to exist as islands of freedom. 
Uprooting the student movement was one of the primary aims of the Islamic Cultural 
Revolution. The university could not be integrated into the Islamic state without tne total 
suppression of the student movement. The armed attack on the campuses organized by a 
faction in the Islamic state resulted in the arrest, wounding and killing of hundreds of 
students. This was followed by closing the universities for two years and, later, purging 
them. 
The Islamic state purged all the students who were not found to be ideologically and 
politically loyal to the state. The new admission policy admitted only those applicants who 
had no record of opposing Islam or the Islamic state. Screening included "local 
investigation" in the applicants' neighbourhood, the secondary schools where they graduated, 
security checks by the Revolutionary Guards, intelligence organization and the local mosque. 
Some of the brightest applicants who had passed the tough entrance exams and ideological 
tests were not admitted because security checks did not or could not confirm loyalty to the 
state or a close relative of the applicant had opposed the Islamic regime. 
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The student body generated by the Islamic Cultural Revolution was, then, carefully 
watched by the organized members of the Islamic Student Associations. Any deviance from 
the norms established by the state (e.g. male/female contact, improper dressing or veiling, 
criticism of the state, etc.) was reported to the authorities. Deviant students were not able to 
register for the new semester when they were able to demonstrate that their error would not 
be repeated. In order to broaden the social base of support for the Islamic state, the 
universities were instructed to admit, on a quota basis, applicants who belonged to the 
security forces (e.g. Revolutionary Guards), numbers of the "family of martyrs," and 
veterans of Iran-Iraq war. The quota system was designed to reward pro-regime elements 
and to create a safe base of support for the state. 
The reign of terror on the campus was so stifling that it affected the architects and 
perpetrators of the terror. They themselves complained about the "atmosphere of terror and 
strangling" when they failed to engage the students in pro-regime activities (see 3.12.0). The 
policy of the Islamic state, unlike the Shah's regime which aimed at an apolitical student 
body, is to produce students who were actively supporting the Islamic regime ideologically 
and politically. Thus, it was a states objective of the maktabt architects of the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution to engage students in politics, i.e. political support of the regime. The 
post-Islamic Cultural Revolution campuses are, however, characterized by die presence of 
students who are apolitical. The maktabts were alarmed trying to find a situation to the 
deadly silence on the campus. This political indifference is, in the eyes of the maktabts, a 
form of dissidence. The end result of this system was general hatred, among the faculty and 
students, for the Islamic Student Association (which had replaced the Shah's secret police 
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SAVAK) and the quota students who were performing the same functions. The maktabt 
policy of strict control had alienated even the Liberals whose policy is to have a student body 
interested in acquiring knowledge only. 
In summing up the policy of the Islamic Cultural Revolution on administration, the 
teaching and students, we find a thread running through them. The main objective of the 
policy is full integration of the universities into the state system by uprooting any form of 
opposition and turning the institutions into ideologically and politically active defenders of 
the Islamic regime. While opposition has been stifled temporarily, the state has not been 
able to turn the universities into active supporters. This is due to the fact that (a) the mind 
of students/faculty cannot be controlled through terrorizing and the suppression of basic 
political freedoms and b) the Islamic state is not a unified political power; opposition to the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution policies came, therefore, from below and from above, the 
Liberal faction. 
4.3.0 The Failure of the Islamic Cultural Revolution: 
An Analysis of the Findings 
Ten years after the Islamic Cultural Revolution, Iranian universities continue to offer 
secular, modem and Western education; in spite of the introduction of more Islamic subjects 
into the curricula, and omissions and additions of programs of study, the institutions continue 
to offer an education designed to train a skilled workforce for the economy and government 
bureaucracy; the exact and social sciences and the Humanities that form the body of 
knowledge offered by Iran's higher institutions were developed in Western research facilities 
and educational institutions. Teaching and research methods, textbooks, academic journals, 
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programs of study and the organization of the institutions in the form of colleges and 
departments are all of Western origin and similar to those found in the universities under the 
Pahlavi monarchy. The Islamic state has failed to rebuild the universities on the basis of 
Howze, the traditional Islamic centers of learning. The "Union of howze and the 
University"-stiU on the agenda of the Islamic Cultural Revolution-has not materialized. 
The two educational systems seem to be incompatible. 
A number of visible changes such as the segregation of female and male students, 
obligatory Islamic ideology courses and the presence of more clerical administrators do not 
distort the picture depicted above. In fact, evidence indicates that these manifestations of 
Islamization are continuously being resisted and their continued presence depends on the 
continued use of repressive forms of governance both on campuses and on the national level. 
In order to understand the failure of Islamization. we must look at two inter-related 
components of the Islamization reform policy. One is the origins or the foundations of the 
policy. It is important to note that the Islamic Cultural Revolution was not based on 
research, on the findings and recommendations of hearings commissioned by the government 
or by independent groups. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was, rather, a product of and a 
factor in important political and ideological struggles of the post-Revolutionary period. The 
other component to examine is the Islamic state which was the architect and implementing 
organ of the Islamic Cultural Revolution. 
4.3.1 Ideological and Political Foundations of 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
The Islamic Cultural Revolution, as a major post-Revolutionary program for the 
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restructuring of Iranian society, had multiple origins. One may trace it to the changing 
religious, cultural, educational, political, ideological and international environment of 19th-
20th century Iran. However, a listing of all discernible factors contributing to educational 
reform is of little analytical/explanatory value because the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
occurred in a particular immediate historical context and in response to a set of challenges to 
the newly-established Islamic state. As this study seeks to show (see, also, Mojab 1985), the 
primary cause of (and the most urgent need for) the Islamic Cultural Revolution was 
political-the need to extend state control over the universities. This political snuggle was, 
however, launched and conducted by a ruling political power with a particular ideology-a 
brand of Shi'ite Islam interested in Islamizing not only the educational system but also the 
entire society. It is, thus, important to examine the political and ideological foundations of 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution, 
The Islamic Cultural Revolution was the scene of conflict between two varieties of 
Twelver Shi'ism-maktabt or (faqdhatt) Islam and Liberal Islam. The maktabts were the 
architects of the Islamic Cultural Revolution and the following synopsis focuses on their 
ideological and political line. 
Ideological Foundations 
The political heterogeneity of the Islamic state in 1980 was also evident in the 
ideological arena. While all political factions sharing political power did in fact claim Islam 
as their ideology, there were substantial differences among them. These can most adequately 
be explained in terms of social class divisions (Digard 1987: 69-70) rather than religious 
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doctrine. There is no single Islamic ideology or even, theology, and the main text, the Holy 
Koran, like other religious texts, contains contradictory statements and principles which have 
invited hundreds of conflicting commentaries and interpretations throughout the past fourteen 
centuries. The Islamic world is divided into numerous sects and denominations. 
Ideological harmony cannot be found even within the Twelver denomination of 
Shi'ism which is the official religion of Iran. In fact, the post-Revolutionary political 
discourse in Iran has identified at least four varieties of Shiite Islam: 
1. Eslam-e Faqdhatt or maktabt. Islam based on the idea of the rule of Faqih, the 
theologian-jurisprudent, represented by Khomeini and the Islamic Republic Party. 
2. Esldm-e Showra't. Islam based on the idea of governing through councils, 
represented by Ayatollah Taleqani and the Mujahedui. 
3. Eslam-e ItbrOlt (Liberal Islam). Varieties of Islam reformed by modem middle-
class intellectuals, represented by Bazargan, Bani-Sadr and the Iran Freedom 
Movement. 
4. Esldm-e Amrtkd-t (American Islam). Islamic tendencies or clergmen who 
supported the monarchy and do not advocate an Islamic state, represented by the pro-
Shah high-level clergyman Ayatollah Shari'atmadari. 
These varieties of Shiite Islam find their representatives among a socially stratified 
clerical hierarchy. Thus, the Iranian clergy, called rOhdniyuh (spiritual people) or 'ulamd 
(people of learning), do not form a homogeneous social class. They form, rather, a series of 
strata ranging from a sizeable population of poor or property-less mullas to a usually well-
to-do, less numerous, group of dkhunds, mujtaheds and Zayatulldhs." However, as is the 
n
 Akhund, 'clergyman', is synonymous with mulla though the former usually refers to 
urban, more educated, clerics while the latter refers to the lowest, rural, ranks of the clerical 
profession. Mujtahed is a higher ranking cleric who practices ejtehad, i.e. deducing from 
Islamic sources a correct opinion on a novel issue or problem. 
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case in non-clerical populations, the ownership of property is not a direct or necessary 
indication of their ideological or political alignment. Khomeini, for example, came from a 
lower-class clerical family. Leading the life of an ascetic, he did not aspire to become 
wealthy though he defended the Islamic institutions' ownership of endowed villages and lands 
managed on the basis of feudal relations of production. 
Although there are different Islamic ideologies within the Twelve Imams Shiism, each 
ideology does have coherence, consisting of a set of interrelated political, philosophical, 
religious, ethical, aesthetic economic and legal views. Moreover, each ideology can be 
related to identifiable class interests. The architects of the Islamic Cultural Revolution-the 
Islamic Republic Party and Khomeini-uphold an ideology that is called "Islamic" and claims 
to be a full-fledged world-view. This ideology is variously labelled as Esldm-e maktabt 
(Doctrinaire Islam), Esldm-e Faqdh&ti (Islam advocating an Islamic sate ruled by ihefaqths 
or theologians-juriprudents), Islamic fundamentalism, bourgeois-feudal, or feudal-comprador 
ideology. This ideology insists that it is neither Western (capitalist) nor Eastern (socialist). 
The Islamic regime uses the Western concept "ideology" (ide'uluzht) to refer to this world 
view. In fact, numerous "political-ideological bureaus" (dqfater-e svydst-tde'uluzht) were set 
up to Islamize the armed forces (the army, the gendarmerie and the police) and the civil 
bureaucracies. Government employees have to take Islamic ideology courses and pass an 
examination in Islamic ideology. What does this ideology entail? 
Philosophically, God (Allah) is the creator, source and measure of all phenomena. 
Human beings are created to worship God, to conform to His order, and to leave this world 
to continue life in the next world. Muslims live in a situation between "the highest of the 
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high people of heaven" and "the lowest of low people of hell." They will follow the wrong 
path to hell if they are led by forces of false deity (taghOt); they will be salvaged only if they 
submit to God (Rajaee 1983:45-49). 
Following the right path or being a good Muslim is not based on personal or 
individual understanding. The right path can be followed only through an Islamic political 
organization such as the rule of the prophet and the Imams who succeeded him. All other 
political orders ruled by "false deity" (e.g. the Shah's regime) must, therefore, be replaced 
by an Islamic state which believes in "the one God (there is no god but Allah), the restriction 
of sovereignty and legislation to Him, and the necessity of submission to His command" (the 
constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Article 2). Thus, religion and politics are 
inseparable: salvation is possible only under an Islamic political system. 
Adherence to Islam as a religion does not make a state "Islamic" (for ins&nee, Islam 
was the official religion of the Shah's regime and is the official religion of Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan). Sovereignty belongs to God not to human beings. To secure the sovereignty of 
God on earth, divine law (Sharfa) should be implemented through the prophet, the Imams 
or, in their absence, faqths (theologians-jurisprudent) who act as guardians (valis) and 
supervisors of the implementation of divine law (Shari'a) (Rajaee 1982:51-72). This political 
system is known as Velayat-e Faqth (Guardianship of the theologian-jurisprudent). The 
political society of Islam is not based on territory, ethnicity, language or nationality. It is 
based rather on Islamic ideology and its objective is to maintain and promote Islam (Ibid., 
70-71). 
Legally, this ideology denies human beings the right to legislate laws. "Human-made 
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laws" (qOnuh-e bashart) are shaped by self-interest and promote a material, worldly, immoral 
life. Divine laws alone can enhance heavenly life. Obeying laws and rules (even those 
relating to traffic) is a religious obligation while their violation is sinful (Ibid., pp. 54-55). 
Moral/ethical views are, thus, intertwined with legal and political perspectives. There 
are two paths-right and wrong, Islamic and non-Islamic, divine and Satanic, etc. People 
will commit errors and tread on the wrong path if they do not live under Islamic rule and if 
they fail to obey Islamic law. Politics for the individual means conformity to Islamic laws 
and for the state it means the implementation of those laws (Ibid., p. 53). 
All non-divine, "human" (bashart), governments are dictatorial because they are the 
result of humans ruling humans. Even when the worldly states are not tyrannical, they are 
concerned with establishing order and prosperity; they are not interested in the spiritual needs 
of men and women and the private lives of their subjects. The Islamic state is the only one 
that aims at "the rectification (tahztb) of people's souls." An Islamic state "is concerned 
with an individual's personal affairs as well as those of his family...relations with 
neighbours, fellow citizens, fellow religionists, and non-believers" (Khomeini quoted in 
Ibid., p. 59). 
This ideology would inevitably seek the Islamization of every aspect of society-the 
economy (Islamic economy), social relations (e.g. regulating male/female relations, 
clergy/laity relations), culture (Islamic dressing, banning dance and certain forms of music), 
and education. Islamic education is one of the main instruments for not only the rectification 
of Muslims but also for the building of the Islamic state which has ceased to exist since the 
ninth century. The "human" or worldly states have corrupted the Muslims since the 
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occupation of the Twelfth Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, Lord of the Age in 874. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran is the only divine regime since the disappearance of the Imam, and 
it functions as the guardian of Islam until he reappears at the End of Time. 
The class nature of this ideology has been a subject of debate.74 While some 
Western and Iranian academics rate this "fundamentalist" ideology as militant, radical and 
revolutionary (e.g., Arjomand 1989), leftist groups whether Islamic (e.g., Mujahedfn) or 
Marxist-Leninist (e.g., the Union of Iranian Communists) refer to its extremely conservative, 
"reactionary," and bureaucrat bourgeois/feudal nature. The bourgeois/feudal nature of this 
ideology manifests itself in, among other things, economic policy-opposition to a radical 
land reform and the maintenance of the current predominance of the state sector of economy 
(Everest 1989:52-54). 
Liberal Islam. The maktabt variety of Islamic ideology is different from Liberal 
Islamic ideology in many respects. Liberal Islam views religious practice and human/God 
relations as more personal; it does not tie rectification or the ability to follow the right path 
to Islamic political rule and, thus, rejects Velayot-e Faqth as the appropriate form of the 
Islamic state. In fact, Islamic liberal ideology is closer to Western liberalism than 
Khomeini's Islam. It calls for a Western-type bourgeois democratic form of parliamentary 
rule. Some Liberal Islamic ideologists believe in the separation of politics and religion. 
Their economic policy favours restrictions on the state sector and advocates freedom of the 
74
 Writing from a Durkheimian sociology of religion perspective, Tibi (1988:78) contends 
that the "Arab Islamic Culture" is a preindustrial Culture because it does not rely on science 
and technology (or mastery of nature) and, consequently, combines religion and politics and 
lacks a rationalist view. 
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private sector in all business activities including foreign trade. 
Based on the above synopsis, it is clear that the two ideologies advocate two different 
educational and socio-economic systems. The maktabt worldview is not consistant with the 
existing relations of production while the Liberal view is in line with an urban middle-class 
or bourgeoisie that has evolved in Iran since the latter part of the 19th century. The clash of 
the two ideologies has shaped the process of Islamization in the universities and elsewhere. 
Political Foundations 
The political restructuring of Iranian society in the post-Revolutionary period was a 
highly complex process of conflicts and alignments in which the Islamic ideology played an 
important role. As indicated above, maktabt Islam, formulated by Khomeini, possessed a 
developed theory of political organization of society. While Khomeini, now head of the 
state, was the architect of this political philosophy" known as velayat-e faqth (rule of the 
theologian-jurisprudent), he did not chose the historical, economic, social and international 
context within which his ideology became the ruling ideology in Iran. Thus, the state 
structure built by him was shaped by both his ideological tenets and concrete conditions 
prevailing in the country. 
The State Structure. It is important to note that Khomeini's Islamic state was a 
restructuring of the archaic and extensive state machinery of Pahlavi monarchy. The old 
state had been "modernized" by the 1906 Constitution, based on European and Islamic 
" According to opposition to Islamic leaders this theory of the state was invented by 
Khomeini and contradicts Islamic teachings (see, e.g., Iran Liberation Movement 1987). 
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principles, as a constitutional monarchy. In practice, however, it was an absolutist monarchy 
similar to its predecessors. 
The 1979 Constitution defines the Iranian state system as an "Islamic Republic" based 
on belief in 1) one and only on God and submission to His order, 2) divine inspiration and 
its constructive role in law-making, 3) Resurrection and its role in leading mankind toward 
God, 4) God's justice, 5) religious leadership and its fundamental role in the permeance of 
Islam's Revolution, and 6) compassion and high value of human beings, and freedom coupled 
with a sense of responsibility before God (Principle 2)." 
In spite of abundant theocratic pronouncements, the constitution incorporates elements 
of the modem form of govemment-a president, a cabinet, a prime minister, a unicameral 
legislature and a judicial branch. What makes the state clearly theocratic is the vesting of 
supreme power in valt-ye faqth, the ruling theologian-jurisprudent or the leader, who must be 
the top theologian-jurisprudent of the country (Chapter 8 of the Constitution; Khomeini 
occupied this post until his death in 1989). The valt-ye faqth or the leader, considered to be 
the representative of the Twelfth Imam, has final authority in all judicial, legislative and 
executive affairs. The leader commands the armed forces, chooses the highest judicial 
authorities, approves presidential candidates, appoints six clerical members of the 12-member 
Council of Guardians which can veto all the parliament's legislation, declares war and peace 
and appoints and dismisses the chief of staff (Principle 110). In a word, the leader has all 
the powers of the absolute monarch and much more. 
* Quotations are based on the "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran," The Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 34, Spring 1980, No. 2, pp. 185-204. 
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Executive power is, according to the 1979 Constitution, shared by the president, a 
figure-head who is elected for four years and the prime minister who is appointed by the 
president. The prime minister forms the cabinet with the consent of the parliament. All 
these appointments need the prior approval of the valt-ye faqth.7' 
Legislative power, too, is under the tight control of the leader. Members of the 
parliament are elected by secret and popular vote. However, legislation will be ratified only 
when the 12-member Council of Guardians approves their constitutionality and conformity to 
Islam. The judiciary system consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Council 
and the lower courts. The highest judicial authorities are appointed by the leader (Principle 
110). 
While the Islamic constitution incorporates some of the administrative and legislative 
procedures of the Western-type modem states" including the separation of executive, 
judiciary and legislative powers, the unlimited powers vested in the valt-ye faqth overrules 
the power of all the three branches. This is evident in both the spirit and words of the 
document. In fact, during the constitutional debates in the "Assembly of Experts" which 
drafted the document when one of the assembly members protested the vesting of supreme 
power in the leader or faqth, he was reminded by a pro-theocracy member that valt-ye faqth 
" The 1979 Constitution was revised in July 1989. It abolished the prime minister's post 
and the president assumed all the powers previously held by this post. Also, judicial 
authority, previously wielded by a five-member Supreme Council, was concentrated in a 
single individual (see Bakhash 1990:284-86, on the constitutional reform). 
" According to Abrahamian (1991:115), the constitution "is highly non-fundamentalist. 
Its central structure was taken straight from the French fifth Republic, founded on 
Montesquieu's separation of powers." 
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constituted the executive power, the legislative power and the judicial power (quoted in 
Bakhash 1990:85). 
Faced with insurmountable economic, social and political crises including inter-
factional conflict within the government, Khomeini laid bare in January 1988 the "divine" 
and unlimited powers of the ruling faqth. He raised velOyat-e faqth to velayat-e mutlaqqe-ye 
faqth, i.e the "absolute rule of the faqth." 
According to Khomeini, the Islamic state derives its authority from the "absolute rule 
of the prophet" velayat-e mutlaqqe-ye rasal al-Alldh) entrusted to him by God. The Islamic 
state, like the prophet's state, exercises power by divine sanction. An Islamic government 
"can revoke any lawful agreement it concluded with people...prevent any matter, whether 
religious or secular" (quoted in Bakhash 1990:251; Iran Liberation Movement 1987:23). 
The government can void contracts and commercial transactions deemed permissible and 
binding under cannon law, can even suspend the exercise of the five pillars of the faith such 
as fasting, prayer and the pilgrimage to Mecca (Ibid.) 
In terms of the nature of the state and the system of state rule over the citizens, the 
Islamic and monarchical states are strikingly similar-all power is vested in the state and its 
absolute leader. While the monarchical state and pro-monarchical clergymen claimed that the 
Shah was the "Shadow of God" (shah sdye-ye khudd ast), the architect of the "Absolute 
velayat-e faqth" claims that the ruling faqth is God himself (for analysis and documentation 
of this claim see Paya 1988; on the anti-Islamic nature of this claim see Liberation 
Movement of Iran 1987:140-46). 
The Class Nature of the State. The Islamic leaders who assumed power in February 
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1979, did not share a homogeneous ideological and political line; moreover, the relation of 
the leaders or factions to the structure of the production system was quite varied ranging 
from Khomeini who did not own any wealth to well-to-do merchants and professionals. 
The class nature of a state cannot be determined by calculating the material 
possessions of the leaders or high-ranking bureaucrats. Discussing "the relationship between 
the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent," Marx wrote 
that one must not imagine that the ideologist of the shopkeepers 
are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to 
their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven from 
earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in 
their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in 
life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and 
solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. 
This is in general, the relationship between the political and literary representatives of 
a class and the class they represent (Marx 1969:424, emphasis in the original). 
Thus, the intellectuals of the ruling class, their ideologist or political leaders are not 
necessarily themselves members of that class, in the sense of being bom into it, or enjoying 
all its privileges. For instance, many leading intellectuals of the feudal aristocracy came 
from the peasantry while many leading intellectuals of the capitalist class were drawn from 
the petty bourgeoisie or even the working class (Comforth 1954:126). From this 
perspective, the class nature of the state is best identified in public policies of the state—what 
social class interests does the state protect and promote? 
Based on this perspective of class analysis, it is possible to claim that the Islamic state 
has represented the interests of the various factions of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. If 
we single out three major issues in the post-revolutionary class struggle-land reform, labor 
law, and the nationalization of foreign trade (Moaddel 1991:319), it is possible to show that 
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liberal Provisional Government (1979) aimed at maintaining the pre-revolutionary class 
structure and the distribution of social resources in which "international capital" and the 
Iranian bourgeoisie dependent on it had the upper hand (Ibid., p. 318). After the fall of the 
Provisional Government, the liberals remained in power but were weakened. For a while the 
merchants and landlords came under attacks and some factions advocated a radical land 
reform, formulation of progressive labor laws and nationalization of foreign trade. This was 
followed by a "reversal phase" in which "they began to abandon one by one of their 
promises of social justice and economic equality" (Ibid., pp. 319-20). One may argue that 
the Revolution brought to power three strata of the capitalist class-the petite bourgeoisie, the 
liberal bourgeoisie and bureaucrat capital. The petite bourgeoisie soon lost its positions of 
power. 
The Islamic state not only inherited from the monarchy the large state sector of the 
economy but consciously expanded it. According to the constitution, this sector "consists of 
all major industries, foreign trade, major mines, banking, insurance, power production, dams 
and major water-carrying networks, radio and television, postal, telegraph and telephone 
systems, air, sea, land and railroad transportation and others similar to the above, which in 
the form of public ownership are at the disposal of the government" (Principle 44). This 
sector includes the entire oil industry and was further expanded by the nationalization of 
foreign trade and expropriation of many private enterprises. The Islamic leaders ranging 
from the liberal President Bani-Sadr and Prime Minister Bazargan to Khomeini sought to 
Islamize this economy. One major item on their agenda was the removal of interest from the 
banking system and the control of profit-making. These pre-capitalist ideological preferences 
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caused tension between state ideology and its capitalist economic sector. In spite of these 
contradiction, according to a survey of class struggle in post-revolutionary Iran (Moaddel 
1991), virtually all conflicts on major economic issues were resolved in the interests of the 
dominant classes, the capitalists and landowners. 
The conflict within the capitalist class—between bureaucrat capital and private capital-
continue on all levels, ideological, political, and economic. By early 1991, the liberals were 
on the ascendency. The influential director of the Central Bank announced that President 
Rafsanjani's economic team was openly committed to "privatization , liberalization and 
rationalization" (Miller 1991: A6). Reports by the London-based Economist Intelligence 
Unit (1991) also confirm the drive toward privatization, liberalization and increasing ties to 
Western capital. The economic and political conflict between the two factions of the 
capitalist class is clearly interconnected with their educational policies in higher education." 
4.3.2 The Role of the Islamic State 
Theoretical Issues. Recent critical theory assigns politics a very prominent role in 
" Although liberal and maktabt factions can clearly be distinguished in the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution, it must be noted that the factional conflict within the top leadership of 
the Islamic Republic is extremely complex. Paya (1978) provides an adequate account of the 
transformation of velayat-e faqth into velayat-e mutlaqqe-ye faqth, i.e. the "absolute rule of 
the theologian-jurisprudent." Pakdaman (1989) provides an excellent synopsis of the theory 
and practice of Khomeini's state. The post-Khomeini developments in the theory and 
practice of the Islamic state is summed up in Pakdaman (1990) who documents how the 
qualifications for the selection of the leader/faqth as determined by Khomeini were modified 
to fit the selection of Khamene'i, a person who did not meet any criteria of the valr-ye faqth. 
The liberal Islamic organization, Liberation Movement of Iran (Nehzat-e AzadT Iran) led by 
former Prime Minister Barzargan, strongly rejected velayat-e mutlaqqe-ye faqth as "nothing 
other than religious or state autocratism and despotism" (Iran Liberation Movement 
1988:150). 
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shaping social change in contemporary societies. It is argued that, in both developed 
industrial countries and in the Third World, the public sector or the state has grown 
increasingly important in all domains -politics, economics, ideology, and law enforcement 
(Camoy 1984:3-9). 
The state also plays a fundamental role in shaping the nature and transformation of 
the educational process. Since the 1970's, critical theory has been applied to explain 
state/education relations in advanced capitalist societies. The foci of these studies are on 
education and the capitalist industrial economy's impact on education's role in reproducing 
capitalist economic relations and class structures. In recent years, the state/education 
relationship in Third World countries with different economic and political systems has 
received some research attention. For example, examining educational reform in five post-
revolutionary countries (China, Cuba, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Nicaragua) which have 
embarked on the transition from capitalism to secularism, Camoy and Samoff (1990:3-4) 
argue that 
...the state, much more than the production system...is the 
source of the dynamic of revolutionary societies, and politics, 
much more than relations in production, ...drives their social 
development. The importance of the state and politics is not 
limited to the analysis of societies undergoing social 
transformation. We also make a case for increasing focus on 
the state and its relation to the economy in understanding how 
social structures in Third World capitalist societies remain 
relatively unchanged. But it is in the "transition" to new 
structures that the state and politics become dominant in 
understanding the nature of change. 
These case studies show that each of the five countries studied was "able to transform 
its society's fundamental economic and political relationship [emphasis on the development of 
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labor not capital]. With that relationship has come rapid educational expansion" reaching 
into rural areas and the poorest regions, the elimination of illiteracy, the raising of the 
average level of schooling, increased investment in education, an emphasis on primary and 
adult education and, in general, educational expansion aimed at the rural and urban poor 
population (Ibid., p. 365). In spite of shortfalls, the educational achievements of these 
transition states are rated as "impressive" (Ibid., p. 366). 
The success of educational reform in these transition societies was due to political 
mobilization and the diffusion of political power which allowed mass organizations an active 
role especially in the early revolutionary years. Continued change depends on mobilization 
and the state's ability to diffuse political power. Here, "the state, not education per se, is the 
key issue." How education develops during the transition-or even what education is-cannot 
be separated from the nature of the transition state (Ibid., pp. 380-81). 
It must be noted that placing the dynamics of social (including educational) change 
within the state (Ibid., p. 75) during the transition from capitalism to socialism is a major but 
rarely known tenet of historical materialism." Marxism argues that capitalist economy 
develops spontaneously and gradually out of pre-capitalist (e.g. feudal) economy; socialist 
economy does not, however, emerge out of capitalist economy; it must be built consciously 
by the institutions within the superstructure-primarily the state—which plans the process of 
transformation and uses all superstructural phenomena such as education, mass media, 
ideology and art to build the new economic base. According to Stalin, quoting Lenin, fTJhe 
" Camoy and Samoff (1990:15-16) are among the few social scientists who recognize and 
apply this proposition. 
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main task of the bourgeois revolution consists in seizing power and making it conform to the 
already existing bourgeois economy, whereas the main task of the proletarian revolution 
consists in seizing power in order to build up a new socialist economy (quoted in Cornforth 
1954:168). 
This feature of socialist revolution explains, in part, why policy is so important in 
socialist society and why major ideological and political struggles are centered on concrete 
issues of socialist construction. In this connection, Lenin argued (in late 1920) that [Pjolitics 
must take precedence over economics. To argue otherwise is to forget the ABC of Marxism 
(quoted in Natha 1977:14). 
From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, whether socialism is being built or capitalism 
restored depends on the ideological and political line adopted by the state. In other words, 
the key question is which class holds state power? Summing up the restoration of capitalism 
in the Soviet Union, Mao emphasized throughout the Cultural Revolution period that, "the 
correctness or incorrectness of the ideological line decides everything" (Ibid., p. 12). 
The fact that socialist construction is a conscious planned activity makes it all the 
more difficult to accomplish. If it is true, as Camoy and Samoff contend, that the state or 
politics drives social development much more than relations in production, it is also true that 
the state must replace the capitalist economy with a socialist economy that does not exist and 
must be created. Thus, the capitalist or pre-capitalist economy (the base) has a powerful 
(sometimes determining) impact on the state's ability to create an alternative to capitalism. 
The restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe provides enough 
evidence for this. Theoretically, the issue has been debated in terms of the dialectics of the 
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relationship between the superstructure and the base, subjective and objective factors, and 
consciousness and spontaneity. Philosophically, the issue relates to the dialectics of 
consciousness and matter. Within these contradictions, Marxism assigns the base, objective 
factors, and matter an ultimately determining role while it also emphasizes the determining 
role of the superstructure, the subjective factor, and consciousness in the process of 
(socialist) revolutions and socialist economic construction. Critics of Marxism, including 
some neo-Marxists, have failed to deal with the dialectic which assigns either side of the 
contradiction a determining role depending on the evolving relationship between the two. 
Neo-Marxist theories of the state have, thus, attacked the most powerful theoretical 
claim of Marxist theory-i.e. the dialectical relationship between the base and the 
superstructure, or between the economic structure and education. Failing to acknowledge this 
dialectical relationship, neo-Marxists assign the state (and other components of the 
superstructure, such as ideology) an independent role and, by so doing, neo-Marxist theory is 
reduced to a more sophisticated form of the liberal-pluralist theory of the state which views 
the state as an autonomous political institution over and above the system of production and 
the class structure." 
The Iranian Case. The Iranian revolution is different from Third World revolutions 
which took the socialist road. The Islamic state claims to be building a society and economy 
that is new and radically different from both capitalism and socialism. This is reflected in 
" The Neo-Marxist position is to some extent a reaction against "structuralist", 
"overdeterministic", and "economic determinist* approaches. Thus, instead of taking a 
dialectical approach to the relationship between agency and structure or the superstructure 
and the base, "Neo-Marxists tend to overemphasize the determining role of the "agency" and 
the superstructure. 
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the "Neither East nor West, the Islamic Republic" slogan. It is claimed that capitalist and 
socialist economy, society, culture, politics, ideology and morality are worldly, "human-
made," and corrupt. The promised Islamic society will be divine and free of all the 
problems of socialism and capitalism. 
Islamization embraces the policy of building both the Islamic individual and Islamic 
society. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was the most extensive and carefully planned 
Islamization effort. Explaining the nature of this failure is both a challenge to theory and an 
impetus for the refinement of our theoretical insight into state-education relations. 
The failure of the Islamic Cultural Revolution is more striking if we consider the 
power and resources at the disposal of the Islamic state: 
1. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was launched and carried out by a state 
which came to power in the wake of one of the most popular revolutions in 
the world. 
2. The Islamic Cultural Revolution was launched and led by a state whose 
leader, Khomeini, was still the most popular leader in Iran in 1980. 
Khomeini himself authorized the ICR and played a direct role in the 
process. 
3. Education, and especially higher education, is an activity which is not new 
to Islam. In fact, the Islamic state boasts the earliest and most extensive 
tradition in higher learning worldwide. In Iran, as in other Islamic 
countries, education was the monopoly of religious establishments until the 
1850's when modem Western-type institutions were established by the 
state. Thus, tradition and experience is expected to ensure more 
successful prospects in educational reform. 
4. The Islamic state has monopolistic control of all educational institutions in 
Iran. Thus, the absence of any challenge from nongovernment sources 
may be expected to allow the state a free hand in educational reform. 
5. The Islamic state, as an "etatist" political system, enjoys a high degree of 
centralization of political, economic and cultural power. It owns the most 
important elements of the economy-the oil, the banks, foreign trade, 
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customs, mines, air and rail transportation, fisheries, tobacco, major 
industries, etc. Therefore, policy and planning on all levels-national, 
provincial and local-are within the prerogative of the central government. 
This monopolistic control should facilitate and contribute to the success of 
educational planning. 
6. Opposition outside the state-leftist and nationalist parties, groups and 
individuals-had been effectively silenced after the mass suppression of 
June 1981. The radio and television broadcasts were under government 
monopoly and the print media had been suppressed in the summer of 1979 
and were under direct state control by April 1980. 
7. The state used all available means, the combined forces of persuasion and 
coercion (including killing, arrests, incarceration, purges) throughout the 
Cultural Revolution. 
In explaining the failure of the Islamic Cultural Revolution, in spite of the fact that it 
was initiated by a virtually omnipotent and apparently popular Islamic regime, we must 
examine the Islamic state and the place of the universities within the social, economic and 
historical context in which the Islamic Cultural Revolution took place. It will be argued that, 
no matter how omnipotent, the state far from being independent, is bound by many ties 
including the economic structure of society. 
The Secular Nature of Modern Higher Education. Modem higher education in 
Iran was created by the Monarchical state in the latter part of the 19th century and was based 
on the European system (in the 1960's, this system was Americanized by the last Pahlavi 
monarch). The university system was instituted in order to train technocrats and bureaucrats 
for the task of "modernizing" the economy and the government. Programs of study, course 
content and teaching methods are designed to train highly skilled workforce to administer the 
civil/military bureaucracy and a diversifying economy. The traditional institutions of higher 
learning, however, were designed to train the clergy to offer religious services. Their 
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objectives, programs of study, course content and teaching methods are different from those 
of modem secular universities. 
The modem secular university cannot, therefore, be desecularized unless it is 
restructured to serve the needs of religion. In fact, universities in pre-modem Europe, 
similarly, were dominated by the church. They became secular institutions with the rise of 
the "modem" capitalist economy. Secularization is not the outcome of evil plots by 
individuals and groups. It is, rather, the outcome of centuries of change, including class 
struggle, in religion, politics, culture and education. Secular thinking and the secular way of 
life has always existed. It is with the rise of the capitalist society, however, that the 
separation of religion from the state and the educational system occurs. While the rise of 
secular educational institutions in the West did not put an end to religious education (in the 
U.S. some two million students of Catholic schools are not allowed to learn the theory of 
evolution), it is clear that in developed capitalist societies even religious colleges have had to 
adapt to the requirements of modem society and have incorporated modem social sciences 
and the exact sciences into their curriculum. 
Secularism and the Economy. Historically, secularism, the modem university and 
the separation of religion and politics, are all associated with the rise of (industrial) capitalist 
economy. A similar process has been taking place in the Third World, including Islamic 
societies, since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Secularism in the Islamic World is 
not an imitation of Western secularism. Reducing "secularism" to an idea without a social 
base, many social scientists studying Islamic societies fail to understand the conflict between 
religion and secularism as a genuine process of social change rooted in the contradictions of 
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the Islamic societies and only marginally related to the impact of Western ideas. Ideas can 
shape social change only if they find a social base in society. Thus, "liberal Islamic" 
ideology, far from being an offshoot of Western society, is, to a large extent, the worldview 
of a section of the Iranian middle classes or national bourgeoisie. 
That there has emerged a social base for secularism in most Islamic societies has, 
thus, often been ignored." The rising middle class is a powerful social base for modem 
secularism. Iranian society has undergone important changes during this century. Many new 
professions have emerged. Urban Iran, now comprising some 50% of the population, has 
produced the giant 8-million strong city of Tehran, and several cities with populations in 
excess of a million. The urban economy cannot function without a differentiated and highly 
skilled labor force, both male and female. Education and especially higher education is 
increasingly tied to these developments. The Iranian economy needs doctors, nurses, 
engineers, lawyers, economists, accountants, statisticians, managers, etc. The large state 
° Isolating "the state" and "secularism" from its historical and socio-economic context, a 
Weberian observer claims that the Islamic Revolution has demonstrated that secularism is not 
a universal process of social change (Arjmond 1988:91). Interestingly, this Iranian observer 
of the Islamic Republic has provided an adequate documentation (Ibid., 163-173; see below) 
of the Khomeini regime's colossal repressive machinery used to desecularize Iran's secular 
society : "By the end of 1984, the development of this intelligence system, more far-
reaching and far more prying than the Shah's, had completed the transition from temporal to 
theocratic absolutism. The Turban had replaced the Crown" (p. 173). Here, inability to 
comprehend the failure of desecularization is not due to problems of inadequate data, 
research methodologies, cultural misunderstanding and the like. We are, rather, witnessing a 
major theoretical problem-a researcher who depicts significant facts but fails to comprehend, 
theoretically, that: a) Islamization or desecularization is the policy of only a minor faction of 
the clergy; b) the majority of Iranians have been and are secular and have been revolting 
against the Islamic State, and; c) the Islamic State has organized the most repressive state 
machinery in Iranian history in order to desecularize Iranian society and has still failed to 
achieve this objective. 
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bureaucracy, also, needs highly trained bureaucrats and technocrats. A desecularized, 
Islamic, higher education system cannot respond to the requirements of the economy. 
Other Islamizations. The Islamic state has conducted Islamization campaigns in all 
areas of social, economic and cultural life. However, looking beyond the sloganeering, the 
pictures of Khomeini, women's veiling, and gender segregation, we see indications of failure 
everywhere. A non-capitalist, Islamic economy has not emerged anywhere. The present 
economy is, in fact, a build-up of the system under the Pahlavi monarchy-the entrenchment 
and expansion of the state or public sector, the continuation of five-year national economic 
plans, increasing destruction of the agricultural sector, and continued migration to the cities 
from the countryside. Iranian economy is still a capitalist economy with a predominantly 
state capitalist sector, private sector and remnants of tribal and feudal relations in the 
countryside. 
The Islamization of culture has also largely failed. The ban on "non-revolutionary," 
non-Islamic music has had to be lifted. Non-Islamic music, painting, posters, literature, 
film, sculpture, etc. have survived and are flourishing. While dancing and an unveiled 
appearance are not allowed in public, they continue to thrive at weddings and all private 
occasions. Moreover, Western entertainment, primarily from the U.S., is widely circulated 
through the underground video and audio tape market. Secular middle-class youth are 
happily inundated with Western culture. The adult generation is thirsty for Salman Rushdie's 
Satanic Verses and is well read in George Orwell's Animal Farm. 
While Iranians, like other nations, are not immoral, moral standards have naturally 
changed during this century. Secular ways of life have permeated modem urban culture. 
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The Islamic Republic has clearly failed to Islamize moral values, attitudes and beliefs. In 
fact, according to confidential reports prepared by the Islamic Propagation Organization, 
corruption is rampant throughout the country. According to one report, drug addiction has 
increased significantly among urban youth (KhabarnOme-ye Farhangt-Ejtema% No. 51, 
second half Farrardin 1368/April 1989, p. 26), reprinted in Andlshe va PeykOr publication. 
The failure of Islamization is especially evident in the sharp decline in mosque 
attendance. According to a confidential report, in Gilan Province, 80% of the urban and 
90% of the rural mosques were "non-active and were mostly closed while the operational 
mosques had few congregations" (KhabarnOme-ye Farhangi-Ejtema't, No. 58, second half of 
Farvardin 1368, April 1989, p. 14, reprinted in Andeesheh va Peykar). These facts clarify 
what some observers of the Iranian revolution fail to see-that it was the revolution that 
activated Islam and brought it to power, not the other way around. 
While the Islamic state conducts extensive persuasion campaigns in the media, and in 
schools, using Friday prayers, slogans, posters, etc., a more visible instrument of the 
enforcement of Islamic morality is overt coercion. According to Arjomand (1989:170-73), 
Revolutionary Courts, in charge of the enforcement of morals, mete out summary justice to 
offenders who are arrested by kumttes (local committees, which were formed in major cities 
during the last months of the Revolution. Many of these kumttes were extensions of the 
neighbourhood committees formed around mosques during the revolutionary year of 1978 
and designed to mobilize people, organize strikes and demonstrations, and distribute scarce 
items like kerosene (Bakhash 1990:56). Revolutionary Guards and a number of vigilante 
groups also regularly patrol the cities. These vigilante groups include the Sisters of Zaynab 
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(khdharOn-e zaynab), who are women in special cars who arrest improperly veiled women, 
vigilante patrols for combatting the Forbidden (gasht-ha-ye mubOreze ba-munkarOt), Patrol 
Group Helpers of God (Ansdr-e Allah), and intelligence patrol groups. The Vengeance of 
God (Sar Allah), the Oari'a (calamity/the Hour of Last Judgement) operate in the cities, and 
the Army of God (Jund Allah) operates in the countryside. By the end of 1984, this 
repressive machinery, "more far reaching and far more prying than the Shah's," had 
established an effective and continuous reign of terror (Ibid., p. 173). 
Both the use of coercion by the Islamic state as the main instrument of Islamization 
and the resistance to this policy call into question the claims of Muslim ideologues and 
Western social scientists who view Islam as the engine of revolution in Iran. 
If these claims-that Iranians are devoted Muslims and Islam was the source, 
inspiration and dynamism of the revolution-are valid, one may ask why an already Islamic 
society must be Islamized at all. Why does the state use the most extensive machinery of 
repression Iranians have ever experienced? Why does this repression fail to stem opposition? 
What are the potentials and limitations of the state? 
4.4.0 The Autonomy of the State 
The Islamic state has aspired to build a society (and educational system) that is neither 
Eastern (socialist) nor Western (capitalist). The state is the architect of Islamization. This 
section examines the contribution of Marxist theory to the explanation of the Iranian case 
and, at the same time, examines the relevance of the Iranian case to theoretical debates on 
the autonomy of the state. 
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Explaining the Iranian experience has been a challenge to the social sciences. Except 
for (Iranian) Marxist-Leninist groups, no social theorist predicted the downfall of the Shah in 
a mass-based revolution. The Marxist-Leninists, in turn, failed to predict the coming to 
power of a theocratic leadership. In explaining the causes of the revolution, a plethora of 
theoretical positions have been developed (see Foran 1989 for a summary). While the causes 
and nature of the revolution are inseparable from its outcome, this section deals only with the 
outcome of the revolution, i.e. the Islamic state's Islamization effort and its failure. 
When the Islamic Cultural Revolution was launched in April 1980, the Islamic state 
consisted of two distinct ideological and political factions-the maktabts and the liberals. A 
year later, the liberal faction, represented by President Bani-Sadr, suffered a serious defeat 
during an intensive political and ideological struggle within the state. This conflict had been 
in the making since the coming to power of the Islamic state. Thus, during the second year 
of the Islamic Cultural Revolution (1982), the state was more homogeneous ideologically and 
politically-the maktabts were dominant. This factional struggle for power which led to the 
domination of one ideological-political trend and one social class (the state bourgeoisie) is 
consistent with the claims of Marxist theory which finds in the state the dominance of one 
social class. The maktabt faction excludes the liberal bourgeoisie (private enterprise) from 
the political power structure while, in civil society, it expands the state sector at the expense 
of the private sector. 
Contradictions within the ruling class did not, however, subside with the ousting of 
the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, Bani-Sadr and his followers, from the state. 
Even without a top political executive in the state, private capital remains powerful. The 
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private sector of the economy is not limited to the ha%ar or the wealthy merchants. It also 
includes the smallest but most numerous and, thus, potentially more powerful owners of 
capital-the petit-bourgeois, i.e. small shop-keepers, farmers, sections of the peasantry, 
professionals (including professors, government employees), etc. This apparent exclusion 
from the state of the representatives of liberal bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeois actually 
intensified the struggle within the state. As the findings of this study indicate, the Islamic 
Cultural Revolution was the manifestation of an intensive struggle between the maktabts 
dominating the state (represented by, e.g. University Crusade; see 2.4.5.2) and the liberal 
bourgeoisie, which was able to exercise power in the educational institutions and the Ministry 
of Higher Education. While the maktabts fought to intensify the Islamization of the 
universities (male-female segregation and the union of Howze and the university) the liberals 
strove to limit its scope (to focus on expertise rather than commitment). Ten years after the 
Islamic Cultural Revolution was launched, the liberals have the upper hand in institutions of 
higher education and the maktabts arc lamenting the victory of the liberals (see the sections 
on Islamization, 2.4.6 to 2.4.6.3). By 1991, the University Crusade representing the 
maktabts was isolated and ineffective. 
The ascendancy of the liberals in the state and the Islamic Cultural Revolution 
reflects, in part, the failure of the maktabts to succeed with respect to the economy, the Iraq-
Iran war (Khomeini said he had to drink the bowel of poison, i.e. accept the cease-fire, in 
order to save the Islamic state), foreign affairs, etc. This led to the adoption of "moderate" 
positions by some factions of the ruling power (e.g. Rafsanjani group). The bitter factional 
conflict between the liberals and the maktabts in which the Islamic Republic Party played a 
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major role led to the dissolution of the Islamic Republic Party (June 1, 1987) on the orders 
of Khomeini who regularly called for unity (vahdat-e kalame). No doubt, the dissolution of 
the Islamic Republic Party has not eliminated the power block which was dominant within 
this party. The power struggle within the state is certainly very complex. Individual 
executives of the state at the highest level change their positions and alignments under a 
situation marked by the almost complete collapse of the economy and popular dissent 
throughout the country. In spite of these complexities, the power struggle conducted during 
the Islamic Cultural Revolution is clearly traceable to the conflict between maktabts and 
liberals. 
The conflict over policy during the Islamic Cultural Revolution cannot, therefore, be 
reduced simply to educational issues. These conflicts are, in essence, political 
confrontations. Thus, while the struggle over expertise and commitment, for example, is an 
educational one, it is, at the same time, a conflict between two political and ideological lines 
over economic policy. The liberals want a viable, private enterprise, capitalist economy 
which requires highly skilled human resources operating as efficiently as possible. For them, 
a commitment to Islam is either irrelevant or an obstacle to the development of expertise in 
the modem sciences and technology. Maktabts, however, who control most of the large 
industries and economic enterprises, are concerned about holding their grip on the economy 
by all means possible. Expanding the state sector and consolidating their power is the 
essence of their policy of building an Islamic economy-'Neither Eastern nor Western". For 
them, commitment is more important than expertise because, without total ideological and 
political devotion to theocracy, an Islamic economy cannot be built. In this context, 
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educational policy is at the same time economic, political and ideological. That the state's 
educational policy cannot be reduced to its purely educational dimension, the fact that 
educational policy is also economic policy and political strategy, is a challenge to educational 
theory. Liberal-pluralist and neo-Marxist theories build up a China wall between politics and 
economics, between the state and production relations. These theories therefore assign the 
state a high degree of independence from production relations (see, e.g., Dale 1989). Neo-
Marxist theory also views the superstructure (the state, ideology, education, media, etc.) as 
independent from the relations of production, i.e. the economic base. These atomistic, 
reductionist views fail to provide an adequate explanation of the Islamic Cultural Revolution. 
Separating the superstructure from the base, Neo-Marxist theory fails to explain why, 
in spite of a change from a secular monarchy to a theocratic state, Islamization has failed, 
and higher education, economy, politics and culture bear striking similarity to that of the 
monarchical period. The policies of the Islamic state or their consequences are similar to 
those of the monarchy with respect to peasants and land reform (Haghayeghi 1990:49; 
Moaddel 1991:326), labor (Moaddel 1991:326-27), language and media policy (Hassanpour 
1989:122-24, 260-61), ethnic minorities (Higgins 1984:61-62), political repression, expansion 
of the state sector of the economy and bureaucracy, integration (assimilation) of non-Persian 
nationalities and tribes, and the national integration of villages (Arjomand 1989: 173-74). 
This continuity between pre- and post-revolutionary Iran, in spite of two apparently 
different state structures and ideologies, can be explained more adequately in terms of the 
limitations imposed on the state by the infrastructure, in other words, the limited autonomy 
of the state. This continuity is also related to the political similarities between Khomeinist 
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theocracy and Pahlavi monarchy. Politically, both states have been extremely despotic and 
gear the entire state structure to promote state capitalism. According to Principle 44 of the 
Islamic Constitution, the state sector includes "all major industries, foreign trade, major 
mines, banking, insurance, power production, dams and major water-carrying networks, 
radio and television, postal, telegraph and telephone system, air, sea, land and railroad 
transportation and others similar to above" (see footnote No. 76 above) To these 
monopolies must be added state ownership of two important domains of the economy-
fisheries and tobacco-all legacies of the Pahlavi monarchy. 
State capitalism is, thus, the major link between the Pahlavi monarchy and Islamic 
theocracy. The Pahlavi monarchy was the creator and Islamic theocracy is the inheritor, 
perpetrator and protector of state capitalism. Without the Islamic state, Iranian state 
capitalism ceases to exist if only because the Iranian bourgeoisie aspires to and is able to own 
and run all major economic activities that are now monopolized by the state. In this sense, 
the Islamic state is inseparably tied to the dominant relations of production. 
State capitalism has generally been associated with repression in the Third World and 
elsewhere. The exclusionist Islamic ideology reinforces the dictatorship of state capitalism 
by imposing Khomeini's variety of the Twelver Shi'ite sect on the predominantly secular 
people of Iran. Significantly, the Muslim leaders who assumed power in 1979 did not 
choose to dismantle the archaic monarchical state; they happily inherited the state structure 
and punished any one who demanded a radical change in the nature of political power or in 
the civil and military bureaucracy. 
While the findings of this study show that the Islamic university is not much different 
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from Western-type universities of the Pahlavi period, they indicate a considerable 
transformation of the educational system during the period of "dual power" on the campuses 
when the Islamic state was not able to exercise complete control over the institutions (1979-
April 1980). During this short period, leftist and nationalist forces who dominated the 
universities instituted significant changes in administration, curriculum, teaching and other 
functions of the university (see 2.2.0, 3.4.0 and 3.5.0). Progress in higher education was 
achieved also in 1946 in the radical autonomous republic of Azarbaijan when the authority of 
the Shah's regime was overthrown and replaced by that of a popular government (see 
2.1.3.3). The Islamic state, relying on coercion, rejected the radical reform presented and, 
to some extent, practised by leftist students and faculty. 
It is, thus, possible to claim on the strength of evidence from the Iranian case and 
other cases, that the institution of the state in itself cannot be considered the main engine of 
radical social change; the state can be the engine of social and educational change only if it 
adopts an ideology and politics of change not only in the educational system but also and at 
the same time in the economic and social structure of society" . Thus, the more or less 
" As the success of educational reform in China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique and 
Tanzania can be attributed to the nature of the state and its ideological and political line, the 
restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and China and the concomitant change in their 
educational systems can also be explained in terms of the adoption of a capitalist ideological 
and political line in the USSR (after the successful coup d'etat of Khrushchev in 1956) and in 
China (after the 1976 coup d'etat of the "capitalist roaders"). Far from negating the Marxist 
theory of the state, these experiences provide further confirmation. 
In China, where the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was launched to prevent 
the restoration of capitalism as it had occurred in the Soviet Union, capitalism was gradually 
restored by the "capitalist-roaders" in the Communist Party who were repudiated during the 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In 1976, however, they took control of the party and the 
state through a coup d'etat which led to a brutal suppression of the "socialist-roaders". 
Thus, while progress in socialist construction was achieved through the dominant "socialist 
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successful educational reform within China, Cuba, Tanzania, Mozambique and Nicaragua, all 
making the transition from capitalism (see 4.3.0 above), was due to the ideological and 
political line of the states which aimed at the "development of labor, in contrast to capitalist 
states' emphasis on capital" (Camoy and Samoff 1990:361). Obviously, in all these cases, 
educational change occurred along with radical economic, political and social transformation. 
In Iran, however, the Islamic state did not offer an alternative to the state capitalism which 
was inherited from the old regime. Thus, the "Islamic economy" of Iran remains a capitalist 
economy with a dominant state sector. In order to function, this economy needs the 
educational system which the previous regime had developed. 
In conclusion, I must address two related questions: (a) What was the contribution of 
theory to this study and (b) what is the contribution of this study to theory? 
This study has consciously avoided the liberal-pluralist perspective which the author 
finds inadequate and irrelevant in educational studies generally and in state-education 
line" in the Party during the 1949-76 period, capitalism was eventually restored through the 
"capitalist line" of the party and the state. In both cases (the socialist revolution and capitalist 
restoration), the change in the state and its political and ideological line was responsible for 
the radical transformation of Chinese society. 
The Chinese Communist Party failed to continue socialist construction upon the relics 
of semi-feudal and capitalist relations within China. This was a party that led one of the 
longest and most difficult revolutions in the modem world, and had learned from the initial 
successes and final failure of the Soviet experience (see Lotta 1978 for a summary of the 
Chinese experience; much of the research on China, including Camoy and Samoff 1990:105-
152, fails to examine the Chinese experience in the context of the class struggle between 
capitalist-roaders and socialist-roaders). 
A similar argument can be made for the Soviet Union. The experience of capitalist 
restoration provides further evidence for the Marxist thesis on the dialectics of the base and 
superstructure. While the socialist state was the architect of socialist construction, the 
(capitalist) base ultimately resisted the new superstructure and enabled the capitalist-roaders 
to take control of the party and the state. 
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research particularly. While liberal-pluralist approaches continue to proliferate (thanks to 
their powerful institutional, political and economic bases of support), critical or radical trends 
have established a body of theory and research methodologies that cannot be displaced or 
ignored. This study was inspired by the latter trend which, like the traditional trend, is a 
plethora of theoretical formulations and research methodologies. In spite of this diversity, it 
is quite clear that Marxism remains the most influential source of analytical concepts (as 
positivism remains a dominant perspective in the liberal tradition). 
Applying current critical theories to explain the Iranian case, the author found Neo-
Marxist positions on education-society relations inadequate. In formulating state-education 
relations, Neo-Marxism emphasizes on the autonomy of the state from production relations, 
social classes, ideology and culture (see, for example, Apple 1989; Dale 1989; Giroux 
1983). Thus, Apple (1989:11-12) in his endorsement of Dale's (1989) rejection of the 
"economic determinism of the political economy of education" and the "instrumentalist" 
theories of the state makes a number of claims that are hardly different from liberal-pluralist 
approaches: 
In the earlier 'instrumentalist' theories that Dale wishes to go beyond, the 
State's primary role is to act as an agent of capital. In these theories, because 
of its connections to the structure of class relations and the economy, the State 
is, by its very nature, necessarily simply a reproducer of the conditions 
necessary for continued class domination. This occurs not only because of the 
interest of those groups of people who hold positions within the State. It 
occurs largely due to the fact that, structurally, the State has no choice. The 
State is an 'arm of capital', one that is bound to do capital's bidding given the 
structuring of its resources, its interest and its place in the capitalist economy. 
For Dale, this is simply too limited; the State is seen as active, as having a 
multitude of 'functions' that are not reducible to economic 'necessities', and as 
being inherently contradictory. 
The State here is no longer seen as only an administrative and coercive 
apparatus. It is seen as well as 'educative and formative'. It exercises moral 
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and educative leadership and, in the process, attempts to justify the leadership 
of a new hegemonic bloc by gaining 'the active consent over those whom it 
rules', something that is very visible in the current conservative restoration. 
Much of Dale's work is situated directly within the State's attempt both to 
provide such 'leadership' and to gain such 'active consent'. 
The purpose of this lengthy quotation is to indicate how these claims are neither a 
valid nor relevant critique of classical Marxist theory or, even, the political economy of 
education. The "multiplicity of the functions of the State" or its "active", "educative" or 
"formative" roles have never been ignored in Marxist theory. The relevant question is, 
however, whether this activism, educative or formative roles are played to train rebels or to 
educate a loyal labor power and citizenry; to serve the upkeep and reproduction of the 
dominant social and economic relations or their replacement by an antagonistic system. If 
the State exercises "moral and educative leadership" the question remains to be, whose 
morality? 
When a "dialectical" approach is adopted by, e.g., Giroux (1983:72-111) it is done by 
shifting the focus from domination to resistance. This approach can hardly be dialectical 
since resistance is usually offered against domination. Indeed a theory of resistance that does 
not account for the domination side of the contradiction is as inadequate as a theory of 
domination which fails to predict resistance. Again, the relevant question is: resistance for 
what purpose? These questions (for whom, against whom, for what purpose) are relevant 
because the possibility of reform exist not only within bourgeois democracy and its 
educational system but even to a lesser extent in dictatorial political systems. The resistance 
of the student body and professorate aimed at changing the educational system within the 
established order is a well-known fact. In spite of a long history of the suppression of leftist 
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and radical educationalist, journalist, artist, and political parties in all Western 
democracies," the Western democratic state is able to tolerate isolated institutions and 
individuals who might resist the dominant system and offer an anti-establishment alternative. 
Failing to take the more difficult, dialectical approach, Neo-Marxism has adopted the 
weakest feature of non-Marxist social theory i.e. viewing society as an agglomeration of 
phenomena (the state, economy, ideology, education, family, etc), each with its own 
characteristics and loosely related to other phenamena. The State, for example, is a self-
contained, independent phenomenon existing in separation from the economy (production 
relations) and social classes. When relations are established, they are external relations, i.e. 
the various relationships between the state and the economy, social structure, ideologies, 
educational system are accidental or temporary and do not affect the nature of these 
interrelated phenomena. 
Independently of the mind of the researcher, however, all social phenomena are 
interrelated. The state, for example, is not independent of relations of production. They are 
both interconnected, dependent on and determined by each other and these interdependencies 
are characterized by a web of contradictions and struggles of opposite tendencies. 
Thus, in the absence of a holistic theory of society (such as the Marxist theory), Neo-
" In U.S. where freedoms of the press, opinion and assembly have enjoyed the longest 
constitutional guarantees, the state has engaged in constant violation of these freedoms. See, 
among an extensive literature on the subject, Cathy Perkus, COINTELPRO: The FBI's Secret 
War on Political Freedom (N.Y.: Monad Press, 1975) and Brian Click, War at Home: 
Covert Action Against U.S. Activists and What We Can Do About It (Boston: South End 
Press, 1989). According to Michael Linfield (Freedom Under Fire: U.S. Civil Liberties in 
Times of War (Boston: South End Press 1990), unconstitutional restriction on civil liberties 
are not war-time exceptions; they "are the rule" (p. 1). 
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Marxism focuses now on this now on that aspect of the multidimensional social reality. For 
instance, the once important contributions of political economy of education (reproduction 
theories) tend to be replaced by an evolving focus on the role of the state in educational 
process; political economy approaches are soon replaced by cultural studies approaches; 
domination is replaced by resistance or the possibility of resistance. As is the case in liberal-
pluralist approaches, few of the findings are integrated into any theory since such a 
dialectical connection between theory and practice or theory and data does not exist. 
Case studies generate extensive data or findings that may be of diverse theoretical 
relevance. In terms of state-education relations, this study has found close interconnections 
between the state, its educational policy, and social and economic policy. Under conditions 
of change in the political system in Iran (monarchy to theocracy), educational policy aimed at 
consolidating state power (under conditions of factional conflicts and the conflict between the 
entire state and opposition forces), building an "Islamic economy" and Islamizing society in 
general. Educational policy, in this case, could not be adequately explained if it had been 
examined independentiy from economic and political strategy. In this case, the state was not 
autonomous from production relations, social classes and state-building. 
The major theoretical contribution of this study was a critique of Neo-Marxist theories 
of the state and education. Contemporary critical theory, benefiting from multiple 
intellectual sources including Marxism, has proved more adequate than mainstream positivist 
social sciences. This study argued, however, that Neo-Marxism carries the weaknesses of 
liberal-pluralist theories by rejecting the dialectical relationship between the state and 
economy, education and the economy or, more generally, the base and superstructure. Based 
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on data from Iran and societies undergoing socialist revolution, this study argued that 
classical Marxist theory provides a more adequate explanation of the complex and 
contradictory interconnections and interdependence between the state and education. 
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I. Dissertations and Papers 
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1979 Education and Theories of the State. Unpublished Study prepared for 
the National Institute of Education. 
Foran, John 
1988 Social Structure and Social Change in Iran from 1500 to 1979. Ph. D. 
dissertation, University of California at Berkeley. 
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Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 
California. 
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Higher Education of Iran. M.A. Equivalency Paper, Department of 
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the Kurdish Language, 1918-1985. Ph. D. dissertation, Institute of 
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dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 
n . Interviews 
Azad, March 19, 1987 Toronto, Canada 
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Five Students , September 10, 1989 Toronto, Canada 
Manuchehr, March 24, 1989 Windsor, Canada 
Members of National Society of banian Academics, November 6, 1983 Paris, France 
Mina, March 19, 1989 Toronto, Canada 
Nine Students, January 5, 1985 Champaign-Urbana, U.S.A. 
Dr. Pakdaman, November 6, 1983 Paris, France 
Soheila, October 10, 1982 Shiraz, ban 
C. Periodicals 
The press is an indespensable source for research on contemporary banian society. 
However, in ban, as in other countries, the press is not a neutral observer or chronicler of 
events. In spite of strict censorship exercised by the monarchical and Islamic regimes, the 
press reflects different political and ideological perspectives. This is true especially during 
periods of political crisis when the central governments are not able to conduct a firm control 
of the press. The purpose of the following list is to provide brief information on the history 
and political affiliations of the journals used in this study. 
Adlne [Friday], monthly, Tehran, (No. 1, Azar 1364/November-December 1985). 
A "scientific, cultural, religious, artistic and social" magazine (published irregularly 
because of shortage of paper and other political restrictions); liberal, secular and 
nationalist in perspective, it provides occasional and mild criticism of the situation in 
ban an is tolerated by the government and disliked by the maktabts. 
Amuzesh va Farhang [Education and Culture], Shiraz, Vol. 1, Winter 1358/1979. 
Quartery publication of the Radical Society of Faculty Members at Shiraz University 
(see 3.2.3). 
Andtshe-ye AzOd [Free Thought], Tehran, New Series, Year One, No. 6, 15 Khurdad 
1359/1980. 
Publication of banian Writers Association, speial issue on the university. 
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AyandegOn [Those Coming in Future], Tehran, No. 1, Dec. 16, 1967 
Daily paper; joined the anti-Shah movement and the press strike in 1978 ; took a 
nationalist stance after the revolution and was critical of the social, political and 
economic situation of ban under the Islamic Republic; was attacked and ransacked by 
the government-led "clubweilders" and closed down on August 8, 1979. 
Besuy-e Ayande [Towards Future], Vol. 1, No. 3, Tir 1327/June-July 1978. 
BesOye AzOdt [Towards Freedom] 
Baltan-e Khabart [News Bulletin], Tehran, No. 1, 20 Urdibeheshet 1357/May 10, 1978. 
Produced by the faculty members of Aryamehr University, it was the first periodical 
published without a licence from the government; it focused on the struggle at the 
university and provided news about other anti-regime activities. 
DOneshgOh-e EnqelOb [University of Revolution], Tehran, No. 1, 23 Khurdad 1360/June 13, 
1981. 
Organ of University Crusade (see 2.4.5.2), deals primarily with the Islamization of 
higher education and propagates the views of the maktabts. 
Enqelab-e EslOmt [Islamic Revolution], Tehran, Daily, since 1979. 
Organ of former President Bani-Sadr, as a "liberal Islamic" paper, it engaged in inter-
faction controversies and exposed the maktabts; was suppressed after the downfall of 
Bani-Sadr and is continuing publication, in reduced form and frequency, in Europe. 
Ettela'at [Information], Daily, Tehran, No. 1, July 10, 1926 
Major daily paper, was a staunchly pro-Shah paper before the revolution; took anti-
Shah stance and joined the press strike of 1978; was suppressed in 1979 and 
controlled by the Islamic government. 
Ferdowst [Ferdowsi], Weekly, Tehran, No. 1075, Year 24, 16 Murdad 1351/August 7, 
1972. 
Political and social magazine, liberal, attempting to pose as independent from the 
Shah's government. 
JumhOrt-ye EslOmt [Islamic Republic], Daily, Terhran, since 1979. 
Organ of the Islamic Republic Party; as a maktabtpaper it engaged in inter-factional 
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ideological and political conflicts; stauncly against communists, leftists and 
nationalists. 
Junbesh [Movement], No. 4, 20 Khurdad 1356/May 10, 1977. 
Hambastegt [Solidarity], Tehran, No. 4, 26 Azar 1357/December 27, 1978. 
Organ of National Organization of banian Academics (see 2.2.3) and banian Writers 
Association (leftist, secular, nationalist). 
Kayhan Havai [Air edition of Kayan], Tehran daily 
Weekly air edition of Tehran daily produced and controled by the Islamic government 
targeted to banians abroad; pro-maktabt (started as pro-Shah air edition). 
Kavoshgar [The Inquirer], Quarterly, 3 issues published 
Published in New York, the journal carries research articles by the former faculty 
members of banian universities who were involved in the National Organization of 
banian Academics and ( see 2.2.3) other democratic, secular organizations; rich in 
history of the faculty and student activism in banian universities. 
eutuuuiiuMnc-yc ruiruuigt-Zftcinu i |owidi-VsUiiiuoi ntwausiusij 
Published by Islamic Republic's Islamic Propaganda Organization (Sazman-e 
Tabfighat-e Eslami) in Tehran, the confidential newsletter provides news, research 
and analysis about political, social and cultural opposition to the Islamic state. It aims 
at providing "classified news" that is censored in government-controlled media and is 
sent to selected individuals in the government. Issues of the publication leaked to an 
opposition group and were published in three volumes in 1989. See Barguztde't as 
KhabarnOme-ye Dakhell-ye Rezhttn (AsnOdt dar EfshO-ye Rezhtm az Zaban-e 
Khudesh), (Selection from the Internal Publication of theHslamic] Regime (Documents 
Exposing Regime in its Own Words), Daftar-e Sewum, Dey-Mah 1368 (Cover page: 
London and Sweden: Andeesheh va Peykar Publications). 
KhabarnOme-ye Pazhuhesht-ye Sharif [Sharif Research Newsletter], Tehran, Year 2, No. 4, 
25 Urdibeheshet 1364/May 15, 1985. 
Khalq-e MusalmOn [Muslim people], New Series, No. 14, 20 Aban 1358/November 11, 
1979. 
Organ of Islamic People's Republican Party, it reflected the political position of 
Ayatollah Shari'atmadari who was pro-Shah before the revolution; the paper was 
critical of velayat-e faqth and the maktabts; it was suppressed after Shari'atmadari 
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was demoted by the government. 
Kayhan [Cosmos], Daily, Tehran, No. 1, May 24, 1941 
Second major daily, joined the press strike of 1978 during the anti-Shah revolution; 
after the revolution, it was an independent, secular, nationalist paper; was suppressed 
and appropriated by the Islamic regime in 1979. 
Nehzat [Resurgence], 30 Urdibehesht 1356/April 20, 1977. 
Nimeye Digar [The Other Half], U.S., No. 1, Spring 1363/1984. 
"Persian language feminist journal," publishes academic research on banian women. 
PayghOm-e Emruz (Today's Message], Tehran, Daily, 1959-79 
Joined the press strike of 1978; critical of the Islamic regime, it was ransacked and 
closed down in 1979. 
PayOm-e Jebhe-ye Mellt [Message of the National Front], 28 Urdibehesht 
1359/May 18, 1980. 
Organ of the secular National Front. 
Ptruzt [Victory], Tehran, Monthly, No. 1, Mehr 1359/1980 
Leftist "political, social" magazine (six issues published) 
al-Qalam [The Pen], Tehran, No. 1, June 1981. 
English-language publication of ban University Press, Cultural Revolution Council. 
Rastakhtz [Ressurection], Tehran, Daily, 1975-1978 
Organ of ban's Ressurection Party established by Mohammad Reza Shah's regime. 
Shanzdahum-e Azar [December 7] Monthly, Europe and North America, 1960s 
and 1970s. 
Bulletin of the Confederation of banian Students, provided news and analysis of 
political, economic and social changes in ban and ban's increasing dependence on the 
U.S. The Confederation was the organization of banian students abroad (Europe, 
North America and Asia) and aimed at overthrowing the Shah's regime and 
establishing a democratic and independent state. 
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Tehran Musawar [Tehran Illustrated], Tehran, Weekly 
Pro-Shah before the revolution; joined the press strike 1978; critical of the Islamic 
regime, it was suppressed in 1979. 
YaghmO [Pillage], Tehran, Monthly, 1947 
A literary magazine. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXCERPTS FROM BANI-SADR'S BOOK 
At about the time of the Tabas Incident, * an affair took place which led to the 
closure of the universities. Some time before the closing of the universities, Mr. Ahmad 
Khomeini came to [see] see me one day and after [many] discussions, asked, "How about 
closing the university?" I answered: "Is anything wrong with us? Why close the 
university? Were we not saying that the Shah was building prisons instead of universities 
and...Did not the former regime propagate the view that the clergy were against science and 
progress?" He said, "But the university is a center of provocation against the Revolution." I 
said, "The center of provocation will not be eliminated by closing the university, it will [on 
the contrary] discredit us among the youth who are Iran's future and the 'provocateurs' will 
be credited. We will lose the young generation. If we have followers in the university 
today, after the closing we should either not reopen it or hand it all to our opponents." He 
said: "All right, then. Forget it..." 
He was present when Dr. Taqizade, then the chancellor of the National University, 
telephoned to say that Students following the Imam's Line had drawn up a plan for closing 
the university; their pretext was to calm down the fever of hostage-taking [that they] must 
create a new issue to maintain the fervour of public opinion. 
I asked Mr. Ahmad Khomeini, "Did you know about this when you posed the 
question?" He said, "I did not have exact knowledge [of it]." It was later I discovered that 
* The failed military operation of Carter's administration to rescue American hostages 
on April 25, 1979. 
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the decision to close the university had been taken in his presence, and in the presence of 
Mr. Khamene'i and Hashem Rafsanjani, and that he had been directed to inform me and to 
convince me to give my consent, but he had refrained from further pursuing the subject when 
he noticed my firm and resolute opposition. 
I went back to Khuzestan. On returning [to Tehran], Dr. Sheibani called to tell me 
that the Revolutionary Council had agreed to the closing of the university. I said, "I strongly 
oppose it and I consider this action to be both a conspiracy and a catastrophe." It was 
agreed to hold a meeting of the Council the next day at Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani's home and 
to reinvestigate the problem. 
The same night, student members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization brought me 
documents concerning the plan to close the university. 
They told me repeatedly and insistently, "Do not yield; this conspiracy is directly 
against you." They were very worried. I don't remember whether Mr. Mas'ud Rajavi came 
to see me or he gave me a call to talk about this, but he said, "They have formed this plot 
against you. The problem is more important and serious than these words. They have 
designed a series of conspiracies to make naught of the presidency." 
The next day, at the meeting of the Revolutionary Council, I asked, "Why do you 
want to close the university? [Tehran] university enjoys worldwide credibility and 
prestige...it has a record of struggle and a tradition of enmity with despotism and 
colonialism. This center has offered many victims since the opening of Dar al-Funoun 
[1851] and has carried the burden of struggle alone for long years." I told them, "Don't be 
deceived, you are laying an axe to the roots of the newly-established life of the Islamic 
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Republic. I am not the one who suffers from this conspiracy. This revolution is the product 
of the unity between the intellectuals and the clergy, or, the university and Fayziye [Islamic 
religious school at the holy city of Qum]. Now, Fayziye wants to close the university and it 
will be isolated..." 
They spent time to convince me that there was no conspiracy and that there was 
nothing against me; they made the following arguments for the necessity of closing the 
university: 
1) The university has turned into a center and a caravansary for political groups. All 
the rooms have been occupied by the groups. The university's paper and printing 
facilities are used by the groups. The university is no longer a university; it is rather 
a political arcade and there will be no instruction in the university; it has not been 
open since the victory of the revolution to close it now. And, more importantly, the 
armed resistance all over the country have been led from the university. The 
Feda'iyan-e Khalq have turned the university into a place for recruiting and center for 
their sabotage network all over the country; the exchange of individuals, arms and 
iftiGniiauGii Sic ou auiiiiiiiaicicu liuiu uic CafiipuS. 
2) The university professors fall within three groups: one consists of maktabt (about 
ten percent); another group opposes the revolution whether leftist or non-leftist (about 
ten percent); the remaining eighty percent are uncommitted (btnazar) and indifferent 
We will purge the university of the second percent and will reopen the university in 
an Islamic form with the remaining 90 percent still present. 
3) Neither the content of the courses nor their methods serve the purpose of training 
scholars and experts. The university produces hangers-on, not experts. 
I replied, "But it is possible to evacuate the university. One can ask the political 
groups to set up their offices outside the university. This requires, of course, their freedom 
of activity outside the university. The reason why they have turned the university into an 
arcade is because they do not enjoy freedom of activity outside i t So let us provide for 
freedom of activity outside the university and invite them to move their offices outside." 
They said, "They won't accept it." I said, "If they don't accept, we will invite the people 
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and will go to the university together and will vacate it..." 
Discussions were long...They made every argument in order to evade that basic 
reason: they wanted to close the universities, to strip the political groups of their university 
protection and to marginalize them; they wanted to carry out the Parliamentary elections 
without trouble or opposition. They wanted to discredit the President from the very 
beginning so that he could not resist their plans of action later, they wanted to throw the 
country into a series of crises and, by applying a policy of purging, get rid of all opponents 
of the monopolist government; they wanted to carry out, under the excuse of anti-American 
sentiment, a general plan to develop the revolution into a counter-revolution and, after they 
were recognized by the world as powerful owners of the country, to create a stabilized 
regime through dependence on the dominant powers. Ayat's famous tape which had not 
been disclosed yet, made it clear that the closing of the university was part of an extensive 
project. You remember that Ayat had said in that tape: "This time we have made 
arrangements which do not i%d to something similar to the closing of the university; this 
time, Bani-Sadr has no way out and"...The creeping coup d'etat had not yet been carried out 
step by step and to the end. Now [after ousting of Bani-Sadr] that all of it has been carried 
out, it is well known to everyone that the necessity of achieving all the above-mentioned 
aims had led them to formulate the plan of closing the universities. 
In any event, it was decided not to close the university but rather to keep it open till 
June 5 and, after that, they would engage in a "Cultural Revolution" and reopen the 
university on a new basis...But they did not want a cultural revolution; they wanted an 
obedient university. I went to see the Imam. He agreed with the proposal. It was agreed to 
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give the political groups three days to vacate the universities. We made the decision on 
Friday. They must be gone by Tuesday. Since the Mujahedln-e Khalq had themselves 
informed [me] of the affair (of course, Dr. Taqizade, too, had been given the same 
information), they tried for the success of the proposals. It had been agreed that the 
[Revolutionary] Kumttes and the Guards should avoid any conflict with the political groups in 
the university till Tuesday. One day before the deadline, representatives of Feda'yan-e 
Khalq came in the morning to see me and said, "We know that the 'Cultural Revolution' is a 
pretext; the closing of the university as a requirement for carrying out the cultural revolution 
is also a pretext. There is an extensive conspiracy in the making and we are prepared to 
cooperate with you in neutralizing this conspiracy." They themselves proposed to vacate the 
university and not play into the hands of the conspirators and they left. But conflicts began 
that afternoon. 
That evening, a colleague close to me told me that there were shootings on and off 
campus. I called Mr. Mahdavi Kani and said, "Had it not been agreed to abstain from any 
confrontation?" He said, "The provocation is from the opposition; how can one prevent all 
sides, under these conditions, from shooting?" I was surprised at this answer. You see how 
the imprudence of the opposition groups imposed the use of the Committee, arms, prison and 
the Revolutionary Court. The Mujahedm and the managing council of the university either 
came to see me or called to say they had talked to the groups inside the university and made 
them understand the situation and that they had been persuaded to vacate the university on 
the condition that the Committee would not cause trouble. Dr. Taqizade, Pir Husseini and 
Hossein went there. Husseini dared to talk over the loud-speakers and tell people: "I have 
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come from the President; he wants you to disperse from the university." And people 
obeyed. The Feda'iyan, too, informed [me] apparently about 2:00 a.m. that they had 
vacated the premises. 
When the vacating of the university through discussions was raised in the 
Revolutionary Council later, these gentlemen (hazardt) answered: "Without these shootings, 
they would not have vacated that easily!"... 
Source: Translated from the Persian text of Bani-Sadr (1982a: 127-132). A slightly different 
version appears in Bani-Sadr (1982b: 123-28). 
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APPENDIX B 
THE NECESSITY OF A CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
DECREE BY IMAM KHOMEINI 
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful 
For some time now, the necessity for a cultural revolution as an Islamic obligation 
has been felt by the Islamic people of Iran. However, no effective measure has been taken 
in this respect and the Islamic people of Iran and particularly our faithful and committed 
students are anxious lest trouble-makers and conspirators take advantage of the present 
situation - as they have occasionally done before. The Muslim nation of Iran, which stands 
by its Islamic principles, fears that opportunities may be lost and our educational system may 
remain what it was under the domination of the corrupt regime of the past when uncultured 
rulers put these important institutions at the service of colonialists. This state of affairs is 
readily confirmed witnessed by the fact that, apart from a limited number of faithful and 
committed university men and women who served Islam, in spite of the official policy of the 
universities, others offered our nation nothing but harm and damage. If this catastrophic 
state is allowed to continue - which is unfortunately what certain groups associated with 
foreign interests want - it will deliver a lethal blow to the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic 
Republic. Therefore, any negligence in this vital area will be tantamount to high treason to 
Islam and this Islamic country. 
Thus, I assign the following respected gentlemen: 
Mohammed-Javad Bahonar 
Mehdi Rabbani-Amlashi 
Hassan Habibi 
Abdol Karim Soroush 
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Shams Ale Ahmad 
Jalaloddin Farsi 
Ali Shariatmadari 
to establish an operational council and invite competent, and faithful people most committed 
to the Islamic Republic from among the Muslim professors and lecturers, employees and 
students and from among other faithful, committed and educated strata to form a council to 
prepare programmes in different fields, to devise educational and cultural policies for the 
universities on the basis of Islamic culture, to appoint committed and informed university 
teachers for educational purposes, and to investigate all programs and problems concerning 
this Islamic, educational revolution. It goes without saying that according to the above-
mentioned directive, all secondary schools and educational centers, which in the previous 
regime were administered on colonialist, heterodox and corrupt lines, will also be 
meticulously investigated so that my dear sons and daughters in this country will be immune 
from harm, corruption and heterodoxy. May God help these gentlemen to succeed in this 
important mission. I pray for the glory of Islam and the Islamic countries. 
As-salam-u-alaikum Ruhullah al-Mousavi al-Khomeini 
22nd Khurdad 1359/29th Rajab 1400 
(June 12, 1980) 
Source; al-Qalam, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1981, pp. 5-6. 
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